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Health policy research tends to focus on medical care practices and disease prevention while the 
emphasis on political determinants of health is thin at best. Past performance can oft be used as a 
predictor for future political decisions. Politicians, the electorate and healthcare professionals 
stand to benefit from such analysis as it improves decision making for policy delivery, election 
outcomes and healthcare distribution. By expanding the research relating to the political 
determinants of health our understanding stands to improve. When thinking of health, who is in 
government and how the health policies might change because of the ideologies associated with 
that party in power is exceptionally pertinent. The motivation of this research for the health field 
is to uncover what populist radical right (PRR) parties do when they are in government with 
regards to health policy. The motivation for the political science realm is to uncover whether 
parties actually matter, specifically in areas (such as health) that lay far from their programmatic 
focus. 
Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties are a relevant force in Western Europe as they enter 
governmental coalitions thereby having the ability to change policies; of which health policies, 
have escaped the keen eye of researchers. Being able to anticipate what these parties will do is 
fundamental not only to health and political science research, but also to countries’ on the verge 
of elections. This dissertation uses an in-depth case study approach to understand what the PRR 
in Austrian and Italian national and subnational governments actually accomplish with respect to 
health policies over time. Manifesto research is of little interest in this case, because the focus is 
on implementation, not promises. 
 xii 
Seeing as there is generally very little crossover between political science and health 
research, this research will add to the small literature available in the hopes of advancing the 
understanding of how PRR parties impact the development of a countries health systems thereby 
increasing the predictability of future policies and outcomes as well as generally inspiring more 
thought and action in this area. Who is in government matters immensely as the health policies 
parties implement, cut or change have serious consequences for the health of entire nations, 
especially given the current COVID-19 pandemic.  
This dissertation argues that, when in government with a conservative coalition partner, 
PRR parties impact health in four distinct ways: 1) they implement welfare chauvinist policies 
implying that health policies for natives are expanded while those for non-natives are decreased. 
2) they implement neoliberal policies. This suggests that they decrease the generosity of health 
policies across the board, but specifically for the non-native population. 3) They implement 
Conservative health policies. This would involve decreasing health sending and investment for 
all. 4) Finally, PRR parties in government tend to be anti-scientific in their decision making 
thereby going against expert opinions.  
This research finds that on a national level all four of the above-mentioned arguments are 
valid, although dependent on the cooperation of the coalition partner, while on a subnational 
level, the impact is very country specific. In Austria, healthcare at a subnational level was of an 
area controlled by the Social Democrats and therefore difficult to influence. In Italy, on the other 
hand, the impact the PRR had on healthcare depended very much on the culture, geography and 
history of the region.  
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 : Getting Acquainted with the PRR 
 
Populist radical right (PRR) parties have become an increasingly relevant force within the 
Western European electoral system over the past 30 years. They have entered governmental 
coalitions both nationally and sub-nationally and have more than tripled their share of seats in 
Parliament (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). The implication for this is that PRR parties have the 
power to make changes to national and sub-national policies, some of which – most noticeably 
health – have escaped the keen eye of researchers. Health, and in the broader sense, social 
policies, are integral parts of the welfare state whose importance lies in the ability to protect and 
promote the social and economic well-being of its people. It is therefore necessary to determine 
what PRR parties do with regards to health policies in countries where they are and have been 
directly involved in the decision-making process. Prime examples of relevant health and social 
policies are smoking bans, vaccination laws, minimum income laws and any policies excluding 
certain groups from obtaining welfare benefits, of which healthcare is a direct benefit. 
Noteworthy PRR parties include the French Rassemblement National (RN), the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and British National Party (BNP), the German Alternative 
for Germany (AfD), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Italian League (Lega), the Hungarian 
Jobbik, the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS), the Finns Party, the Danish People’s Party (DFP), 
the Vlaams Belang in Flanders, The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Dutch Freedom Party 
(PVV). These parties have dense enough international contacts to show that they view 
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themselves as a coherent party, though others, such as Hungary’s Fidesz party are PPR parties 
that formally belong to and benefit from belonging to other party families.  
These parties clearly do not have a monopoly on PRR rhetoric, policies, or style. Boris 
Johnson, Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro are particularly high-profile PRR leaders whose 
parties are not historically PRR parties. For this dissertation, however, I will only be looking at 
PRR parties from countries that have proportional representation systems. The incentive in a 
majoritarian system is to take over a major party (as with Trump and Johnson). Along with the 
limitation that I am looking at only PRR parties from countries with proportional representation, 
I have ensured that multiparty coalition politics will heavily influence what happens.  
While there is an increasing list of PRR parties, only some of these have actually ever 
entered into government. Since the mid-90s PRR parties from seven1 Western European 
countries have entered into a steady stream of national government coalitions (Akkerman et al., 
2016) (Figure 1) most generally at the expense of center parties (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Of 
these seven countries, at least two (Italy and Austria) have additionally seen PRR governmental 
coalitions form on sub-national levels. I will use four subnational level cases (Carinthia and 
Burgenland in Austria and Lombardy and Veneto in Italy) to leverage my national cases (Austria 
and Italy. Not only is going subnational innovative as there is a gap in PRR subnational research 
but, as mentioned, it will provide leverage.  
Populism is a “thin centered ideology” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p 6) or a political 
style that appeals to the common people and denounces the elites. Because of its thin-centered 
nature, populism is always attached to other, more thick-centered ideologies (nationalism, 
                                               
 
1 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. 
 3 
neoliberalism, socialism), implying that populism can take various different shapes. Although 
always conditional on the core concepts of populism (the people, the elites and the general will), 
these shapes can appeal to a variety of societies.  There are two common types of populism: the 
left and the right. Left wing populists parties tend to “combine a democratic socialist ideology 
with a strong populist discourse presenting themselves as the voice of the people” (Mudde, 
2004). While there are some strong left populists, most notably, the Five Star movement in Italy, 
Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece, there is little disagreement that the stronger force is on 
the right (Greer and Falkenbach, 2018).  Characterized by a core ideology of nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007: chapter 1), these parties are much more prevalent 
across Europe (Mudde, 2007) (see Figure 1 below).  
When thinking about PRR parties in government, it is clear that attempts to tighten 
migration (Bergmann et al., 2021; Paxton, 2020) and integration (Bolin et al., 2014; van Ostaijen 
and Scholten, 2014) policies will be made, however it is often difficult to determine how these 
parties will act and what they will pursue in terms of health policies once they enter national or 
subnational governments.  
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Figure 1 PRR parties in Western European governments 
 
Source: Authors own, adapted from (Mudde, 2013a).  
Past performance can oft be used as a predictor for future political decisions (Lebas and 
Euske, 2002). Politicians, the electorate and healthcare professionals’ benefit from such analysis 
as it will improve decision making for policy delivery, election outcomes and healthcare 
distribution. By expanding on the research relating to the political determinants of health as well 
as the social and welfare politics as they relate to health policy, outcome prediction will improve. 
When thinking of health and social policies, who is in government and how the health and social 
policies might change because of the ideologies associated with the party in power is 
exceptionally relevant. Being able to anticipate what these parties will do is fundamental not 
only to health and political science research, but also to countries on the verge of elections.  
In his 1984 book Do Parties Make a Difference?, political scientist Richard Rose, came to 
the conclusion that in Great Britain forces outside the control of parties (public opinion, societal 
changes and economic trends) impacted policies (Rose, 1984). This finding was re-evaluated in a 
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more recent literature review (Falkenbach, Bekker and Greer, 2019) finding that political parties 
and their ideologies affect health in two important ways: First, and most importantly, politics 
shape our health systems and establish whether a country has a national health system, a social 
insurance system or neither (Immergut, 1992). This means that politics frames how healthcare is 
thought about and approached within a society (Falkenbach and Greer, 2018): Is it considered a 
universal right available to all or is it an industry like the banking, textile or electronic industry 
subjected to the market with questionable regulations? Secondly, and as a result of the first point, 
political traditions affect health outcomes (Navarro, 2008). In essence, politics informs public 
policy and thus affects health outcomes for a given population. It is known that Social Democrats 
tend to favor redistributive health and welfare policies, thus generally improving health 
outcomes, whereas Christian Democrats and conservatives are more reserved in their 
redistributive policies (Huber and Stephens, 2001). The Populist Radical Right (PRR) 
preferences are well known as studies combing through manifestos demonstrate (Alonso and 
Fonseca, 2012; Akkerman, 2015); however, what policies they actually implement and enforce 
(specifically in the realm of health) remain enigmatic. 
There is generally very little crossover between political science and health research 
(Navarro, 2008) and this research will add to the small literature available in the hopes of 
inspiring more thought and action in this area. Who is in government matters immensely as the 
health and social policies parties implement, cut or change have serious consequences for the 
health of entire nations (Silviu, 2010). Therefore, the ultimate question that this research aims to 
answer is: What is it the PRR parties do in government regarding health policies? 
Before diving into the literature, it is important to establish whether parties, in general, 
even matter when it comes to developing health policies. 
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Do Parties Matter? 
A systematic review was conducted by Falkenbach et al. asking the question whether political 
parties matter to welfare and healthcare policy change? (Falkenbach et al., 2019). It was found 
that yes, political parties absolutely matter as they make a significant difference in transforming, 
retrenching and revising welfare policies and thereby also health policies. The article touched on 
three concluding points: 1) new theories on partisanship and welfare are necessary. These should 
focus on the interaction of partisanship with the structures of constitutional democracies 
including mandates (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the presence or absence of a major party, powerful 
unions, former union members (i.e. the ‘yellow vests’ in France), social partnerships and civil 
society on partisanship and politics as a whole. 2) The literature shows a significant gap in 
research on the relationship between partisanship and health and healthcare policies as a part of 
the welfare system. Given the changes in parties, the creation of new parties and particularly the 
increased influence of the PRR parties, it is necessary to know what these parties are doing in 
governments and especially how they are affecting the eligibility and accessibility of health and 
social policies in general. 3) As Social Democratic parties continue to lose support and power 
across OECD countries, the question of whether they will be able to revive themselves or who 
will replace them as proponents of welfare expansion (Beland and Oloomi, 2015; Scruggs and 
Allan, 2006) becomes increasingly relevant. It is clear from this comprehensive literature review 
that health policies, as a separate entity of the welfare system, are grossly understudied. 
 
The Populist Radical Right (PRR) 
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The literature exploring the phenomenon of the PRR in government largely focuses on 
how the PRR attained their support, very little is said about what they actually do when given a 
position of power and even less information can be found when looking specifically at what they 
do in terms of health.  
PRR parties:  
 share a core ideology that includes (at least) a combination of nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007: chapter 1). By nativism, I 
mean a xenophobic form of nationalism in which a mono-cultural nation-
state is the ideal and all non-natives (i.e., aliens) are perceived as a threat 
to the nation. Authoritarianism entails a strict belief in order and its 
stringent enforcement within society through discipline, law and order-
based policies. Finally, populism is defined as a thin ideology that 
considers society to be essentially divided between two antagonistic and 
homogeneous groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and wants 
politics to reflect the general will of the people (Mudde, 2014). 
 
 Given this fact, it is less than surprising that unemployment and resentment, leading to 
xenophobia were common areas of research. In the mid to late 90s2, for example, countries that 
were seen to have fairly low levels of unemployment (Austria, Switzerland, Italy, etc.) found 
themselves faced with the onset of globalization and thereby labor shortages. This stark 
realization led to the demand by industry to open the borders so that Eastern laborers could fill 
positions. This influx of new workers from different socio economic and cultural backgrounds 
led to the emergence of exclusionary populism (Betz, 2001; Griffin, 1999). In the words of 
Roger Griffen, there were many people in these countries who felt “threatened by the pace of 
change” (Griffin, 1999, pg. 14). The PRR parties capitalized on this fear, which fit perfectly into 
their existing rhetoric.  
                                               
 
2 For PRR party history predating the 1990s see (Mudde, 2013b). 
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This populist rhetoric developed not only into a general fear of what is different, but also 
a genuine resentment. This fear stems from loss of employment as a result of technological 
advancement. Researchers found that fearful or anxious citizens were more likely to 
acknowledge and be interested in political campaigns (Steenbergen and Ellis, 2006), making 
them easier targets for persuasion (Nai, 2018; Nai et al., 2017). This is exactly the psychological 
approach used by populists. Populist communication pits the people against the out of touch 
elites wherein they highlight both real and symbolic threats to society. Many of these threats 
surround the fear of unemployment, loss of economic prosperity or loss of cultural identity (Mols 
and Jetten, 2016). According to research in the realm of psychology, when fear is framed in 
terms of out-group issues, feelings of impending threats to in-groups increases (Huddy et al., 
2005). The result is increased solidarity amongst in-group members and the rejection of the out-
group (Bettencourt et al., 2001). Fear, in turn,  transforms into the resentment of these out-groups 
resulting in a hatred towards perceived enemies (immigrants, elites, refugees, etc.) (Salmela and 
Von Scheve, 2017).  
The Austrian case is perhaps the best case of diffuse resentment to appear in Europe 
(Betz, 2001). The then leader of Austria’s FPÖ, Jörg Haider, launched a movement criticizing 
the Austrians political correctness with a campaign slogan “He says what you think” (Betz, 
2002). By freeing the country of past burdens through open discourse and pardon, Haider found 
support in the older generation as well as from the youths that were tired of being reminded of 
their country’s history (Betz, 2001). His strategy was using the media to fuel resentment against 
political correctness. This case exemplifies research in this area, with further cases to be seen in 
the United States, Switzerland, France etc. (Betz, 2001, 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). 
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Immigration as a driving force of the radical right allure and success has been thoroughly 
researched. In fact, a recent study by E. Grande et al. shows that higher levels of politicization 
regarding immigration in the electoral arena can be attributed to the issue entrepreneurship of 
radical right populist challenger parties (Grande et al., 2019). Furthermore, a study by Podobnik 
et al. found that the radical right vote in a given country depends on the prevalence of 
immigrants in that country’s population (2016). Other researchers have elaborated on the allure 
of populist rhetoric using the common anti-immigration stance as a way to solidify the working 
class votes (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015; Golder, 2016; Greven, 2016; Ivarsflaten, 2008). 
An interesting development that has occurred over the last years with regards to the PRR and the 
issue of immigration is that many of the mainstream parties in Western Europe are “moving in 
the same direction as their more radical counterparts and have— to varying degrees—adopted 
similar approaches to immigration and integration as well (but not necessarily using the same 
rhetoric)” (Odmalm and Rydgren, 2019). With this development comes the natural risk that 
mainstream parties are fueling radical right party support through their adaptation of more 
restrictive immigration positions (Down and Han, 2019).  
Along with fear and resentment, according to (Grzymala-Busse, 2017), the rise of the 
PRR, and populism in general, can be divided into the four different causes: 1) Economic 
hardships, 2) International aspects such as increased support from Russia and bilateral 
coordination between populists, 3) The failure of mainstream parties, and finally, 4) Immigration 
posed both as a source of labor competition and a strain on the welfare system as well as a 
cultural threat. 
Efforts have been made to explore PRR parties, their appeal and why they are currently 
represented in many Western European countries parliaments (Röth et al., 2017). The most 
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obvious reason, perhaps, is the linking of PRR with economics. Samir Gandesha (2018) focuses 
on neo-liberal globalization as a potential reason for the rise of populism. In his article on 
Understanding Right and Left Populism, he uses David Harvey’s (2007) explanation of 
neoliberalism: 1) accumulation by dispossession; 2) deregulation; 3) privatization; and 4) an 
upward redistribution of wealth, to show that globalization has led to an increase of both 
economic insecurity and cultural anxiety. Three crucial reasons for these increases in fear are: 
the creation of surplus peoples, rising global inequality, and threats to identity (Gandesha, 2018). 
It is inherent that with increased globalization, certain jobs become superfluous. The argument 
therefore is that over time, with the growing number of people, jobs will decrease as they will 
become more and more automated (Shammas, 2019). This will imply that the lowest skilled 
workers, which consist of the majority of workers (Leigh, 2015), will not have jobs. This brings 
me to the second risk, namely that globalization leads to increased inequality (Berger, 2014), 
especially amongst low and middle income countries. This inequality is especially pronounced 
with regard to wages. Surprisingly, in a 2008 study on globalization and its impact on 
inequalities, researchers found that the “economic dimension of globalization has exacerbated  
industrial wage inequality in developed countries” (Dreher and Gaston, 2008, p 20) as opposed 
to low and middle income countries. This makes sense considering the appeal to PRR parties is 
predominately focused in developed, high income countries. The final risk that fuels PRR appeal 
is the fear of being left behind and the fear of increased diversity all of which poses a threat to 
identity (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015).  
What links these three fears in the PRR ideology is that they can all be pinned on 
immigrants. PRR parties and leaders have successfully used immigrants as a scapegoats to 
provide answers to the “globalization losers” (Teney et al., 2014). The PRR implement a rhetoric 
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that appeals to the minds of the impacted “Jobs are lost because too many immigrants are 
entering ‘our’ country”, “we are losing our jobs to China or India” or “immigrants are changing 
your culture, your language, your traditions”. 
In Italy for example, the Lega Nord (Northern League)3, as the party’s name would lead 
one to assume, previously garnered much support by using the South as a scapegoat. The LN 
appealed to northern voters because of their consistent criticism that the South was lazy and the 
North had to transfer their hard-earned resources to the South (Betz, 2001; Savelli, 1992). Today, 
the populist party under Matteo Salvini is simply known as Lega and choses to blame the 
European Union, specifically the “Euro” for much of the country’s financial troubles (Albertazzi 
et al., 2018). When a countries economy is not doing well, the citizens of a country want a reason 
and the far right can usually supply this in various forms: unemployment rates, resource 
distribution, and the EU’s influence over national politics and decision making (Grzymala-
Busse, 2017).  
The international aspects supporting the rise of the PRR, can generally be traced to Putin 
and his efforts to weaken the European Union as well as the tie between Europe and the United 
States allowing for an increase in his own power and importance (Grzymala-Busse, 2017). There 
is no question that Russia is involving itself more and more with Western countries domestic 
policies. For example, Putin helped finance LePen’s radical right party Front National in 2017 
(Klapsis, 2015; Oliker, 2017; Shekhovtsov, 2017), signed cooperation agreements with the 
Austrian FPÖ in 2016 and of course the involvement in the 2016 US presidential election 
                                               
 
3 The Lega Nord had been known as a regionalist populist party until Matteo Salvini took over the lead in 2013.  Now, 2018, the 
regionalist ideology has been replaced by an “empty form of nativist nationalism” (Albertazzi, Giovannini, and Seddone 2018, pg 
645) and the party is simply known as Lega. 
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(Oliker, 2017). In addition to Russia’s support for the PRR, there are also strong coalitions being 
formed between PRR parties, most notably the Hungarian Fidesz and the Polands PiS. Fidesz 
and PiS have united in the “defense of Europe against the madness of the left” and have 
supported one another when the EU has criticized them for their politics (Grzymala-Busse, 
2017). 
The third point, the failure of mainstream parties to contain the threat of the PRR, is 
perhaps what matters most; especially in countries like Poland and Hungary where both PRR 
parties govern without constraints and have no coalition partners or any other checks and 
balances. Centrist parties have been governing for most of the 20th century, however where these 
parties are weak, fail to articulate a clear vision and most importantly neglect to address the fears 
of the people, PRR parties arise. Particularly in Western Europe, the rise of the PRR “is a 
reaction to the failure of traditional parties’ ability to respond adequately in the eyes of the 
electorate” to issues surrounding mass migration and financial insecurity (Albertazzi and 
McDonnell, 2015; Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). PRR parties have, in part, found support 
because democratic politics have, in many ways, lost the ability to clearly address the frustrations 
of the people (Grzymala-Busse, 2017).  
It therefore comes as no surprise that there has been an attempt to understand the PRR’s 
inherent dissatisfaction and adversity towards traditional political parties. Here, research has 
found that suspicion toward the party system as well as a country’s elites has initiated much 
support from young, educated middle classes, which the populist right has effortlessly capitalized 
on (Betz, 2001; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). In his comparative analysis of the radical right in 
Western Europe, Herbert Kitschelt argues that the populist appeal derives from their strong 
opposition to systems that have dominated for decades (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Prominent 
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examples of this practice come from Austria, Italy and Switzerland where PRR parties (Austria’s 
FPÖ, Italy’s Lega and Switzerland’s Peoples Party SVP) adopted a strategy of rejecting and 
criticizing not only their colleagues on the left, but also those in the center right stating that they 
were abandoning their national and bourgeois roots (Betz, 2001; Diamanti, 1996; Graf, 1996; 
Leuzinger, 2017).  
Finally, immigration as a threat to a society’s culture and its workforce is clearly an 
important issue to PRR parties. However, PRR parties do not see immigration as their most 
important issue, rather these parties “link their ideological core of xenophobic nationalism to the 
increasing 'uneasiness' and even resentment among parts of the electorate” thereby using the 
immigration as a catalyst for electoral success (Mudde, 1999, p 192). What this implies, 
according to Mudde, is that immigration is not the PRR’s only catalyst issue, however it is one 
that has, over the years, reoccurred. Its most recent reoccurrence was during the 2015 migration 
crisis in Europe.  
Despite all the research surrounding the rise of the PRR and the policies they proclaim to 
follow, there remains a gap in the literature when thinking about how these PRR parties act once 
they enter government. Two relevant Oxford handbooks have been published on populism 
(Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Rydgren 2018) with 68 chapters between them. One is about impact. 
Although it is important to know why and how PRR parties come about, we are currently in a 
situation where it is arguably more important to be able to understand what they do when they 
hold governmental positions and the policies they implement in that position.  
 
The PRR in Government 
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With sufficient literature covering the rise of PRR parties and their appeal to Western 
Europeans, researchers began focusing on concrete action points and policies that PRR parties in 
governing coalitions actually implemented.  
As could be predicted, the scholarly focus was predominately on immigration and 
migration policies as these were considered the PRR domain (Akkerman, 2012; Ivarsflaten, 
2008; Mudde, 2007) and one of the main reasons the parties were elected in the first place (Van 
Der Brug et al., 2000). The main findings in this literature can be summarized as: 
1) Anti-immigration policies are intensively promoted and supported (Akkerman, 2012; 
Bale, 2008; Bale et al., 2010; Jungar and Jupskås, 2014; Mudde, 2010; Spanje, 2010; Zaslove, 
2008). Timely examples of this are Chancellor Kurz’ vehement opposition to the involvement of 
European countries in the rescue of migrants in the Mediterranean stating that “Because of the 
sea rescue more people had made their way [to Europe] and refugee smugglers have earned 
more, and this had resulted in more deaths. You have to destroy the smuggler business model 
instead of supporting it” (Hermann, 2020). Former Italian Minister of interior, Mateo Salvini 
from the PPR party “Lega”, also pledged to begin deporting illegal migrants (Curz, 2017).  
2) There are increased restrictions in integration policies (Akkerman, 2012; Akkerman 
and De Lange, 2012; Bale, 2008; Luther, 2011; Lutz, n.d.; Zaslove, 2004). The most current 
example can be taken from Austria where the ÖVP/FPÖ government (Kurz I, 2017-2019) 
decided to reduce benefits to Hungarians, Poles, Romanians and Slovaks working in Austria if 
their children lived in their home country (Bild.de, 2019). This model is still in effect today even 
though the FPÖ is no longer in government. 
3) When PRR parties are successful and anti-immigration policies become salient, all 
other parties, particularly the more center right parties are incentivized to take up a more 
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restrictive position on immigration (Bale, 2008; Bale et al., 2010; Spanje, 2010). We can see this 
example in both Austria and Italy with both coalition partners the Austrian Peoples’ Party (ÖVP) 
and the 5 Star Movement in Italy tightening their positions on immigration and migration to 
follow suit with their radical right partners. Again, we can look to Austria for an example where 
the ÖVP and Green party coalition (Kurz II, 2000 - Present) have agreed that “In the case of 
asylum, the systematic deportation of third-country nationals whose protection status has been 
revoked will continue and the headscarf ban that currently applies in kindergartens and primary 
schools will be extended to young people up to 14 years of age” (Focus, 2020). 
4) Most importantly, many of the policies that the PRR would like to implement in 
regards to anti-immigration, integration restrictions, etc. are deemed unconstitutional by the 
national or European Court of Justice or are not supported by the coalition members (Afonso, 
2014; Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Heinisch, 2003b; Zaslove, 2012). In 2002, for example, the 
Austrian minister of interior attempted to pass a directive withdrawing state support from all 
asylum seekers except Afghanis and Iraqis, which was considered a breach of human rights by 
the Austrian High court and withdrawn (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). The reduction of benefits 
to the children of foreign nationals working in Austria mentioned in point 2 has also been 
deemed unconstitutional by the European Court of Justice, but this was simply ignored by the 
previous ÖVP/FPÖ government in 2019. Former Minister of Family Affairs, Juliane Bogner-
Strauß (ÖVP), stated: “We [will] continue to assume that the solution we have chosen is 
compatible with European law” (Bild.de, 2019). 
While these political areas are of importance, they do not give a holistic view of the 
PRRs impact on policies when in government and they do not show how or if the welfare system 
changes under PRR rule.  
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The social policies that the PRR parties have implemented or supported have generally 
been excluded from research up until 2017, and even then, the research is thin at best. Previous 
research (Afonso 2014; Bale 2003; Ennser-Jedenastik 2016; Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der 
Brug 2014; van Spanje 2010; Williams 2006) on the social policy impact of PRR in government 
can generally be summarized as nonexistent (Muis and Immerzeel, 2017) with a few exceptions.  
In his analysis of pension reforms during the PRR participation in the Austrian, Dutch 
and Swiss governments, Afonso (2014) finds that although these parties claim to support social 
benefits, when they find themselves in office however, these promises become difficult to follow 
through on.  Welfare and health policies prove to be rather unsafe areas for PRR parties when in 
government as they are faced with a “tradeoff between office and votes” (Afonso 2014, pg 18).   
Bale (2003) chose to focus on the restrictions that arose for PRR parties in government 
due to their center right coalition partner. Particularly in economic policies, the center right 
refused to back more interventionalist and nationalistic economic policies and instead put forth 
more market liberal policies (Bale, 2003). He hints on a similar trend for social policies but fails 
to elaborate and moves onto immigration policies.  
The social policy profile of the PRR party in Austria is analyzed by Ennser-Jedenastik 
(2016) coming to the conclusion that the FPÖ follows a welfare chauvinist approach in their 
welfare policies demanding generous benefits for citizens while limiting access to foreigners 
(Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). 
The research on PRR polices conducted by Rooduijn et al (2014) combs through party 
manifestos and concludes that PRR parties change their programs once achieving electoral 
success and adapt their policies more towards the ones followed by their coalition partner 
(Rooduijn et al., 2014).  
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In her chapter on PRR impact, Williams (2006) never strayed far from the theme of 
immigration as the main source of all social an economic concerns within a given country and 
summed up her chapter with the identification of the European Parliament as an important source 
of PRR influence as well as the general inclusivity of institutional effects on the PRR (Williams 
2006).  
Judging from these results it is unclear whether PRR parties in government simply had a 
limited impact on social policies or whether the research was focusing more on immigration and 
migration policies because they were timelier subjects to study. After 2017, there are a few 
articles (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018; Scott L. Greer, 2017; Röth et al., 2018) that push the envelope 
a bit further on the topic of PRR parties and social policies however none of them touch 
specifically on health policy, other than (Falkenbach & Greer, 2018). This latter article asserts 
that PRR parties in government de-emphasize the issue of health or social policies preferring to 
turn the focus instead on immigration and migration. The article postulates that these parties tend 
to pursue exclusionary policies, and that it is unclear whether these policies increase or decrease 
benefits for the “native” population. The authors are, however, unable to specify what policies 
the PRR tend to follow and if their policies are actually beneficial to their voter base (Falkenbach 
& Greer, 2018).  
In his 2017 article on Medicine, public health and the PRR, Greer asserts that the populist 
radical right is a “threat to [the] core values of medicine and public health even when they hold 
office in a functioning democratic system”, but fails to elaborate on this point (Scott L. Greer, 
2017). Röth et al. performed the first mixed-methods comparative study on the PRR socio-
economic impact finding that “these parties not only refrain from welfare state retrenchment but 
are also less inclined to engage in deregulation compared with right-wing governments without 
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PRR participation.” In addition, they state that PRR parties find it “easier to liberalize in domains 
that are not very salient or technical (such as economic regulation) than in ones that are highly 
politicized (such as welfare issues)” (Röth et al., 2018). Ennser-Jedenastik adds to the theoretical 
literature on the PRR and welfare chauvinism (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) in that he finds 
“social insurance systems [to] be more resilient in the face of welfare chauvinistic rhetoric than 
universal or means tested benefits as they award benefits based on an individual’s contribution 
and they cut [them] against the impulse of pitting the native in-group against the non-native out-
group” (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). 
 
Summary of Finings 
The goal of this dissertation was to assess how PRR parties in government impact health policies 
across two countries and four subnational regions within those countries. This dissertation found 
that elements of welfare chauvinism, increasing benefits for the native population while 
simultaneously decreasing them for the outgroup, were common within the health policies 
passed by the PRR in government. The effectiveness of these policies depended on two 
fundamental variables: 1) the coalition partners willingness to agree to such policies and 2) the 
strength of the institutional courts within the country.  
 The willingness of the coalition partner generally depends on tow aspects: their strength 
and their political orientation. This implies that the coalition partner is typically stronger than the 
PRR party, which often makes it difficult for the PRR party to implement its desired policies.  In 
most cases, however, PRR parties form coalitions with a stronger center right party. With such a 
constellation, the PRR party often finds support for their proposed health policies.  
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  The second approach that PRR parties in government were found to take is the liberal 
chauvinist one. Policies following this approach typically decrease benefits for all with the 
strongest impact on outgroups. While the PRR’s welfare chauvinist policies were often hindered 
by constitutional rulings as well as by an unwilling coalition partner, liberal chauvinist policies 
were generally supported by the coalition partner (if of conservative orientation) and rarely ever 
questioned by the courts. As previously mentioned, Conservative, or center right parties, most 
often form coalitions with the PRR. In such cases liberal chauvinist policies, also within the 
realm of health, are not uncommon as they serve the interest of both political parties: a decrease 
in spending (conservatives) while also making life more difficult for outgroups (PRR). 
 Countries like Austria, where health policies are primarily made on the national level, 
will find that the PRR can have a greater impact when they hold positions in the national 
government. On the other hand, countries like Italy, where healthcare has devolved to the 




There was a great deal of research on populist parties and their voters, but very little on their 
effects on policy, and what was there, was often more of a hypothetical or an assertion in an 
editorial. Amazingly, at the intersection of two of the biggest bodies of literature today, we find 
very little. We do not know what populists do to health or health policy when they are in 
government.  
It is evident that research surrounding the impact of PRR parties on health policies is 
slim, therefore the task this book has set out for itself is to not only add and expand on the 
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existing literature, but to also contribute relevant data so that governmental coalitions with the 
PRR and their impact on health may be better understood across Western European countries. 
The remainder of the book follows the following outline. In Chapter 2, I examine the 
literature related to the welfare state, welfare chauvinism and partisanship. In this chapter, I 
argue that the PRR parties follow one of two strategies with regards to welfare politics. They 
either follow a welfare chauvinistic, restricting benefits to the native population and excluding 
immigrants, path or push towards a neoliberalistic, a general reduction of benefits to all, one. In 
Chapter 3, I highlight the methods used for this research project. To understand what health and 
social policies PRR parties follow when in government, I conducted in-depth comparative case 
studies across two countries and five regions. Selection is of utmost importance for case studies. 
For the national studies, the cases of Austria and Italy were most relevant as they are the 
countries that have had PRR parties in government over the longest period of time.4 The cases 
selected for study were Austria and Italy on the national level and the provinces of Burgenland 
and Kärnten (both in Austria) as well as the regions of Lombardy and Veneto (both in Italy) on 
the subnational level. In order to understand variations in policies across the cases, I collected 
two types of data. First, I conducted semi-structured key informant interviews across each of the 
case study states, employing stratified sampling and chain sampling methods within each country 
and region. Second, I collected and analyzed documents, including written and oral legislative 
testimonies, legal material, and governmental reports related to the policies and politics of PRR 
parties. 
                                               
 
4 The SVP in Switzerland have of course been in government the longest but due to the difficulty in comparing Swiss politics to 
other Western European countries, this case option was excluded. 
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In chapters 4 and 5, I individually analyze both national cases. Beginning first with 
Austria in chapter 4 and then moving to the national case of Italy in chapter 5. In chapters 6 and 
7 I move to the subnational level in both countries. Chapter 6 looks at the provinces of Carinthia 
and Burgenland, while chapter 7 explores the regions of Lombardy and Veneto. In Chapter 8, I 
use the COVID-19 pandemic to look more deeply at the PRR actions within my cases. Although 
the FPÖ was and is not in power during the pandemic, I look to how they react to COVID-19 as 
a party in opposition. The interesting exploration occurs on a subnational level in Italy where the 
Lega were and are still in government making these exceptionally interesting cases to explore in 
the midst of a world-wide pandemic to see how PRR parties impact health. In chapter 9, I 
provide an overview of the key themes that emerged collectively across the cases and explore 





 : Welfare Chauvinism vs. Welfare Austerity 
 
Most European states enjoy a well-entrenched welfare system that has always had the purpose of 
serving as a safety net for the people. Health and social policies fall nicely into the category of 
the welfare system, however, health alone, as an important entity of the European welfare model, 
has not yet been considered within previous research on this topic. As established in the previous 
chapter, political parties do, in fact, impact health policies; however, in order to properly study 
these policies, it is helpful to determine what type of welfare politics are being implemented in a 
given country.  
 This chapter will progress where chapter 1 left off. It will continue to convince the reader 
that further investigation into the health policies passed by parties in government are necessary 
not only within political science research, but also within public health research. This chapter 
will begin by looking at the welfare state theory in order to prove that, as touched on in chapter 
1, parties’ matter when thinking about policies. Then, the chapter will focus on how a specific 
party, the PRR, approaches welfare policies.  
 Backing up just a bit, some definitional work is necessary before we continue talking 
about the existing welfare theories. First of all, a political party, as I will use the term throughout 
this dissertation, is “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing 
through elections, candidates in public office” (Sartori, 1976). Parties serve crucial functions as 
they coordinate politicians within legislatures and between different (e.g. local and central) 
governments, structure political careers and recruitment, create networks of diffuse reciprocity 
between politicians over time and provide labels voters can understand (Aldrich, 1995). 
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Collectively, parties form party systems. This is simply the sum of parties and their relationships 
to one another, typically mapped in some sort of ideological space (e.g., left-right). Parties in 
Europe, and the world, form families based on their shared predispositions, such as Social 
Democratic, Liberal, Christian Democratic or the Populist Radical Right, and they often 
coordinate their actions across borders. An individual’s preference for the victory of one party 
over another is known as partisanship. In other words, partisanship implies party identification 
and is the result of affective attachment due to socialization (Campbell et al., 1980; Settle et al., 
2009) that stems from childhood and reflects ones familiar surroundings (Hyman, 1959). 
 Several theories surrounding the welfare debate help us understand how political parties, 
political systems and partisanship can relate to the welfare state. This is important because it 
motivates how political parties think about the welfare state and ultimately what kinds of welfare 
policies parties in government pass.  
 
Part I: Welfare State Theory 
There are two dominate theories in the partisanship debate that have always been accepted and 
used in the literature to explain how partisanship influences the direction of a government as it 
relates specifically to welfare policies.  The first is the Power Resource Theory also known as the 
“old politics perspective” (Giger and Nelson, 2011). This theory posits that partisanship matters 
greatly, especially in an era of austerity and retrenchment.  The general notion assumes that 
parties of the Right retrench more than those of the Left and parties of the Left and unions are 
associated with welfare state expansion (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Korpi, 1983; Korpi and 
Palme, 2003). The perspective is supported by Walter Korpi and colleagues and states that by 
mobilizing the citizens from the lower socio-economic ranks the social democratic parties and 
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their allies are able to be electorally successful, which in turn is vital for the survival of the 
welfare state (Korpi, 2003; Korpi and Palme, 2003). It holds that Left wing parties are generally 
in support of welfare expansion because they represent working class interests (Häusermann et 
al., 2013) and the generosity of welfare will vary with the strength of the Left wing party. In 
addition, many supporters of this perspective support the notion that welfare politics can still be 
considered the same democratic class struggle it was over 50 years ago (Häusermann et al., 
2013). Essentially, the PRT explains that the success of social democratic parties began to 
decrease because working class power resources diminished (Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015). 
This in turn gave rise to a social democratic party whose core voting base was made up of civil 
servants. The bottom line: partisanship matters. 
The Christian Democratic dimension of the Power Resource Theory highlights the 
contrasting  effects of Christian Democracy and Social Democracy on social benefit expenditures 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990a; Huber et al., 1993), among others. This dimension finds that Christian 
Democrats also strive to expand the welfare state, however in a much less egalitarian (Levy, 
2001) way compared with the Social Democrats (Huber et al., 1993). Again, the bottom line: 
partisanship matters. 
The second dominate theory of the welfare state is the New Politics Approach. This 
approach considers the governmental budget problem through the lens of demographic changes 
such as population aging and pension costs, decreasing economic growth rates and a general 
increase in social expenditures. The New Politics Approach was promoted most strongly by Paul 
Pierson who consistently argues that because we live in an ‘era of austerity’ partisan differences 
have little influence on the direction and scope of welfare state reform and thus welfare and 
social policy (Pierson, 1995, 1996, 1998). When looking solely at social policy, this perspective 
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posits that it is difficult for parties of any color to support a policy of retrenchment because of the 
popularity of the welfare state (Albertazzi and Mcdonnell, 2008). This same conclusion is drawn 
when looking particularly at healthcare: The partisan character of government no longer plays a 
significant role in determining changes in public responsibility. The bottom line: particularly in 
periods of retrenchment and austerity, partisanship ceases to matter.  
The disagreement between the two approaches can be found in how they view the role of 
partisanship as it pertains to welfare generosity. As previously mentioned, the Power Resource 
Theory believes that partisanship matters despite austerity measures wherein the Left is more 
likely to expand welfare generosity and the right is more likely to retrench. The opposing view of 
the New Politics approach proclaims that partisanship in an era of austerity no longer matters 
because neither the Left or the Right will dare cut welfare benefits for fear of losing the support 
of their constituencies. Other theories exist as well, but they are marginal and not widely 
represented within the literature. Market liberalism supports the notion that market liberal parties 
find it easier to retrench welfare policies because voters themselves have moved into a more 
libertarian policy space (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995) while the contingency theory, Nixon Goes 
to China, posits that voters trust parties that were historically pro welfare state and are more 
likely to forgive these parties should they retrench (Giger and Nelson, 2011). 
Much of the literature in the review conducted by Falkenbach et. al., finds that the Power 
Resource Theory seems to fit with results from 1945 to the mid-1970s (Falkenbach et al., 2019), 
while some researchers argue its relevance until the 1980s (Kittel and Obinger, 2003). The years 
between 1945 and 1970 were known as the “golden age of the welfare state” (Wincott, 2013) 
where there were considerable distinctions between Left and Right leaning regimes (Esping-
Andersen, 1990a; Huber et al., 1993). The Left expanded welfare generosity whereas the Right 
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chose to, more often than not, keep the status quo. This was mostly due to an increase in 
economic globalization as well as centrally organized labor and strong labor movements (Hicks 
and Freeman, 1992) which consequently led to a decrease in unemployment (Kwon and 
Pontusson, 2005). During this “golden age”, the Left encouraged spending on social services 
which led to increased participation in the labor market, particularly among women, and 
stimulated strong labor movements (Levy, 2001). Right-wing governments, on the other hand, 
were typically associated with promoting less egalitarian welfare systems (Levy, 2001) focusing 
instead on the liberalization and privatization of the product markets. By the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s (some argue a decade later—1990s (Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Levy, 2001)) 
researchers began questioning the importance of partisanship as alternative explanations for 
welfare policy change emerged: growth was slowing, unemployment was increasing (Hicks and 
Freeman, 1992; Kwon and Pontusson, 2005; Scruggs and Allan, 2006), globalization was 
flourishing (Hicks and Freeman, 1992; Starke et al., 2008) and the population was rapidly 
ageing, all of which resulted in a changing welfare burden on society, which formed the basis of 
welfare redistribution. This initially led to slower welfare expansion. One researcher even made 
the claim that: “During periods of fiscal difficulty, a government with a strong funding base, 
regardless of its partisanship and the original intentions of policy makers, has resisted welfare 
retrenchment” (Kato, 2003 p. 40). It was at this time, the late 1970s to the early 1990s, that the 
New Politics Approach garnered support with its theory that partisanship no longer mattered, as 
both the Left and the Right were afraid to cut welfare benefits (Wolf et al., 2014). This 
perspective was then challenged by the Power Resource Theory with the argument that 
partisanship still mattered and continued to affect welfare outcomes in arguably conventional 
ways (Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Kwon and Pontusson, 2005). Allan and Scruggs, e.g. showed in 
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their work that since the 1980s Right-wing governments were generally associated with welfare 
retrenchment (Allan and Scruggs, 2004). 
In essence, the theories and the literature tell the following story: after the end of the 
“golden age” in the mid-1970s, the economy spiraled downward (triggered by the two global oil 
crises in the 1970s) causing unemployment to increase. The result was fiscal stress at the same 
time that public expectations of social benefits and welfare in general shifted upward (Bonoli, 
1997). Due to this fiscal stress that continued into the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Left was 
unable to continue to expand welfare while at the same time the Right was unable to cut the 
existing welfare benefits because there was such strong popular support for entitlements. 
Altogether, this decreased the partisan effect on welfare, leaving the social benefits static. In this 
context, partisanship matters insofar as parties on the left have shifted away from expanding and 
instead focus on defending social entitlements. While welfare states are not all on the same 
trajectory, there does seem to be a clear inflection in the 1980s and early 1990s as countries 
entered the politics of austerity. 
When looking specifically towards healthcare policies, the findings are quite similar to 
the overarching conclusion: partisanship mattered until the 1980s (with the inflection varying by 
country), with Left parties spending more and exerting a positive effect on preventative health 
(Johan P. Mackenbach and McKee, 2013) while the Right resisted expansion or attempted to cut 
benefits (Falkenbach et al., 2019). After that point, there was no longer a difference, as neither 
the Left nor the Right cut or expanded health benefits and partisanship ceased to matter as a 
major influencer (Jensen, 2011; Jordan, 2011; Kittel and Obinger, 2003). In a study on whether 
political parties’ matter for the implementation of specific preventative health policies, McKee 
and Mackenbach found that positive health effects used to be associated with Social Democrats 
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being in government, particularly in relation to indicators such as tobacco and alcohol control. 
The last decades, however, found little correlation between Social Democratic governments and 
health policy development (Johan P. Mackenbach and McKee, 2013). We see government 
coalitions no longer being made up of Social Democrats and Conservatives rooted primarily in 
class-based politics, but rather the conservatives or liberals governing with the Populist Radical 
Right (Falkenbach & Greer, 2018).  
The 2015 migration crisis tapped into existing yet implicit sentiments and enabled 
increased social acceptance and growth of an identity-based electorate and politics on the right. 
This also involved a shift of Social Democratic and Left parties away from their roots in the 
organized working class, with their adoption of economic and welfare system reforms, climate 
change policies, globalization, etc. thereby disregarding traditional supporters’ economic 
concerns. 
A major determinant of variation in policy choices, including health policy and output is 
the party composition of government (Hibbs, 1992). Larger partisan effects can be seen in 
majoritarian, parliamentary, democracies where the legislature and the executive are ‘sovereign’. 
The structure of the welfare state also matters, with social insurance and social partnerships 
forming a barrier to action by any government. The institutional structures relinquish some of 
their power particularly in matters relating to social insurance contracts. Even in countries with 
divided powers (federations, presidential democracies), a Right-wing government in power for a 
long period of time leads to lower healthcare spending (Herwartz and Theilen, 2014).  
The general consensus that can be reached from the welfare literature is that the Power 
Resource Theory generally prevails within the literature as the Left (or liberals) will generally 
seek to expand the welfare state while the Right (or conservatives) will either keep it the same or 
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push for cuts in certain areas (Achterberg and Yerkes, 2009; Amable et al., 2006; Brady et al., 
2005; Hicks and Freeman, 1992; Scruggs and Allan, 2006). As far as healthcare is concerned, 
very little has been researched as to what parties do with regard to health policy. A scoping 
review conducted in 2020 confirmed this point as it found there was little research “about the 
direct relationship between PRR parties and health” (Rinaldi and Bekker, 2020). In fact, they 
found the research surrounding health policies to be so thin that they had to expand their scope to 
include social policies. Generally, it is said that parties from both the Left and the Right tend to 
expand health care (Jensen, 2011), however we see this changing if the coalition is no longer 
made up of Social Democrats and conservatives, but rather the conservatives and the PRR 
(Falkenbach & Greer, 2018). Rinaldi and Bekker ended up combining social and health policies 
leading them to the conclusion that PRR parties, like other parties, impact welfare policies. The 
PRR impact, they found, is seen through the implementation of a welfare chauvinistic agenda 
that restricts access and eligibility to provisions for outsider groups such as immigrants and 
minorities (Rinaldi and Bekker, 2020). 
 Seeing as the typical partisan construct of Left and Right is no longer the only dominant 
governmental form and that PRR parties are beginning to take part in governmental coalitions, it 
is necessary to determine how PRR parties impact the welfare state and more importantly health 
policies. 
 
Part II: PRR Welfare Approaches 
I have now shown you that PRR parties impact policies surrounding migration, security, 
integration and also social policies (chapter 1). In the previous section, I have displayed how the 
traditional social democratic and conservative parties approach welfare policies. What is missing 
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from the literature of the last section is a discussion surrounding how PRR parties approach 
welfare policies. In this section of the chapter, the theory surrounding the PRR welfare 
approaches will be discussed followed by how PRR parties shape policy and ending on the 
limited literature that actually talks about PRR parties and their impact on welfare policies, most 
particularly health policies. 
According to the literature, a PRR parties’ social welfare policy can fall into two distinct 
categories: (1) PRR want to protect citizens’ social welfare benefits, of which health care is a big 
part, from non-citizens (mostly migrants), thus embarking upon an exclusionary model known as 
welfare chauvinism5 (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016; Mudde 2009, 2016). In recent years PRR parties 
have criticized mainstream parties for cutting welfare to benefit the immigrants (Schumacher & 
Kersbergen, 2016). This implies that they support the welfare state, but only for the native 
people. (2) The other possibility is that PRR engage in welfare austerity (Greer & Falkenbach, 
2018), or neo liberal policies (Kitschelt, 2007), combining racial and ethnic animosity while 
essentially cutting welfare expenditure for all (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Swank & Betz, 
2003). However, no study has, as of yet, investigated PRR parties’ effect on health policies in 
particular, instead welfare systems as a whole were examined (de Koster, Achterberg, & van der 
Waal, 2012; Facchini, Mayda, & Murard, 2016; Schumacher & Kersbergen, 2016; van der Waal, 
Achterberg, Houtman, de Koster, & Manevska, 2010). It is therefore unclear as to whether all 
PRR parties follow one or the other model, whether there are particular circumstances, i.e., 
Coalitions, that lead to the use of one model over the other, or whether it simply depends on the 
country under investigation. In order to better understand what PRR parties do in government, 
                                               
 
5 This term was first introduced by Andersen and Bjørklund and stated that “welfare services should be restricted to our own” 
(Andersen and Bjorklund, 1990). 
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particularly with regards to health policies, it is essential that researchers have a clear 
understanding of the circumstance that led to a given welfare policy. 
In an effort to determine which welfare approaches PRR parties take, it must be 
understood that these parties get elected because they claim to support the “common man” (Betz, 
1993) promising to restore their voices within the political debate (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015). 
Initially, it was thought that PRR parties fill their voter base with people of lower education, the 
unemployed, blue collar workers and people that have a generally negative attitude towards 
immigrants (Lubbers et al., 2002). While it is certainly true that the unemployed, in particular, 
perceive immigrants as an economic threat, this type of voter base is not what makes a PRR 
party successful, and does not apply to all PRR parties equally6. What makes the party 
successful, thereby helping it to enter a governmental coalition, is the ability to attain votes from 
voters that previously voted for a different party (social democrats or conservatives) (Immerzeel 
and Pickup, 2015). Previously social democratic voters typically move to the PRR because of 
economic deprivation and job loss (Jylhä et al., 2019). Previously conservative or Christian 
Democratic voters on the other hand defect to the PRR because they are concerned about 
immigration and the European Union (Webb and Bale, 2014). PRR parties, appeal to voters for 
different reasons depending on the given circumstances in any one country. Sometimes they 
appeal to the “common man”, other times they appeal to the educated self-employed. The point 
is that the appeal evolves over time. The common thread is that the party group manages to pit 
groups against one another: in vs out groups. This can range from citizens vs. immigrants 
                                               
 
6 In Austria and Italy, for example PRR voters are more heterogeneous (Betz, 1993). In Austria, the PRR appeals to younger, 
welfare state minded, above average educated white-collar workers; market oriented, above average educated, self-employed 
white-collar workers; and skilled, blue collar workers (Plasser et al., 1992). The Lega in Italy attracts both blue collar workers as 
well as the self-employed with above average levels of education (Natale, 1991). 
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(although this is fairly common in all PRR parties) to self-employed small business owners vs. 
industries and globalization and well-educated white-collar workers vs. political elites. The 
question that arises is how do PRR parties determine what welfare approach to take to appease 
their voter base, and more importantly what does that mean for health? 
Several scholars have attempted to explain how PRR parties deal with welfare benefits 
and they have chosen to do this by distinguishing “deserving” from “undeserving” citizens (van 
Oorschot, 2006). Ennser-Jedenastik creates a table of those “deserving support” versus those 
“undeserving of support” to explain the welfare sentiments of the Austrian PRR party between 
1983-2013 (Ennser-Jedenastik 2016 pg 214). In his piece on pension reforms, Afonso explains 
that the “deservingness” of a particularly group, for example pensioners, will save them from 
retrenchment (Afonso, 2014). Afonso and Papadopoulos focus on the Swiss case and argue that 
PRR parties eagerly use the popular ordering of deservingness accepted across Europe to 
determine which category of recipients are “more deserving” of benefits (Afonso and 
Papadopoulos, 2015b).  
Thinking about welfare programs such as healthcare along two axes: generosity and the 
exclusiveness of benefits (Figure 2) proves useful. The generosity of benefits is a longstanding 
preoccupation of the welfare state literature. Conceptually, it is the extent to which a welfare 
state decommodifies by reducing people’s dependence on money. This can, for example, be seen 
as the amount of social protection  offered  unemployed  and  how actively  labour  market  
policies  are  pursued to decrease unemployment (Van der Wel and Halvorsen, 2015). When 
thinking about healthcare this implies the extent to which access to healthcare is independent of 
income (Esping-Andersen, 1990). For health, the generosity of benefits can be and is measured 
in a variety of ways, e.g., out of pocket expenditures, prevalence of catastrophic health care 
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expenditures, financial barriers to access, or resource-based barriers to access such as the 
adequacy of facilities.  
The exclusiveness of benefits is and is not a longstanding preoccupation of the welfare 
state literature. It is, insofar as inequalities in access and benefits within systems has long 
interested analysts. It is not, however, insofar as the access of outsiders such as migrants to 
benefits is a newer and largely separate field. Conceptually, the exclusiveness of benefits is the 
extent to which access to benefits is restricted on grounds of, for example, citizenship, residency, 
or participation in a social insurance scheme. The least exclusive benefits are available to all. 
The most exclusive benefits are those which require membership in some scheme that involves 
having money, legal residency, and an established labour market position. Healthcare examples 
pertaining to the established welfare states in Europe include the option of attaining private 
insurance on top of the mandatory social health insurance in countries like Austria. Only people 
that have sufficient resources, i.e., money are able to afford such a luxury that might grant them 
everything form shorter waiting times to the privilege of choosing which hospital and specialist 
will care for them. In NHS systems such as Italy, money, in the form of the ability to pay out-of-
pocket for extra services, gives some people an advantage in securing more timely access to care. 
In an effort to display a more visual interpretation of the above, I created a four-policy 
model depicting the relationship between access and generosity.  
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Figure 2 Four Policy Model 
 
Source: Authors own. 
 
In the upper left-hand corner, the liberal universal approach calls for minimal state 
intervention in the lives of the citizens. Libertarians, even today, support a free-market health 
system, which typically results in low health expenditure, translating into less generous benefits, 
and low exclusivity implying relatively unhindered access to benefits. Another option, found in 
the upper right-hand corner of the graph, could be termed Social Democratic Universalism. This 
scenario is currently practiced in the autonomous community of Catalonia, which has refused to 
implement a Spanish central state decree cutting off health care benefits to undocumented 
migrants (Castano et al. 2016). This system ensures that everyone has equal access to healthcare 
services no matter if they are a citizen or not, which amounts to both the increased access to 
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benefits as well as the increased generosity of those benefits. This also implies that the health 
expenditure is higher for cases that fall into this quadrant.  
The two most probable approaches in the case of PRR parties in government can be 
found in the lower left- and right-hand corners, respectively. Initially, PRR parties tended to lean 
more towards having an economic liberal orientation, promising freer markets, lower taxes and 
less statism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), which can be referred to as a combination of 
nationalism and neoliberalism (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Spies and Afonso 2017) or simply, 
welfare austerity (Greer and Falkenbach, 2018) or liberal chauvinism. This means that there is, 
for example, little support for the collective financing of health care services (Greer 2017) 
resulting in less generous benefits. In the late 90s, most PRR parties held an extreme cultural 
authoritarian position, however adopted a more lassiez-faire policy approach, which in turn 
called for less redistribution, tax cuts and reduced welfare expenditures (Spies and Afonso 2017). 
Conservative parties, such as the party formerly led by Theresa May in the United Kingdom, 
have adopted the old radical rights neoliberal approach resulting in decreasing the amount of 
money spent on healthcare and thereby decreasing the generosity of benefits provided while also 
increasing its exclusivity implying that those benefits are harder to access. 
When thinking about a liberal chauvinist approach to healthcare, PRR parties might 
chose to call for significant reductions in spending towards health care. A good example of such 
a policy comes from Hungary. Although it was not implemented, the National Budgets Act 
would have resulted in the significant reduction of public health care spending. The result would 
have been the continued underfunding of public health care facilities, increased problems with 
the medical infrastructure, shortages of basic equipment like soap or toilet paper, and the 
stagnation of health sector workers’ wages (Moise et al., 2021). In the United States, the 
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Medicaid Block Grant, is an example of a liberal chauvinist policy passed by Donald Trump. 
The Block Grant waivers covers fewer people, and provides coverage that offers less financial 
protection and worse access to care (Singer and Willison, 2021). Both examples signify a 
decrease in health benefits for all, however, the decrease would most effect a specific group of 
people (immigrants, minorities, etc.).  
Since the mid-90s, however, a trend towards “welfare chauvinism” among PRR parties 
was found. This approach depicted in the lower right quadrant of Figure 2 implies that benefits 
are more generous due to an increase in health expenditure, however, these benefits the access to 
these benefits are restricted making them more exclusive. Anderson and Bjorklund first used the 
concept of welfare chauvinism in a social science paper and described it as a notion where 
“welfare services should be restricted to our own” (Andersen & Bjorklund, 1990, pg. 212). The 
Danish People’s Party, for example, was successful in demanding a change of social policies 
where the “length of stay principle” in effect excludes foreign born immigrants from welfare 
entitlements (de Koster, Achterberg, and van der Waal 2012). Today, the term is widely used by 
researchers and similarly implies that welfare benefits should be generous (as they are in most 
European countries), however these benefits should be restricted to citizens only (Cavaille and 
Ferwerda 2016a). Many PRR parties have built this notion into their platform to exclude 
outgroups such as immigrants (Afonso 2014; Cavaille and Ferwerda 2016b; Greer 2017; 
Kitschelt 2007). 
Health policy examples of such an approach for PRR parties could be anything from the 
immigrant health surcharges proposed in the United Kingdom, to the tobacco regulations 
implemented in the United States to the exclusion of drug users and “terrorists” from services in 
the Philippines. In each of these instances the welfare generosity towards the population stays the 
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same or improves, while that of a certain population group gets worse. For example, by 
regulating ENDS products, policy makers did not account for flavors that were most common 
amongst non-white populations (including cigarillos and menthol cigarettes). So, rather than 
targeting policy at all tobacco products used by youth, the Trump administration acted in 2019 to 
ban certain flavors for ENDS products only (Singer and Willison, 2021).  
In addition, we can expect the core positions of the PRR with regards to health to follow 
an anti-scientific path. We can see this with regards to smoking with the Austrian FPÖ reneging 
the smoking ban (discussed in Chapter 4) or Mike Pence’s statement that ‘smoking doesn’t kill’ 
(Scott L Greer, 2017). Similarly, the PRR Lega in Italy as well as former President Trump 
promoted the idea that vaccines cause autism.  Many more examples of anti-scientific rhetoric 
can be found in Chapter 8 when I look at the impact of the PRR during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Looking more closely at the welfare chauvinist model, it is apparent that the concept of 
generous welfare provisions for citizens coupled with the restricted access and provisions for 
foreigners directly plays into the PRR ideology of nativism. Within the literature, two different 
sides of this model are discussed. One focuses predominantly on the demand side of politics 
(voter preferences) while the other side is more concentrated on the supply side of politics (party 
policy and ideology). The demand side stands to explain the emergence of the PRR altogether as 
many voters feel that immigrants should not be immediately entitled to social benefits upon 
arrival (Bonal & Zollinger 2018) often identifying them as the least deserving social group 
(Ennser 2020). Why and to what degree voters embrace welfare chauvinistic policies and 
attitudes is made up of a number of different influencing factors: viable alternatives to the 
traditional mainstream parties during economically insecure times (Michel, 2017), low cultural 
capital (van Oorschot 2000 & 2006), the previously mentioned feeling of economic inequality, 
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and cultural heterogeneity (Reeskens 2012). In the supply side research, scholars have 
highlighted welfare chauvinism as central in the policy approaches mentioned in party programs. 
PRR manifestos have been extensively researched and it is clear that this party group favors 
welfare chauvinistic policies (Careja 2016, Heinisch 2019 & 2020). 
What is not entirely clear however, is whether there are distinct circumstances that must 
be in place for PRR parties to favor one approach over the other. What also remains unclear from 
this literature is whether a given welfare approach also applies to a PRR parties health policy 
choices. This research will build on these theories and identify under which specific 
circumstances PRR parties engage in welfare chauvinist vs. liberal chauvinist policies. In order 
to accomplish this knowing when PRR parties shape policy can be particularly helpful. 
There are many factors that influence the impact of a political party on policy as can be 
seen in the figure below summarizing the key factors that stand between PRR parties, in 
particular, and policy impact.  
Figure 3 Impact of the PRR on policy 
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Source: Adapted from (Falkenbach & Greer, 2018) 
On the one side, there is a set of political and institutional constraints on the PRR party. 
Electoral rules determine the effective number of parties in a party system, with proportional 
representation systems increasing the number of parties. The effective number of parties in most 
party systems has been going up in most European countries for some time, regardless of 
electoral rules, as party systems fragment, and the previously dominant Social Democratic and 
Christian Democratic parties’ decline. In party systems with more parties, governments require 
coalitions. The PRR parties in European national governments have almost all entered 
government in coalition with established conservative, mostly Christian Democratic, parties (the 
exception is Italy7). There are very few examples of the Social Democrats in any country 
working with the PRR8. In a coalition government, both the coalition agreement and the partner 
party constrain what the PRR party can do to pursue its goals—for example, welfare chauvinist 
objectives might be turned into exclusionary liberalism if the conservative coalition partner, for 
example, is willing to endorse anti-immigrant policies in return for PRR support for budget cuts. 
This factor has a further implication. So far, the PRR has only entered government in coalition 
governments in countries with proportional representation. In countries whose institutions make 
them more prone to have single-party governments with extensive power, such as the United 
Kingdom or France, a PRR government could be unconstrained and very powerful. 
The second major external constraint is the rule of law, especially constitutional judicial 
review, but also lower forms of law such as administrative public law review and international 
                                               
 
7 The Italian government was made up of the PRR Lega under Matteo Salvini and the left-wing populist 5 Star Movement under 
Luigi di Maio in 2018. This government lasted until 2019. 
8 The most known example is the “Sinowatz” government in Austria where Social Democratic chancellor Fred Sinowatz formed 
a coalition government with the PRR FPÖ in 1983. This lasted until 1986. However, the FPÖ at this time is described as being 
more liberal and less confrontational (Bischof and Plasser, 2008). 
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law such as that of the European Union. PRR policies, whose explicit goal is often 
discrimination, can very frequently run into trouble with rights protection and antidiscrimination 
law. The effectiveness of courts and the strength of rights protection varies widely, and courts 
often find it difficult to prevail when an elected government seeks to undermine them. In the 
short run, however, they can block PRR policy initiatives. 
The third factor affecting the impact of the PRR is simply their actual, revealed, policy 
preferences. It is harder to blur goals when in government as opposed to when campaigning. 
PRR parties might, for example, decide that anti-immigrant policies are more important to them 
and their voters than living in a generous welfare state. Even in an age of weak party 
organizations, PRR parties are often particularly top-down and short on activists (the name and 
logo of the Five Star Movement in Italy are literally the property of its leaders Beppe Grillo and 
Gianroberto Casaleggio while the Dutch PVV has only two members: its leader Geert Wilders 
and an association he controls) so they have considerable latitude to make risky decisions. 
These three factors are among the many that shape the impact of parties on policy in 
general, but they have been the dominant ones in the cases of the PRR that we have so far. The 
PRR is of course also shaped by a force that shapes all parties, which is policy legacies. For 
example, it is hard to impose new exclusionary laws in self-governing social insurance systems 
such as that of Austria. All other things being equal, we should expect that the formal impact of 
the PRR on access to healthcare for legal immigrants should be greater in NHS systems, such as 
Italy, where the eligibility rules and administration of social insurance do not form obstacles. 
What have PRR parties done to implement their views while in power? There are only a 
handful of articles that provide answers to this question. In 2015, Afonso and Popadopoulos 
published a piece showing how the rise of the PRR Swiss People’s Party (SVP) affected welfare 
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state reforms in Switzerland between the 1990s and the 2000s. They quote politicians explaining 
that health is not their focus as it is not a “battle that suits us” such as polices concerning 
immigration and public safety (Afonso & Papadopoulos, 2015).  That same year, Afonso 
published a piece comparing the welfare reforms of PRR parties in Austria, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland finding that either the PRR gave into the coalition partner and implemented 
retrenchment reforms thereby losing the support of core voters (Austria and Switzerland) or they 
refused the reforms and got kicked out of office by their coalition partner (Netherlands) (Afonso, 
2014). In his analysis of the social policies put forward in the election manifestos of the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPO) between 1983 and 2013, Ennser-Jedenasik, found that healthcare was not a 
prominent feature on the FPO’s agenda during the time period of investigation. Instead, the party 
promoted the inclusion of disabled people in social life, and had over the years proposed a 
number of measures to that end (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). In 2017, one article (Röth, Afonso, 
and Spies 2017) touched on the impact of PRR parties on social policies and one article (Muis 
and Immerzeel, 2017) contested that more specific research was necessary in order to study PRR 
impact. Röth et al. (2017) maintain to have offered the first “systematic comparative study” 
(page 1) of Western European PRR parties’ impact on social spending/welfare generosity and 
economic policies. Although they make salient conclusions, their methods could be seen as 
incomprehensive. For instance, in the quantitative part of their design they use the Comparative 
Manifesto Project data to calculate each party’s position on social and economic policies, 
however they are not able to separate redistributive from de-regulative issues making it difficult 
to differentiate center right politics from PRR politics as the result will likely be more centrist in 
nature. As for the qualitative analysis, by only choosing one PRR government and one non PRR 
government within the same country the analysis seems rather weak as it is only reasonably 
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applicable to Austria, the case chosen for the comparison. In a 2018 article, Afonso partnered 
with Rennwald suggesting that Bismarckian countries with PRR parties in government tend to 
follow more exclusionary welfare policies based on an insider-outsider divide, while the 
Scandinavian and Beveridgian models seem to “move to more conditionality as a radical right 
parties become stronger” (Afonso and Rennwald, 2018).  
While research on PRR social and economic policies exist, none are truly focused on 
health impact. In addition, most studies are single country studies making it difficult to convince 
readers that the findings are applicable across PRR governments. Altogether, there is simply not 




This chapter has first and foremost demonstrated that party’s matter in making welfare 
policy decisions. When looking at parties’ impact on the welfare system, social democrats were 
found to be the main agents of social expansion and egalitarian welfare policies. With their 
decline and the transition of the party system to include new parties (such as the PRR) within the 
political spectrum it became essential to deduce what stance PRR parties take with regards to 
welfare policy.  
The literature surrounding PRR welfare policies led to the creation of a model depicting 
four possible welfare policy directions (Welfare chauvinism, liberal chauvinism, liberal 
universalism and social democratic universalism), According to the literature welfare chauvinism 
and liberal chauvinism are the most likely to be pursued by PRR parties in government. The 
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question that remains is which do they chose for health policies and under what circumstances do 
they make this decision.  
These findings stress that more research is necessary specifically focusing on how the 
PRR have impacted healthcare and health policies. Given the small number of PRR parties in 
national governments and the complexity of their effects, it is customary to use comparative 
qualitative analysis to study them (Falkenbach & Greer, 2018). Chapters 4 and 5 will use this 
method to shine a distinct light on the national cases of Austria and Italy, while Chapters 6 and 7 
will explore the subnational level of these countries. Chapter 8 will then use the COVID-19 
pandemic to determine what impact PRR parties in government have on health. Before these 
chapters are explored, Chapter 3 will outline the dissertations methodology.
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 : Methods 
 
This dissertation will add to the limited literature through the use of an in-depth case study 
approach (Morse and Richards, 2002; Zainal, 2007) to understand what the PRR in Austrian and 
Italian national and subnational governments actually accomplish with respect to health policies. 
The benefit of this type of qualitative research is the ability to obtain holistic and comprehensive 
insight into an issue in its natural context (Crowe et al., 2011; Yin, 2003).  
European countries vary in a number of substantial ways, including their differing 
healthcare systems, their regulations pertaining to social and welfare benefits and the norms that 
govern their political process.  The country’s political actors vary in their ideologies, how they 
interact with institutions, other political players and how they make decisions. These substantial 
variations make it difficult for traditional quantitative methods to effectively capture a telling 
story of what is happening in these countries (Hennink et al., 2011). The case study approach 
allows this study to uncover “patterns of diversity” (Ragin, 1987) across my two countries and 
selected regions within these countries. While examining the cases of Austria and Italy on a 
national level is valuable, going subnationally gives me additional leverage that a country level 
analysis cannot provide. According to (Giraudy et al., 2019) advantages of subnational 
comparative analysis can also be found in substance, theory and methods. Substantively, 
subnational research allows me to explain the variation inside a country by focusing on political 
actors and healthcare institutions that are often neglected. In addition, new theories can be 
created specifically “when subnational observations cannot be explained by national-level 
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theories” (Giraudy et al., 2019, p 5). Theoretically this approach is useful to avoid attributing 
subnational theories to explain national outcomes. Methodologically, as previously stated, I am 
expanding my unit of analysis thereby enlarging my pool of comparative research possibilities. A 
final reason as to why the use of subnational analysis is particularly fitting for this study is that 
PRR and/or authoritarian regimes “often persist at the subnational level” (Giraudy et al., 2019, p 
9).  Furthermore, as we will see in the case of Italy, health policy is not made at the national 
level, rather each region is responsible for developing a healthcare system. 
The case study approach both nationally and subnationally allows me to identify variation 
and detect common themes which emerge from key-informant semi-structured interviews, 
archival records, text analysis, and discourses. Additionally, I conducted within-case analysis of 
each of the countries and the selected regions. This portion of the analytic plan is more focused 
on the causal mechanism occurring within a country and region over time, using process tracing 
methods (Tansey, 2007).  
There are several other, additional reasons, based on (Morse and Richards, 2002), that I 
chose a qualitative design approach over a quantitative one: 1) There is not very much literature 
on this topic and therefore more information is necessary to expand the knowledge in the field. 
Populism and health policy is profoundly understudied (Falkenbach et al., 2019), which is why I 
was forced to broaden my scope to include welfare policies, of which health policies are an 
essential part and not just focus solely on health policies. 2) Populism is a complex system that is 
constantly adapting and changing making it difficult to understand. Not only is populism a thin 
centered ideology, meaning it is commonly coupled with other characteristics requiring the 
differentiation between right and left winged populism, but more recently a distinction has been 
made as to whether one is speaking about a populist party or a populist leader, or both (populist 
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practitioners). Thus, in depth analysis of the different situation in within the two countries and 
four regions will better serve this field of research. 3) This research aims to understand what 
populists do in government, thus requiring the study of a person’s/people’s behavior. People’s 
behaviors are difficult to quantify in numbers, specifically when those people are politicians or 
parties. In this case, it is more fruitful to observe the behavior and ask about the reasoning behind 
the behavior as opposed to quantifying it. In addition, there is not enough data available to make 
quantifying it a viable option. 4) One of the goals of this research is to garner a deeper 
understanding of the nature of populist radical right (PRR) parties in office. Typically, a deeper 
understanding of a thing of interest requires one to go beyond the numbers and figure out more 
than: Did PRR parties pass health policies? Rather, the questions for this type of research 
embraces a more inquisitive style: Why did PRR parties pass health policies or why not? What 
kind of health policies were passed? Did they follow a more welfare chauvinist model, or could 
they be classified as neo-liberal? 
These are important questions that must be answered to further research in this field. This 
dissertation will help in establishing a classification for at least two PRR parties (Austria and 
Italy) and it will identify their tendencies when it comes to health policies. These two points will, 
in turn, make studying the PRR and their impact on health easier in the future. Once more cases 
have been evaluated, quantitative studies might then be useful in comparing country cases on a 
much larger scale. 
This chapter will highlight the qualitative methods that I have chosen to answer my 
research question: What is the impact of the PRR on health (and social policies) at a national and 
subnational level in Austria and Italy. The chapter will begin by speaking to the qualitative 
design, then it will go onto the case selection on both national and subnational level for both 
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countries. Then the interview strategies and textual data collection are discussed and finally the 
analytical approach is presented. The chapter will end with a section dedicated to the analysis 
across cases. 
 
What to expect 
Qualitative case studies are a useful approach to enhance the understanding of policy 
decision-making processes as they provide inherent flexibility to use all relevant data and present 
it in a variety of ways (Anckar 2008). Applying rigorously selected cases and in-depth 
qualitative analyses enhances findings by further examining the complex relationships and 
temporality of multiple factors affecting policy decision-making (Anckar 2008). In each case, I 
collected two types of qualitative data: interviews, and textual document data. Interviews and 
document analysis add a contextual grounding of the complicated relationships between the 
multiple factors at work and helped to tease apart the political decision-making processes leading 
to the outcome with a greater level of detail (Collier 2011). In my cases, the multiple factors at 
work are party politics, specifically the success of nontraditional parties (PRR), institutional 
constraints, and policy making. The outcome of interest is what policies (health and social) were 
actually implemented by PRR parties.  
This in-depth case study design begins with a comparative historical analysis on a cross-
national, sub-national and longitudinal basis between Austria and Italy in order to determine 
what can be learned from the political involvement of the PRR in national and subnational 
governments. The comparative method will help highlight and contextualize policy events and 
help me to understand the policy decision-making processes that can be used to explain the PRR 
phenomena beyond a particular time and place (Ritter, 2014).  This method will illuminate the 
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factors associated with different policy choices in the specific context of each country. Not only 
were cases selected that are representative of the existing heterogeneity from the national sample 
to improve generalizability, but an additional in-depth analysis of the processes at work in each 
regional/provincial case was conducted, to gain a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
processes at work affecting the policy choices made by PRR parties in terms of health and social 
care.  
I will use a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) of the Mill’s Methods approach to 
comparative politics (Teune and Przeworski, 1970), which maximizes case selection variation at 
the level of the dependent variable/s, which in this case are health policies. MSSD will isolate the 
independent variables, which explain the presence/absence of the dependent variable by 
extracting contextual data and themes specific to each case (Landman, 2013). The 
generalizability of the findings will greatly increase by maximizing the variation between the 
selected cases. In addition, the use of MSSD will also allow for the stratification of the findings 
across a larger group of cases.  
 
Case Selection 
Selection is of utmost importance for case studies. To understand what health and social 
policies PRR parties follow when in government, I conducted in-depth comparative case studies 
across two countries (national) and four regions (subnational). For both the national and 
subnational studies, the typical method of case selection was used because the interest lies within 
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the two country cases themselves allowing for a better exploration of the causal mechanisms 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008).  
Figure 4 Populist Radical Right Parties in Government 
 
Considering Figure 4, I will explain why cases such as Denmark and Switzerland were 
not selected for this study. While the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) is the PRR party with the most 
stable and longest governmental experience, this case was excluded for a number of reasons. To 
begin with, the Swiss political system does not lend itself to easy comparison with other Western 
European countries seeing as the Swiss follow a vigorous federal structure both in an 
institutional sense and a cultural one (Church and Dardanelli, 2005). Research signals that this 
system is more complex (the element of direct democracy plays a significant role here) and 
behaviorally motivated than is often realized (Church and Dardanelli, 2005) making comparative 
attempts difficult.  The second significant reason as to why the case was excluded is that political 
parties in Switzerland do not have the same amount of power that they do in other Western 
European countries. In fact, all major parties are included in a grand coalition government 
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resulting in a diffusion of power amongst many actors. This implies that even if the SVP has a 
strong position within the government, their influence is limited by the other, more liberal actors.  
 The case of Denmark and the Danish People’s Party (DFP) was excluded because the 
party was not in government with a leadership position on the subnational level. My inferential 
strategy is based on using both the national and subnational level for leverage in order to control 
for country effects. Including the case of Denmark would not usefully expand my comparative 
selection because unlike Austria and Italy it does not offer any subnational leverage that would 
further contribute to the explanatory results of the research question.  
 
Analytical Approach 
I used process tracing as the primary analytic approach. The approach is a data analysis 
method for identifying, validating, and testing causal mechanisms and how they evolve within a 
given case (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Mills et al., 2010). Process tracing is used to build and 
test theories of processes linking together causes and outcomes within causally similar cases. The 
process is typically used in combination with comparative methods, but can also be used to gain 
a greater understanding of the causal dynamics that produced the outcome of a particular 
historical case (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Since process tracing is a systematic review of 
evidence across time, I was able to discern a causal mechanism through the analysis of my case 
events coupled with the retrieval of key contextual information (Bennett 2010). There are several 
research objectives that process tracing helps a researcher to achieve (see (Collier, 2011)), in the 
case of my research these objectives are: 1) to identify novel political and social phenomena and 
systematically describing them 2) gaining insight into causal mechanisms. A further note, seeing 
as process tracing seeks a historical explanation for the individual case in question, the goal is to 
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document whether or not the sequence of events within the case at hand fits those predicted by 
alternative explanations of the case (Bennett 2010). This historical explanation allows for a 
deeper an understanding of the mechanism involved in each individual case, which subsequently 
helps to create larger theories pertaining to a potential macrophenomena (Bennett 2009).  
Furthermore, according to (Falleti and Lynch, 2008), these mechanismic explanations 
have a primordial ontological status in the social sciences (p. 338) seeing as they allow for 
causation analysis and not just correlation. My mechanismic explanation rests primarily on the 
third trope presented by Falleti and Lynch, namely that of narrative. This dissertation aims to tell 
a rhetorically and logically persuasive story so that the hypothesis takes the reader from input to 
output.  
National: Austria and Italy 
The cases of Austria and Italy were selected as they are typical and representative examples of 
countries that have had PRR parties, The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Italian League 
(Lega), in government over a long period of time. In addition, the FPÖ and Lega are close allies 
within the nationalist groups in Europe (Balmer, 2020; Bracco et al., 2018), they are also among 
the oldest, most stable and most established cases of the populist radical right party family in 
Europe and can be seen as prime examples of right wing populism that is predominant in 
contemporary Europe (Plescia et al., 2019).  
While the FPÖ was in government for the first time in 1983 (see Table 1), this was at a 
time when the party was not yet considered PRR, rather liberal focusing on free market and anti-
statist policies (Bischof and Plasser, 2008). The party did not become PRR until Jörg Haider took 
over in 1986. Thus, the beginning of the national analysis will begin in the year 2000 when the 
FPÖ first entered into national government as a PRR party under the direction of Haider. The 
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years of national analysis will be from 2000-2003, 2003-2007 and 2017-2019 wherein Haider 
headed the FPÖ from 2000-2003 (although not taking on the position of Vice Chancellor9), the 
FPÖ split into the PRR party BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) in 2004 with Haider 
taking over the BZÖ and the FPÖ disappearing from government. This split was due to 
discrepancies concerning the direction of the party (see chapter 4). With Haider’s death in 2005 
the BZÖ lost its flame and died out after it was voted out of office in 2007. What this implies is 
that Haider held the party together and without his leadership the usual factional fighting within 
the FPÖ (nationalist vs libertarians) recommenced making it an unvotable party. The FPÖ spent 
several years regrouping after Haider’s death under the new leadership of Heinz-Christian 
Strache. Strache moved the party further to the right on the political spectrum which gained him 
much approval from voters and would eventually lead the party into a governmental coalition in 
2017. 
 The situation in Italy is slightly more complicated. The Lega was initially founded by 
Umberto Bossi as a separatist party known as the Lega Nord (Northern League), the name of the 
party did not change to Lega until 2018 in the run up to the 2018 general elections (see chapter 
5). As the Lega Nord, the party was predominately separatist in nature, however it embraced a 
eurosceptical attitude after the Euro was adopted in 2000 and began directing its attention to non-
European immigration as a threat to the Northern Italian identity (Hopkin, 2004).  Thus, the 
Italian analysis will begin in 2001 when the Lega Nord (LN) joined forces with Silvio 
Berlusconi’s business firm party Forza Italia (FI). Although the LN did not have a significant 
                                               
 
9 The Vice-Chancellor stands in for the Federal Chancellor should the Chancellor become ill, die or become otherwise hindered. 
In practice, the Vice-Chancellor is generally the leading member of the junior party within the current coalition government. S/he 
is also frequently the party chairman. 
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governmental role between 2001-2006, it did hold the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
making it an interesting time period of study. Similarly, the LN’s 2008-2011 time in government 
was perhaps less significant, however the party was given the Ministry of Interior as well as the 
Ministry of Federal Reforms. The period between 2018-2019 is of special relevance as this is the 
first time the party was given the position of deputy prime minister making it more than just a 
small part of the government rather an equal player with an equal among of ministerial positions.  
 See Tables 1 and 2 below for the national case selection time periods (below the solid 
black line). See also the ledger to explain the party abbreviations in the table.  
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Table 3.1 National Case Selection Austria 
      Table 3.2 National Case Selection Italy 
  
AUSTRIA 
SPÖ è Social Democratic Party of Austria 
ÖVP (until 2018) è Austrian People’s 
Party 
ÖVP new è The new Austrian People’s 
Party 
FPÖ è Freedom Party of Austria 
BZÖ è Alliance for the Future of Austria 




















FI è Forza Italia 
LN è Lega Nord 
AN è National Alliance 
CCD è Christian Democratic Center 
UdC è Union of the Center 
NPSI è New Italian Socialist Party 
PRI è Italian Republican Party 
PdL è The People of Freedom 
MpA è Union for the Autonomies 
PD è Democratic Party 
NCD è New Center Right 
Year Chancellor Government 
1983 SPÖ SPÖ/FPÖ 
1986 SPÖ SPÖ/FPÖ 
1987 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
1990 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
1994 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
1996 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
1997 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
2000 ÖVP ÖVP/FPÖ 
2003 ÖVP ÖVP/FPÖ-BZÖ 
2007 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
2008 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
2013 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
2016 SPÖ SPÖ/ÖVP 
2017 New ÖVP New ÖVP/FPÖ 
2019 Independent Technocratic 




1994 Forza Italia 
FI–LN–AN–
CCD–UdC 
1995 Independent Independent 
1996 
The Olive 
Tree  Center Left 
1998 
The Olive 
Tree  Center Left 
2000 
The Olive 
Tree  Center Left 

























2018 Independent M5S & L 
2019 Independent M5S & PD 
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SC è Civic Choice 
PpI è Italian People’s Party 
RI è Reality Italy 
AP è Popular Alternative 
CpE è Centrists for Europe 
L è Lega 




Subnational: Carinthia, Burgenland, Lombardy and Veneto 
The main criteria in this case selection was that the regions and provinces chosen had to have 
had a PRR governor or deputy governor over a period of time. This means that being a part of 
the subnational governmental coalition would not fully meet the criteria required for case 
selection. The reason for this specific criterion is that when a party is given the governorship or 
the deputy governorship, they are also given more ministries in the provincial government, 
thereby increasing their overall influence. For example, while the provinces of Salzburg, Upper 
and Lower Austria, Styria and Tyrol included the FPÖ in their governmental coalitions, the FPÖ 
did not hold the position of governor or deputy governor and thus these cases were excluded. 
There are two reasons why a party can be a part of the subnational government, but not hold the 
position of governor or deputy governor. The first is that the province still supports proportional 
representation (Proporzsystem), as is the case in both Upper and Lower Austria. The system of 
proportional representation, applied in every province until the 90s10, allows positions in 
government to be distributed in a manner proportional to their electoral or public support. The 
original goal behind this Proporzsystem was so that the two biggest parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) 
could consolidate their power in each of the provinces seeing as the smaller parties (FPÖ and 
Greens) were too insignificant to meet the threshold. In the case of the 2018 state election in 
Lower Austria, the ÖVP was able to hold their state parliamentary majority with six out of the 
nine state councilor seats, the SPÖ was able to uphold their two seats and the FPÖ won one seat. 
Since the ÖVP won the majority, they got to place the governor and the deputy governor was 
                                               
 
10 Excluding Vorarlberg, where the Proporzsystem was already abandoned in 1923. 
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placed by the runner up – the SPÖ. The FPÖ in Lower Austria, therefore, did have a single 
council position in the state parliament, but had no leverage to make any significant decisions. 
The second reason that a party can be a part of the subnational government, but not hold 
the position of governor or deputy governor is if the election winner chooses to form a coalition 
with them. Taking, for example, the 2018 election in Salzburg, the ÖVP won the majority of 
votes. However, the ÖVP did not have the absolute majority (15 out of 36 seats) and therefore 
needed to choose a coalition partner. Instead of choosing the SPÖ with 8 seats, which would 
have given the two parties the majority, the ÖVP opted instead to form a coalition with the 
Greens (3 seats) and the NEOS (3 seats). This situation resulted in the ÖVP being able to 
designate the governor and the deputy governor while the Greens and the NEOS were each just 
given one position in the state government. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is of limited 
use, specifically for the case of Austria, if a party has only one position in the state parliament.  
A further criterion was that the party had to be considered PRR by my definition (see 
chapters 1 and 2) as informed by the literature. With Austria, this turning point came when Jörg 
Haider took over the FPÖ in 1986 (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016) and in Italy this came in 2000 with 
the introduction of the Euro (Hopkin, 2004).  Therefore, any FPÖ or Lega governorships or 
deputy governorships before 1986 and 2000 will not be considered. 
Beginning with the Austrian subnational case, only two of Austria’s nine provinces had a 
history of having the FPÖ in government (Carinthia and Burgenland). Even though the FPÖ in 
Vorarlberg was made junior partner in the ÖVP coalition government from 1984 until 2009, their 
influence was insignificant. Between 1984 and 1999, and again from 2004 to 2009, the FPÖ only 
had a single councilor representative within the state parliament. Between 1999 and 2004, the 
solitary councilor was made the Vorarlberger equivalent of deputy governor, however the ÖVP 
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state parliamentary majority remained (6-1). This is to say that while the FPÖ was represented 
within the Vorarlberger state parliament, it only had one representative at all times compared to 
the six the ÖVP had. Thus, the case was excluded as their influence was slim to none.  
That left me with the cases of Burgenland and Carinthia. In Burgenland, the FPÖ held the 
deputy governor position as well as one other position within the state parliament between 2015 
and 2020. In Carinthia the FPÖ/BZÖ positioning was much greater. Haider held the position of 
governor from 1989 until 1991 with no other FPÖ council members meaning the state parliament 
was made up of Haider (FPÖ), four SPÖ council members and two ÖVP council members. The 
case was kept because Haider had the governorship. Between 1991 and 1999 the FPÖ held two 
council positions, but no position of leadership within the parliament, thus those years were 
excluded. Starting in 1999 the FPÖ held both the governorship of Carinthia as well as the deputy 
governorship and had a regular councilor as well. This gave the FPÖ 3 councilors, the SPÖ 3 and 
the ÖVP 1. This constellation remained until 2009 despite splits within the FPÖ. In 2005, Haider 
formed the BZÖ and after his death this party became the FPK. Also in 2005, after Haider’s 
death, the FPK took 4 councilor positions in the state parliament including both the governor and 
the deputy governorship. Given these explanations Carinthia and Burgenland were the only cases 
that made sense to choose for the analysis (See Tables 3 and 4).   
The analysis in Carinthia will begin in 1989-1991 when Haider was first elected governor 
and will continue from 1999 until 2013 when the BZÖ lost the governorship to the SPÖ. The 
case will however, most strongly focus on Haider and his time in government (up until his death 
in 2005) because that was when the party had the most power and influence.  
While the FPÖ in Burgenland were in government from 1996 until 2000 they only held 
one ministry and were not given the position of governor or deputy governor, therefore, the 
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analysis for this province, as previously mentioned, will begin in 2015 when long time governor 
of Burgenland, Hans Niessl (SPÖ), decided to form a coalition with Burgenland’s FPÖ making 
Johann Tschürtz deputy governor. This coalition was upheld until 2020 when the SPÖ won the 
absolute majority in the province and no longer needed a coalition partner. 
To summarize, to be considered for case selection, the FPÖ had to have held at least two 
portfolios in the state parliament, wherein one of those must have been at least the deputy 
governorship, if not the governorship. This is pertinent as I am going in-depth and looking for 
leverage therefore, I need cases where the PRR was part of the core executive.
Table 3.3 Case Selection Carinthia 









1989 Haider I SPÖ/ÖVP 
1991 Zernatto I SPÖ/FPÖ 
1995 Zernatto II SPÖ/FPÖ 




Dörfler I SPÖ/ÖVP 




2018 Kaiser II ÖVP 
 
Table 3.4 Case Selection Burgenland 
Year Governor Coalition 
1982 Theodor Kery ÖVP 
1986 Kery / Hans Sipötz ÖVP 
1991 Karl Stix ÖVP 
1996 Karl Stix ÖVP/FPÖ 
2000 Stix / Niessl ÖVP 
2005 Hans Niessl ÖVP 
2010 Hans Niessl ÖVP 
2015 Hans Niessl FPÖ 
2019 Hans Peter Doskozil FPÖ 
2020 Hans Peter Doskozil SPÖ 
 
AUSTRIA 
SPÖ è Social Democratic Party of Austria 
ÖVP (until 2018) è Austrian People’s 
Party 
ÖVP new è The new Austrian People’s 
Party 
FPÖ è Freedom Party of Austria 
BZÖ è Alliance for the Future of Austria 
Green è The Green Alternative 
TS è Team Stronach 
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In Italy, out of the 20 regions, I narrowed the scope of my focus to Northern Italy (eight 
regions; see Figure 5) for three distinct reasons: 1) It is the macro-region in which the PRR Lega 
first developed. The Lega was created in 1991 as a regionalist populist party (Albertazzi et al., 
2018) under Umberto Bossi11. It was established as a federation of six regional parties of 
northern and north-central Italy (Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia Romagna and the 
Toscana) whose primary goal was to split Italy in two – North and South – so that the rich north 
would no longer have to pay for its much poorer Southern counterpart. Not until Salvini took 
over the party from founder Umberto Bossi in 2013 was there a move to win over voters in the 
more southern and central regions. 2) It is where the majority of regular immigrants are located 
(Colombo and Sciortino, 2004), making it ideal to research PRR inclusion and exclusion 
tendencies. 3) Northern Italy is highly representative of the wealthiest and most densely 
populated regions of Europe (Abbondanza and Bailo, 2018). It is also a structural component of 
the so- called ‘Blue Banana12’, also known as the ‘Industrial Pentagon’13, which covers the 
world’s highest concentration of people and industries and has the highest GDP per capita (Bosse 
et al., 2013). 4) Its healthcare system is more comparable, in quality, to its northern neighbors 
(Ferré et al., 2014).   
                                               
 
11 The Lega did not turn PRR until Salvini took over in 2013 (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017).  
12 approximately the areas of London, Benelux countries, South-west Germany, Switzerland and Northern Italy. See (Bosse et al., 
2013).   
13 Milan, Munich, Paris, London and Hamburg. See (Bosse et al., 2013).  
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Figure 5 Map of Northern Italy 
 
Looking at the eight Northern regions, I can further narrow down the scope by excluding 
regions where the Lega has never been in government. This would leave the regions Piedmont, 
Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino and the Aosta Valley. Of these six regions, 
the Aosta Valley was excluded because the Lega was only in government one time and that for a 
very short period of time in 2018. Trentino was excluded because the Lega just recently made it 
into government in 2019 and thus it is still too soon to evaluate their impact in that region. Friuli-
Venezia Giulia was excluded because the Lega held the governorship only once post 2013 and 
that was in 2019 making it too recent to efficiently study. While the region of Piedmont was run 
by a Lega governor from 2010 until 2014, the case was excluded for two reasons: First, 
Piedmont’s inclusion would then result in an unequal number of subnational cases. Secondly, 
Veneto and Lombardy are the two regions generally known as Lega strongholds, and have 
therefore had a consistent Lega government over time making an analysis of health policies more 
reliable (See tables 5 and 6).  
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Table 3.5 Case Selection Lombardy 
Year President Coalition 
2000 
Roberto 
Formigioni II FI LN AN CDU CCD 
2005 
Roberto 
Formigioni III FI LN AN UdC 
2010 
Roberto 
Formigioni IV PdL LN 
2013 
Roberto 
Maroni LN FI FdI 
2018 Attilio Fontana L FI FdI 
 
 











FI è Forza Italia 
LN è Lega Nord 
AN è National Alliance 
CDU è United Christian Democrats 
CCD è Christian Democratic Center 
UdC è Union of the Center 
FdI èBrothers of Italy 
LV è Venetian League – Lega Nord 
NPSI è New Italian Socialist Party 














Year President Coalition 
2000 Giancarlo Galan II 
FI LV AN CDU 
CCD 
2005 Giancarlo Galan III 
FI LV AN UdC 
NPSI 
2010 Luca Zaia I LV PdL 
2015 Luca Zaia II LV FI 
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Therefore, the regions, Veneto and Lombardy were chosen to represent Northern Italy 
and the Italian case study in my dissertation. Veneto and Lombardy are both considered Lega 
strongholds (Cento Bull, 2009) and have been chosen as cases because the Lega has consistently 
been in government since the 90’s. In Veneto since 2010 and in Lombardy since 2013 there has 
been a Lega governor. In other words, I am maximizing the odds of finding Lega impact that is 
unconstrained by a coalition partner. This is essential because the goal of my dissertation is to 
analyze the impact of the Lega on health.  
 
Semi-structured Interviews 
Within each of the two countries (including the five selected cases) semi structured interviews 
were conducted. A semi-structured format allows the researcher enhanced flexibility to explore 
new ideas during the interview, which can increase the responsiveness of the interviewee 
(Frenchtling et al., 2002). Despite its semi-structure nature, this interview format still used a set 
of pre-determined themes derived from the research questions and factors of interest (Warren, 
2001) (see Appendix). Political actors as well as researchers and professors were asked a series 
of open-ended questions to help engage them in sharing their experiences and perspectives as to 
what PRR parties accomplished in government in terms of health and social policies. To increase 
validity, the interviews were triangulated with official documents, previously published research 
and news media. 40 semi-structured interviews with political scientists, healthcare researchers, 
health policy makers and politicians have not only helped clarify the historical significance of 
both countries and their selected regions but have also helped to explain the national and 




The interview sample included a mix of political actors within the national and regional 
healthcare systems as well as health policy or political science researchers or professors based in 
the different regions. For each country case, I recruited 20-25 interviewees (See Appendix D). 
This sample size was chosen in order to keep the number of interviews feasible for the 
completion of in-depth, in person interviewing and large enough, on the other hand, to obtain 
useful information. I interviewed each group until I reached saturation, which means that no new 
additional information was obtained from the interviews. This is important because it enhances 
reliability (Warren, 2001).  
I found it particularly difficult to obtain political actors in Austria from the FPÖ party. 
Most simple did not respond to my inquiry. It was also difficult to locate interviewees that had 
both a knowledge of Austrian healthcare and Austrian politics. Many of the healthcare experts 
that I contacted declined to be interviewed due to the fact that they are not knowledgeable about 
FPÖ politics. I overcame this challenge by interviewing health experts, Austrian health and 
political science researchers and Austrian political scientists. Although researchers and experts 
are typical partisan, I was not able to detect bias for or against the FPÖ within our interviews.  
I began interviewing my Italian subjects in the summer of 2018 as preliminary research 
for my dissertation. While I tried to obtain meetings with politicians in the regions I ultimately 
selected for my cases (Lombardy and Veneto) none came to fruition despite. Between the fall of 
2018 and the fall of 2019, I decided to conduct my interviews pertaining to Italy at the European 
Public Health Conference (in Ljubljana and Marseille, respectively). Here I contacted health 
experts and people affiliated with regional politics prior to the conferences and proceeded to 
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interview them during intermissions. While I received some interesting information regarding the 
Italian healthcare system as a whole and how healthcare works in certain regions, I was missing 
people familiar with the regions of Veneto and Lombardy. With the outbreak of the COVID-19 
in the early months of 2020, my planned Northern Italy trip for interviews was canceled and I 
was only able to interview two of the subjects over the internet as all others canceled. Given the 
travel restrictions placed on Italy, I will likely not be able to finish my interviews in person. As 
previously mentioned, this has presented a problem in the past as people, specifically politicians, 
are reluctant to schedule meetings online. To overcome the shortage of interview partners 
pertaining specifically to the regions of Lombardy and Veneto, I used a similar strategy to the 
one I employed for Austria – namely looking more towards Italian health and political science 
researchers and Italian political scientists. 
 
Interview Approach and Questions 
The interviews were conducted in an iterative process. Cold Emails, professional social 
media sites (researchgate, linkedIn), word of mouth and conferences were used to establish 
contact and schedule interviews. Due to the fact that this research falls under the IRB 
(International Review Board) exempt category two, recording of the subjects was possible as 
there was only minimal risk to the subjects. Therefore, all interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.   
A combination of snowball sampling and quota sampling ensured that representation was 
based on: (a) geographical region, (b) relation to healthcare system, (c) if applicable, political 
affiliation. The snow-ball sampling approach (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) was taken, despite 
its risk of inconsistency, as this was the best way to reach interviewees that have substantial 
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knowledge of the healthcare system as well as insights into the political parties and systems. In 
addition, politicians, specifically right winged ones, are not always willing to speak to 
researchers and also do not believe in the value of research, therefore snowballing was the best 
way to obtain a larger sample of this group as well as of people willing to discuss right winged 
politics in general. I also followed quota sampling, which implies that the choice of the actual 
sample units is left up to the interviewer (Moser, 1952). This sampling method was specifically 
chosen because I previously decided on the breakdown of the sample, but I just did not know 
how many people I would be able to attain for each category.  
The interview template (see Appendix F) I used to complete my semi-structured 
interviews eased into the discussion with a general, easy to answer question not necessarily 
relevant for my research. This initial question changed from interview to interview as it 
depended very much on whom I was speaking with. The following questions focused on the 
interviewee’s experiences with the PRR party or actor in question. This could range from how 
they saw them as governing partners to how they would analyze the health policy decisions 
implemented by PRR in government to the general impact of PRR in government.  
 
Document Analysis 
Document and interview coding occurred in an iterative process using the software MAXQDA, a 
qualitative software package for qualitative data organization and analysis. Coding is a heuristic, 
meaning it is an exploratory technique that helps in problem solving without having to rely on set 
formulas to follow (Saldaña, 2009). Coding was used in this dissertation to link data (in this case 
document analysis and interviews) to ideas (Richards and Morse, 2007). The software 
MAXQDA aided in the organization, coding, mapping of the decision-making processes and the 
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establishment of inter-coder reliability for all interviews and textual sources. The generated 
codes (see Appendix A) were then grouped into themes using a deductive and latent approach. A 
deductive approach was chosen because I already had several preconceived themes that I was 
expecting to find based on my literature review and the theory surrounding PRR parties. 
I triangulated between interviews, official documents, media news and previously 
published research to effectively establish what health and social policies were enacted by PRR 
parties in government as well as why other policies failed to be implemented. The document 
coding and interview coding occurred in an iterative process.  
I conducted open coding to allow for other, non-pre-determined themes to arise from the 
data and I enlisted a secondary coder to code for inter-rater reliability thereby enhancing the 
validity of the measurements.  
 
Text Data 
I collected archival documents at national and regional/provincial levels to provide an 
institutional context behind the policy decision made during the PRR governments. This body of 
text includes laws and regulations passed at both the state and regional/provincial levels on 
relevant policies such as the health insurance mergers in Austria, the revocation of the No 
Smoking Act or the “evolution of the social and healthcare system in Lombardy”. At the national 
level in Austria, I used the publicly available parliamentary database www.parlament.gv.at as 
well as the legal database https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/. The same strategy was used at the Italian 
national level using the publicly available parliamentary database www.parlamento.it/home and 
the legal database https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it. At the regional/provincial level, I visited each 
regional and provincial website to determine if any relevant health or social policies were passed 
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during my time of study. The analysis of legal and historical documents has built the framework 
for the comparative analysis of both countries and supplement as well as complement the 
interviews giving a holistic and thorough picture of the PRR’s impact on policies.  
 
Analyzing Across Cases 
A cross case analysis is one that seeks to examine themes, similarities and also differences across 
cases by teasing out the complex processes involved in policy development (Mathison, 2005). 
Process tracing also aids in this process by examining the main factors at work thereby extracting 
themes in order to compare findings across individual cases. Comparing results across different 
cases allows me to understand and theorize how political decision-making is influenced by 
contextual arrangements in each case –institutional structures, ideology, economic and social 
factors, and existing lateral policies – to be able explain the relationship between context and 
divergent policy outcomes.  
 This form of analysis provides me with a template for exploring the similarities and 
differences of my cases in a way that supports their generalizability and theoretical predictions. 
This analysis will present itself in the final chapter of the dissertation when I analyze my cases in 
comparison to one another with particular focus on how the PRR in the discussed cases 
responded to the corona pandemic. The analysis will allow for the emergence of generalizable 
themes that can then be used to address similar issues (the PRR in government and their impact 




This chapter has demonstrated the methods used in my dissertation and the next chapters will 
showcase their application. Chapter 4 will explain the national case of Austria and highlight the 
impact of the PRR on health and social policies at the federal level, while Chapter 5 will do the 
same looking at the subnational level. Chapters 6 and 7 do the same things for Italy (national and 
subnationally). Chapter 8 will apply the concepts discussed in the previous chapters to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the final chapter will conclude the dissertation. 
 70 
 : The National Case of Austria 
 
“The FPÖ has absolutely no impact on health whatsoever, you are wasting your time.” 
- Hans-Peter Doskozil (SPÖ) 
 
This chapter will begin by looking at the Austria system including its welfare model and 
healthcare system. Then the chapter will proceed to the case of the FPÖ in national government. 
A history of the FPÖ tracing their transition from a predominantly welfare populist party in 
government into one that adapted a welfare chauvinist approach to governing will be given. Then 
the chapter will move into the history of the FPÖ tracing their transition from a predominantly 
welfare populist party in government into one that adapted a welfare chauvinist approach to 
governing. Health-related policy decisions, both indirect, through social policies, and direct, 
through health policies, will be traced back to the year 2000 when the FPÖ first entered into the 
national government coalition14. A short section will reflect on the FPÖs reaction to the COVID-
19 and the conclusion will summarize the findings. The goal of this chapter is twofold: 1) to lay 
out what the FPÖ actually does in government with regards to social and health policies and 2) to 
establish what type (welfare populist, chauvinist, liberal or conservative) of health and social 
policies the FPÖ pass when in government. The result will be a detailed account of what the FPÖ 
                                               
 
14 The FPÖ was in a governmental coalition with the SPÖ between 1983 and 1986, however at that time the FPÖ was classified 
as a more liberal party (Huber, 2009). 
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accomplished in terms of health and social policies during their time in government and 
subsequently what impact these policies had on the Austrian population. 
 
The Austrian System in Brief 
Austria is a landlocked country with 8.66 million inhabitants (Statistik Austria, 2015), of whom 
51.2% are women (Hofmarcher, 2013b). Being a federal, parliamentary, representative 
democratic republic, each of the nine “Länder”, except for Vienna, is divided into administrative 
regions, then branching into local authorities. The federal legislative power is divided between 
the government and the two chambers of parliament known as the national and federal councils. 
The judiciary system is solely federal, independent of the legislative and executive branches, 
meaning there are no state courts in Austria.  
 
Social Insurance System 
The Austrian social insurance system contains three separate branches of insurance: health, 
accident and pension. These were represented within 22 insurance companies belonging to the 
umbrella organization Hauptverband der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger 
(Hauptverband) or the “Main Association of Austrian Social Security Institutions” until the 
ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government (2017-2019) changed the number of insurance companies to 5. 
This change saw the merger of the nine (one for each of the nine federal states) different regional 
health insurance funds (GKKs), covering most private-sector employees, into one common 
“Austrian Health Fund” (ÖGK) see Figure 6. The ÖGK, however, continues to have nine district 
branches, equipped with some managerial powers. The five company-based occupational health 
insurance funds (BKKs) had the opportunity to either opt into the Austrian Health Insurance 
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Fund, or to continue to exist independently as “private welfare providers”. The insurance 
institutions for trade and industry (SVA) and for farmers (SVB) were merged into a common 
insurance institution for the self-employed (SVS). Similarly, the insurance institutions for public 
service employees (BVA) and for the railway and mining industries (VAEB) were merged into a 
joint insurance institution, administering pension, health and accident insurance for these groups 
BVAEB. The pension insurance fund PVA and the accident insurance fund AUVA stayed 
mostly as they were. As can be seen, insurance holders are not able to freely choose their 
insurance fund, which means that there is also no regulated competition between the insurance 
funds (Hofmarcher M. M., 2013b).  
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Figure 6 Change in Austrian Social Insurance System 
 
Source: (Pecher, 2018). 
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 Most social policy fields, health included, fall within the legislative competencies of the 
national government (Article 10, 12 B-VG). There are two factors that play a role within the 
health system, the social insurance funds, as described above, and the hospitals. The health 
insurance funds attain their revenue through employee and employer contributions meaning that 
the Länder have a financial connection to the social insurance funds, however they have limited 
control over the social insurance funds (Obinger, 2005). Hospitals, on the other hand, fall more 
heavily into the Länder jurisdiction. The national government is responsible for setting up the 
framework legislation while the Länder are given the responsibility for the more detailed 
legislation, for the implementation and for guaranteed hospital care within each province 
(Mätzke and Stöger, 2015).  
 The social insurance funds are a part of the social protection system in Austria. The 
Austrian social insurance system contains three separate branches of insurance: health, accident 
and pension. Insurance holders are not able to freely choose their insurance fund, which means 
that there is also no regulated competition between the insurance funds (Hofmarcher M. M., 
2013b). 
 
The Healthcare System 
Austrian health insurance makes up one part of the Austrian social insurance system. The system 
was founded on the Bismarckian principles, which, as opposed to the Beveridge national health 
insurance system, is a social one based on contributions from wages.  The general difficulty 
within the Austrian healthcare system is that healthcare is represented by a number of different 
actors, and therefore the complexity of the setup often gets in the way of its efficiency. 
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 There are three characteristic features of the Austrian healthcare system: Firstly, 
healthcare competencies are shared between the state (federal government) and the nine Austrian 
provinces or Länder. Secondly, the healthcare systems function through a high degree of 
delegation to self-governing bodies. And finally, Austria has a mixed model of healthcare 
financing, where 75% is financed by social insurance contributions and the state, to almost equal 
shares, and 25% comes from private sources such as PHI, OOPP, etc. (Hofmarcher M. 
M.,2013b). 
Health on a federal level is overseen by the Austrian parliament, the BMG or Federal 
Ministry of Health, the BMASK or Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer 
Protection, and the social security institutions (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, 2013; Zanon, 
2016). Typically, legislation and enforcement are executed by the federal government, however 
several competencies are delegated to the Länder or to social security institutions. Basically, 
what this means is that the federal government determines the regulatory framework of the 
Austrian healthcare system and delegates statutory tasks to legally authorized stakeholders 
(Hofmarcher M. M., 2013a) such as the Länder and social insurance funds.  
The Länder and local authorities play a key role in the establishment, implementation and 
also the supervision of the public health care system (Hofmarcher M. M., 2013b). Specific duties 
of the Länder include ensuring adequate hospital capacity, public health services, administration 
of social benefits and the provision of preventative services (Figure 7). In addition, the Länder 
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have departments geared to health promotion and health statistics, to name a few (Hofmarcher 
M. M., 2013b).  
Figure 7 Division of Healthcare Competencies in Austria 
 
 
The Political System 
Austria is classified as being a premier presidential regime because its Chancellor has greater 
executive power than its President (Roper, 2002). These regime types are especially common in 
Eastern Europe and are also considered the most popular form of semipresidentialism (Roper, 
2002). Researchers believe however that this classification is misleading as “Austrian presidents 
are only strong on paper” (Sartori 1997, pg 126) and the country should therefore be considered 
a parliamentary regime.  
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Shugart and Carey developed a way to measure premier presidential power dividing them 
into two dimensions: legislative and non-legislative power (Shugart and Carey, 1992). The 
legislative powers include veto power, decree authority, reserved policy areas, budgetary powers 
and the ability to propose referenda. The non-legislative powers of a president include cabinet 
formation and dismissal, censure and dissolution of parliament. The measurement methods for 
premier presidential regimes were implemented for the case of Austria, among other European 
countries (Roper, 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992). 
According to these measurements, the Austrian president has no legislative powers; little 
say in cabinet formation; and a very strong impact on the dissolution of parliament. This shows 
that amongst all the countries that have popularly elected presidents, Austria along with Bulgaria 
and Romania are amongst the weakest in the European Union. The significant strength of the 
Austrian President is in his ability to revoke the formation of government.  
 The Austrian Constitutional Court (Vervassungsgerichtshof) is made up of a President, a 
Vice-President, twelve members and six substitutes. In Austria, all constitutional judges are 
completely independent and should not make decisions based on party politics once they take on 
their appointed role. The appointment of constitutional judges is however a political decision. All 
Justices are appointed by the President of Austria. The federal government along with the two 
chambers of the federal parliament (National and Federal Council), however, makes the 
recommendations to the President (Cole, 1959). The Justices remain in office until they reach the 
age of 70, meaning they are appointed for life (Faber, 2009). 
The competencies and tasks of the Austrian Constitutional Court can be summarized as 
follows, in order of importance (Faber, 2009): 
• the infringement of fundamental rights by an administrative ruling (Art. 144 
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• B-VG); 
• the constitutionality of statutes (Art. 140 B-VG); 
• the legality of administrative regulations (Art. 139 B-VG); 
• electoral disputes, in particular challenges to elections to the popular 
• representative bodies such as the National Council (Art. 141 B-VG) 
• rules on conflicts of jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies (Art. 138 
para. 1 B-VG)  
• determines the distribution of powers between the Federation and the Länder (Art. 
138 para. 2 B-VG)  
• conducts impeachment trials against the highest state officers for violation of the law 
in the conduct of their office (Art. 142 and 143 B-VG)  
The power of the Austrian Constitutional Court comes from its ability to solely review statues 
and repeal them. In addition, the Court can review every administrative decision. Judicial review 
must comply with all provisions of the constitutional law especially those found within the 
European Convention of Human Rights (Faber, 2009).  
Since its re-establishment after WWII in 1946, the powers of the court expanded. In 
1964, for example, the court was given the additional power to review the lawfulness of treaties. 
With an amendment in 1975 the provisions governing the review of laws and regulations was 
harmonized and the number of applicants entitled to file such a review was increased 
(Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich, n.d.). Many smaller revisions and amendments followed and 
can be seen on the Constitutional Court of Austria’s homepage. The most recent innovation was 
enforced in 2015 making it so that all courts of law have the right to challenge the 
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constitutionality of laws before the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof Österreich, 
n.d.).  
This is relevant because many FPÖ policy proposals were enforced only to be later 
overturned by the Austrian Constitutional Court. The power of this court can be seen in the fact 
that it has continuously denied politicians the ability to pass unconstitutional laws. For example, 
in 2002 the then FPÖ Minister of Interior issued a directive withdrawing state support for all 
asylum seekers besides Afghanis and Iraqis (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). This was withdrawn 
as it was found unconstitutional by the Austrian High Court due to its breach of fundamental 
human rights. The same thing happened when the attempt was made to withdraw government 
support from all asylum seekers accepting help from NGOs (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). In 
2003, again during the FPÖ participation in national government, a new asylum law restricted 
the appeals process for migrants; this was also struck down by the Austrian Constitutional Court 
(Akkerman and De Lange, 2012). Most recently, the Court declared the ban on wearing religious 
head coverings in schools, implemented by the previous ÖVP/FPÖ government, as 
unconstitutional. 
Parliament in Austria is made up of two houses responsible for passing bills into law. The 
national council (Nationalrat), commonly referred to as the lower house, is the constitutionally 
more powerful of the two houses and houses the federal legislative authority in Austria. The 
federal council (Bundesrat) is the upper house and represents the nine Länder on a federal level. 
The 183 members of the National Council are elected by national popular vote for five years and 
whereas the 61 members of the Federal Council are elected according to proportional 
representation by each of the state legislatures (Landtage) for five to six years. This implies that 
the makeup of the Federal Council is subject to change after each state election.  
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In order for bills to become laws in Austria the bill must first pass through the lower 
house and then be approved by the upper house. However, if the upper house does not approve 
the bill, it can go back to the lower house and can be voted on again. If it is passed in the lower 
house a second time the bill, simply becomes a law without the approval of the upper house. 
There are however three exceptions to this scenario: 
• Constitutional laws or regulations limiting the competencies of the federal states 
• Laws relating to the rights of the Federal Council itself 
• Treaties concerning the jurisdiction of the federal states.  
In general, the lower house is significantly more important and powerful than the upper one, 
which is why its makeup will be the focus within this dissertation. Only the National Council 
majority will be considered given that the Federal Council has significantly less power and really 
only has a say when it comes to decisions made about the Länder. In order to hold the majority in 
the National Council and thereby be able to form a governmental coalition, parties need at least 
96 of the 183 seats. A National Council majority is necessary in order for a governing coalition 
to form, thus, I will, go into some detail as to the nuances of the various majorities. These details 
can be found in Appendix B. Before starting with the national case, it is important to discuss the 
meaning of the party book economy in Austria as this is a reoccurring theme throughout the 
Austrian cases 
 
Party Book Economy 
 Party book economy, or Parteibuchwirtschaft, as it is known in the German speaking realm, 
occurs when positions in public service and in business enterprises under political party 
influence are allocated. This can also refer to the allocation of material goods, services or ideal 
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values such as medals or honors based on party membership (or the possession of a party book). 
Essentially party book management ignores the factual criteria typically applied to award 
processes, thereby making it a form very closely related to political corruption. This is especially 
the case when it comes to filling public positions in schools, courts and audit courts. Politicians 
make personnel decisions according to proportional representation and political power 
calculations (expanding their influence or granting favors for friends) (Von Arnim, 2000). 
 In Austria, the ÖVP and SPÖ were the major political players for decades and thus split 
the control of courts, banks, schools, etc. between themselves (proportional representation). 
When the FPÖ entered the political scene in in the early 1980’s, stopping the proportional 
representation and the party book economy was one of its main goals (Interviewee 1.3 
Politician). For more information see (Schmidt, 2010). 
 The dynamics surrounding the concept of party book economy is not only partly 
responsible for the FPÖ’s rise to power, but it also helps to explain why clientelism, of which it 
is a form, runs rampant within Austrian politics. While the FPÖ believed that the party book 
economy needed to be stopped, they certainly were not opposed to engage in clientelism (which 
is simply the exchange of goods or services for political support, without needing to belong to a 
certain party). As the following section as well as the next chapter will show, the FPÖ wanted to 
put an end to the party book economy so that they could also begin to influence the political 
structures within the country. 
 
Austria: The National Case 
The Federal Republic of Austria, located in the heart of Europe, boarded by Switzerland, Germany, 
Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia has had a long-standing history of 
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being governed by a “Grand Coalition” made up of the conservative Austrian People’s Party 
(ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ). In fact, there were only a handful of years where 
there was not a grand coalition on the federal level15, which is to say that these two parties 
dominated much of the post-war government. The other party that found itself in government three 
times was the Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ). Today this party is considered to be one of the most 
successful Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties in Europe (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016), but that was 
not always the case. 
 The FPÖ’s first years in government as a PRR party (2000-2005) were marked by internal 
arguments and scandals wherein their policies, mostly social, generally took the back seat. By their 
third round in a governmental coalition (2017-2019), the FPÖ was much better prepared and able 
to implement (with the support of the new ÖVP) many pivotal health and social policies.  
 
History of the FPÖ 
The Freedom Party was founded in 1956 as a successor party to the Federation of Independents 
(VdU) by former national socialist Anton Reinthaller as an alternative to the red-black coalition 
governments of the SPÖ and ÖVP (Ellinas, 2010). The party was formed by both an 
economically liberal, i.e., “doctors, lawyers and also business owners that were turned off by the 
clerical ÖVP – mostly people that weren’t Catholics” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist), and a 
nationalist wing. These diverging interests often made the creation of clear political strategies 
difficult seeing as the former was interested in free enterprise and the preservation of individual 
                                               
 
15 In 1966 the ÖVP was in government alone. Between 190 and 1979 the SPÖ was in government alone. From 1983 until 1986 
the SPÖ formed a coalition with the FPÖ. From 2002 until 2006 the ÖVP was in a governmental coalition with the FPÖ/BZO. In 
2017 until 2019 the ÖVP formed a coalition with the FPÖ and in 2019 the ÖVP joined forces with the Greens. 
 83 
liberties while the latter found its hold in the former Nazi philosophies. By 1958, upon the death 
of Reinthaller, Fredrich Peter took over the party and led it towards increased ties with the SPÖ. 
Under Norbert Steeger, “all the German nationals were pushed back” (Interviewee 1.2 Political 
Scientist), essentially removing them from the party and thereby allowing the FPÖ to pursue 
more of its liberal winged strategies. This strategy led to the FPÖ’s first stint in national 
government in 1983 as the SPÖ’s junior coalition partner. The relationship was short-lived as by 
1986 after just three years in a crisis filled coalition Steeger lost support within his party and was 
replaced by the charismatic Jörg Haider.  
Haider got elected by the nationalist faction of the FPÖ (only narrowly 
won over Steger) and thereby essentially sold himself to the 
nationalists, just like Strache did in order to get rid of Haider. The 
problem is that you can’t get rid of the nationalists (Interviewee 1.3 
Politician). 
 
Haider brought with him neo-Nazi tendencies that appealed to the parties conservative 
nationalists, an oratory gift that united him with his populous and an authoritarian grip that held 
together his party marking the FPÖ’s turn to the PRR party family (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). 
Haider “restructured the party similar to other PRR parties across Europe as the party of the 
“little man” – these blue-collar workers” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). Under Haider the 
FPÖ achieved great success in both national and provincial elections and was finally seen as a 
viable alternative to the ÖVP and SPÖ (Figure 1). Haider began by 
critiquing the elites – those up there they don’t understand you. He 
called Vranitsky (former Cancellor of Austria – SPÖ) a 
“Nadelstreifsozialist” (pin-striped socialist) because of course this 
identification with the director of a bank and “Nadelstreif” (pinstriped) 
supporting the interest of the industry workers or the simple people this 
contrast is something Haider consistently tried to very visually present 
to people – through such terms. This upset Vranitsky terribly because 




By focusing his anger on the elites (the SPÖ at the time), Haider was able to unite 
communists, socialists and Social Democrats and bring them onto his 
side. This wasn’t a sole achievement on his part rather we can see these 
changes everywhere because of the modernization processes. There are 
groups that aren’t able to cope with the change – we call these people 
in political science the modernization losers – and even then in the 80s, 
with the beginning of globalization – computers came, the borders 
opened, the EU developed – and that was a time where a lot of people, 
especially those that were less educated, felt threated by the immigrants 
and these are exactly the people that he was able to get on his side 
(Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). 
 
As a result, Haider’s most popular political goal evolved into cutting down the number of 
foreigners allowed to live in the country. In 1991, he was able to pass a law stating that no more 
than 10% of the country's workforce could be made up of foreign workers16. This anti-foreigner 
sentiment is what would lead to increased tensions between the liberal and conservative factions 
of the party, resulting in the liberal faction leaving to form their own party in 1993. 
  
From Welfare Populism to Welfare Chauvinism 
The Haider period of the FPÖ (1986 to 2005) followed two main goals: 1) breaking the 
SPÖ/ÖVP dominance within the Austrian political party system and 2) Solidifying the FPÖ as a 
votable party fit to take part in a government coalition. The first point was a success as the SPÖ 
and ÖVP parties were forced to broaden their political party spectrum. The second point turned 
out to be more problematic for the party ultimately resulting in a new party leader and a 
complete rebranding of the FPÖ.  
                                               
 
16 This was reduced to 9% in 1993 under the Resident Alien Law. 
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The FPÖ under Haider marked the party's turn from liberal to PRR (Bailer and Neugebauer, 
1998). This was not only made visible through party members extreme right and neo-Nazi 
sympathies, but also through Haider’s policies which offered simple solutions to complex 
problems. Haider presented his party as a new “workers party” wherein he sought to 1) decrease 
the power of the bureaucracy (trade unions, institutional structures, SPÖ), which he accomplished 
by passing the Pension Reform in 2000 wherein the Social Partners role was significantly 
decreased (Schludi, 2005; Talos and Kittel, 2001)  2) increase welfare benefits for the average 
worker whilst trying to simultaneously reduce these same benefits for bureaucrats17 and 
immigrants (Hacklerregelung in Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). In essence these were fairly 
contradictory goals. On the one hand, presumably wanting to decrease the generosity of the welfare 
system for bureaucrats by first and foremost removing their overwhelming influence on welfare 
policies while on the other increasing welfare benefits for the native working class. The policies 
passed during the FPÖs time in government under the leadership of Haider however resulted in 
benefit cuts for all leading to a loss in support for the FPÖ in 2000 (see Figure 8). So, what started 
out to be an engagement towards welfare populistic policies quickly turned to liberal chauvinistic 
ones. The impact that Haider left on Austrian politics, however, was great: 
Although Haider as a person was always fervently sidelined, his content 
was not. The ÖVP/SPÖ coalition adapted many of his claims within the 
big coalition. Ex. Ausländer Volksbegehren (foreigner referendum) – 
everything was implemented: restrictive immigration, longer 
proceedings to become a citizen and all these things. Thematically, 
Haider quickly took control, but was personally always excluded 
(Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 
                                               
 
17 Attacks against bureaucratic privileges stopped once the FPÖ entered government (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). 
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So, while many of Haider’s welfare chauvinistic ideas did not come to fruition during his 
leadership of the FPÖ, they did become part of the ÖVP/SPÖ party programs after his death. 
Figure 8 FPÖ vote share at parliamentary elections 1983-2019 
 
Source: Adapted from (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). 
 
Following the FPÖs stint in government that led to a massive decrease in support, the FPÖ 
went in yet another direction under the leadership of Heinz Christian Strache. When Strache took 
over the party in 2006 he rebranded it as “die Soziale Heimatpartei” (the social homeland party) 
(Austrian Press Agency, 2005), thereby increasing its anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and pro welfare 
state messaging. This approach, known as welfare chauvinism, emphasizes generous welfare 
benefits for ‘the people’ and reduced benefits for “foreigners” (Falkenbach and Greer, 2018b; 
Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017), which found great appeal with the socially disadvantaged native 
population (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016). Whereas Haider’s main policy points were immigration and 
pension reforms, under Strache the FPÖ made immigration their core issue while finding a 
moderate tone on socio-economic issues. This change in both leadership and policy focus paid off 
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as the party under Strache began recovering, reaching former heights by 2017 (Figure 8). The FPÖ 
under Strache was exceptionally successful until the 2019 “Ibiza affair”18 that led to a dismissal of 
the ÖVP/FPÖ government and the removal of Strache from the party. Since that point the FPÖ has 
been struggling to find a charismatic leader to turn the party’s luck around at the polls. 
  
The FPÖ and their Social Policies 
Haider and Strache had several things in common: Charisma19, dedicated followers and a drive to 
implement strict immigration policies to limit the number of foreigners residing in Austria.  
One of Haider’s greatest accomplishments in this realm was maintaining one of the most restrictive 
regimes on family reunions for foreigners (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016), consistent with his 
aversion to European integration. Strache’s greatest anti-immigrant feat was the passage of the 
Family Equalization Law, detailed below. Among their differences, however, was the way in 
which they pursued social policies.  
  
Haider 2000-2005 
Surprisingly, when the FPÖ was asked to join the ÖVP as junior partner in the 2000 governmental 
coalition, Jörg Haider, the head of the party at the time, opted to stay in Carinthia as governor 
saying that he would only go to Vienna as Chancellor (Badzic, 2008). Instead, Susanne Riess-
                                               
 
18 A 2017 video was released to the press in the Spring of 2019 showing Austrian vice chancellor, Heinz-Christian Strache, 
discussing with a woman that he believed to be the niece of a Russian oligarch. In the video Strache promised the woman public 
contracts in exchange for campaign support. Upon release Strache and the entire FPÖ team stepped down and Chancellor Kurz 
called for snap elections (Oltermann 2019). 
19 “Although Haider was able to speak to these people more than Strache because he was seen as a legitimate intellectual person, 
and it is generally known that Strache does not have that quality. Which can be seen in the difference of appearance. Haider came 
to the Ash Wednesday meeting in a pin stripe suit, then he talked at a bank, at night he was at a firefighter party and the next day 
he was at some sport party, he always had four changes of clothes in his car, and he was able to speak to everyone. Strache was 
always the same, at the end he became a bit snobby” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). 
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Passer assumed the role of vice chancellor for the FPÖ until 2002 when she was replaced by 
Herbert Haupt. Although Haider did not take the position of vice chancellor, a move that many 
argue weakened the party (Austrian Press Agency, 2003), he did still try to assume control of the 
ongoings in Vienna (Austrian Press Agency, 2004a). Thus, although Haider was not vice 
chancellor in the national governmental coalition, he was still head of the FPÖ and very much 
controlled the party's direction. 
As previously mentioned, the FPÖ under Haider would have ideally followed a welfare 
populistic path with regards to social policy, however, his coalition partner prevented this pushing 
him more onto a typical conservative one wherein cuts were made across the board not regarding 
“in” or “out” groups. This can be seen through the pension reform passed in 2000 and fully 
implemented by 2002. All FPÖ manifestos between 1986 and 1999 called for cuts to or the 
abolition of politicians’ pension privileges or severance rights (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016) whereas 
the ÖVP wanted to abolish the early retirement scheme, increase financial penalties for each gap 
year in contributions, lower the conversion rate for each year of contribution and substantially 
change how pensions were calculated (Afonso, 2014). In an effort to reach a zero deficit three 
years ahead of schedule (politically important for both parties), the compromise that ensued was 
an increase in the early retirement age of 1.5 years for both men and women, an increase in the 
statutory age of retirement for public employees, increased penalties for people retiring sooner 
than the statutory age of 60 for women and 65 for men, and it completely abolished all newly 
granted widows’ pensions for retirees, whose own pension entitlements exceed a certain income 
limit (Schuldi, 2005). Consistent with the FPÖ’s desire to dismantle the traditional social 
partnership system (Greer and Falkenbach, 2017) from which it was excluded, the FPÖ notably 
tried to condition its support for the pension reform on a 40% cut in the mandatory contributions 
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of individuals to the Austrian Chamber of Labour, thereby decreasing the union's institutional 
influence and satisfying a promise to its core voters, but the ÖVP rejected the demand. The result 
was that the FPÖ essentially went along with the ÖVP’s Conservative plans, garnering them much 
backlash from their core voters (this may have also influenced the drop in voter support during 
this period - Figure 1). 
The social policies passed during the FPÖs governmental stay under Haider’s leadership 
from afar can be summarized as having been primarily influenced by the ÖVP as they were 
generally in line with conservative policy changes in other countries (Heinisch, 2003a), but they 
also served to weaken institutional networks and break ties with the traditional corporatist 
structures (Röth et al., 2017). The radical and oft populistic tendencies that shone through every 
once in a while, were eloquently contained by the ÖVP (or the constitutional court) and therefore 
not particularly noticeable in implementation. In essence, when in government during this time, 
the FPÖ helped to enact a series of classical conservative reforms and fiscal measures that ended 
up being felt most acutely by the very same people the party had wanted to protect - workers 
(Heinisch, 2003a). This, along with the split of the FPÖ,20 led to a radical decline in the polls 
(see Figure 1) until Heinz Christian Strache’s leadership coupled with Haider’s death gave the 
party a new wind.  
  
Strache 2017-2019 
                                               
 
20 In 2005, Haider split with the FPÖ to form the BZÖ which immediately took the place of the FPÖ in the coalition with the ÖVP. 




The former Health and Social Minister, Beate Hartinger-Klein (FPÖ) summarized the FPÖ agenda 
during their 2017-2019 governmental period as “new” and advocated for “social justice” (Austrian 
Parliament, 2019b). This fit well with the nativist stance the “new” ÖVP (Schultheis, 2017), under 
chancellor Kurz, was taking (Gady, 2017). Both the ÖVP and FPÖ supported cuts for foreigners, 
whereby refugees marked the starting point for broader cuts sealing their government program as 
politically neoliberalistic and welfare chauvinistic (Becker, 2018). During their two year stay in 
government several different social policies were passed, three of which were distinctly welfare 
chauvinistic in practice. 
Beginning with the Family Bonus Plus regulation (Austrian Parliament, 2018c) every 
family would receive a tax credit of €1500 per child per year up until the children's 18th birthday 
thereby reducing that tax burden of parents. Upon first glance this seems to be a very generous, 
pro-welfare move. However, upon closer examination the tax credit applies only to families whose 
children live in Austria or EU countries (including Switzerland). This regulation was heavily 
criticized by the opposition because it lacked differentiation between the various socio-economic 
groups implying that the motivation for the reform was a cultural one and not redistributive 
(Austrian Parliament, 2018a) seeing as families from more Eastern European countries with their 
proportionately larger families would get less. In addition, the credit would be less if the child lives 
in an Eastern European country21 (Seidl, 2018), increasing the welfare chauvinistic style of the 
reform. 
                                               
 
21 Childcare money is matched to the amount the child would receive in the country where it resides. So, while a 0-2-year-old 
Austrian child would €114, a 0-2 child living in Bulgaria whose parents work in Austria would only receive €51,30. Similarly, a 
0-2 child living in Luxembourg whose parents work in Austria would receive €134,52. 
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In November of 2018, Health and Social Minister Hartinger-Klein (FPÖ) proposed the new 
minimum income law which would standardize the minimum income across the country while 
also tightening eligibility rules, promoting general cost efficiency and decreasing the dumping “of 
immigration into the Austrian social system” (Austrian Parliament, 2019a). The law was proposed, 
in particular to increase the fairness for Austrians wherein Chancellor Kurz argued that “there are 
more minimum income recipients than the entire population of Burgenland”, and that “every 2nd 
person that receives this money is not an Austrian citizen” (ORF, 2019). The proposal stated that 
a single person would receive €863 per month, which is the same as in the current law. The 
difference is, if that single person “does not speak German well or at least speak English, that 
amount would be reduced to €563 per month” (Interviewee 1.6 health and welfare expert). In 
addition, the proposal sees that families with children would no longer receive the same amount 
of money per child. Instead, “after the 2nd child the amount received per subsequent child would 
decrease substantially” (Interviewee 1.6 health and welfare expert). This additional condition 
targets, in particular, families with many children - i.e., migrant families. Excluded from any 
benefits according to the legislation are criminal offenders, foreigners without residence permit as 
well as asylum seekers – in short, minority groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy according 
to the PRR. Health and Social Minister Hartinger-Klein (FPÖ) summed up the proposal nicely: 
“Fairness for Austrians, others have to wait” (Krutzler, 2018). While the proposal was never 
implemented due to the governments premature termination resulting from the Ibiza scandal, this 
is certainly an example of welfare chauvinism and clearly “shows which groups the FPÖ is in 
favor of supporting with the guaranteed minimum income and which it wants to exclude” 
(Interviewee 1.4 Politician). 
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The last social policy change, the Family Equalization Law Amendment, was implemented 
on January 1st 2019 wherein child support for parents working in Austria whose children live 
outside of the country would be adjusted to the child support standards of the country in which the 
child resides (Austrian Parliament, 2018b). This implied that Austrian employees whose children 
reside in Eastern and South-Eastern European EU countries would receive reduced benefits. The 
desired effect of the policy was to prevent the abuse of welfare payments by other EU nationals 
that live in Austria and would be, under European law, eligible for social security provisions for 
their children, even if those children live in another country. The hidden agenda herein was to 
make Austria less attractive for economic migrants. This amendment could very well be 
categorized as being welfare chauvinistic seeing as the government wanted to prevent the welfare 
state from being seen as an instrument catering to those “undeserving of assistance”, i.e., economic 
migrants. 
While the FPÖ ran on and promised welfare populistic social policies in the late 90’s, 
what resulted were ÖVP led conservative policies that ended up hurting the FPÖ voter base 
resulting in decreased support for the party by the early 2000s. The FPÖ government under 
Strache between 2017 and 2019 generally advocated for, and at times was even able to pass 
welfare chauvinistic social policies with the help of the new ÖVP. The reason that the FPÖ under 
Strache was able to play more towards its own agenda of welfare chauvinism was because 
his coalition partner, the “new” ÖVP under Kurz, was not only seen as being more right leaning 
(Austrian Press Agency, 2017) than his predecessors (i.e. Schüssel), but also because the party 
moved away from its values surrounding Catholicism and tradition and more towards a value 
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base that was situationally elastic and unable to be clearly defined22. In fact, many political 
scientists and commentators feel that the new ÖVP is taking on the role of the FPÖ (Bartlau, 
2019; Bodlos and Plescia, 2018; Lackner, 2017; Liebhart, 2019; Löffler, 2020). These 
characteristics combined with the FPÖ’s Austria first mentality in the health and social sectors 
(Interviewee 1.3) made the governing coalition that formed between the new ÖVP and the FPÖ 
particularly precarious seeing as both parties favored welfare chauvinistic policies accompanying 
an anti-immigrant political discourse.  
 
The FPÖ’s Role in Shaping Health Policies 
In two of the three times that the FPÖ participated in coalition governments they controlled the 
health ministry (2000 to 2003 and 2017 to 2019). The 2000 ÖVP-FPÖ coalition did not introduce 
deep systemic changes to the health care system; however, smaller regulations, such as a partial 
renunciation from the free co-insurance for couples without children or a new law to raise private 
patient contributions were introduced (Tálos, E., & Obinger, 2019; Unterthurner, 2007). As part 
of the national government, the FPÖ has also contributed to major structural reforms, which began 
to take shape between 2000 and 2003 and were consolidated in the second ÖVP-FPÖ coalition 
between 2017 and 2019 (Hofmarcher, 2019). What is particularly interesting in light of these 
structural reforms is that while the FPÖ/ÖVP governments in both 2000 and again in 2017 aimed 
at reconstructing the social insurances, the SPÖ/ÖVP government between 2007 and 2017 
attempted to strengthen the coordination and cooperation between the different actors within 
Austrian health care system (Hofmarcher, 2019). Furthermore, the FPÖ positioned itself as a harsh 
                                               
 
22 Interviewee 1.11 Austrian Public Health Expert. 
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opponent of tobacco regulations and pushed to overturn a planned smoking ban in bars and 
restaurants in 2018. 
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The Social Insurance Merger 
The reshaping of the social insurance system was a key target in the 2017-2019 ÖVP/FPÖ 
government. Although this merger was something that the ÖVP readily agreed to, it was a 
political decision originally brought forth by Jörg Haider in 1988 (Neubauer, 2019). Haider’s 
reasoning behind the merger was political, namely destroying the SPÖ stronghold and replacing 
several of the SPÖ’s officials with his own. While some politicians posit his goal was “cost-
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saving (as the 21 different health insurances cost too much and were too bureaucratic to manage)  
and more so to be able to have more control over the officials23” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician) 
others assert that the “FPÖ always followed the big goal of destroying the structures of the social 
insurance system” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician), put differently, “Haider’s biggest argument for 
the merger was to break up this red black Proporz system (proportional representation)” 
(Interviewee 1.8 Politician).  
In December 2018, the Austrian parliament adopted the Social Insurance Organizational 
Act (SV-OG), which merged the preexisting 21 social insurance institutions into only five 
institutions. These five institutions are now represented by an umbrella organization 
(Dachverband), instead of the former “Federation of Social Insurance Institutions”. Despite the 
fact that the European Commission approved the reduction of social insurance companies in 
Austria, the implementation and consequences of this massive structural change is worth a closer 
look. 
On the homepage of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Health, the reform is described as 
“ensuring an efficient and modern social insurance system, which is closer to ordinary people.” 
(Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs Health Care and Consumer Protection, 2020). To achieve this 
goal, the plan was to reduce costs through a merger.  Thus, the nine regional insurance institutions 
for privately employed citizens were merged into one national “Austrian” health insurance fund 
                                               
 
23 “After WWII, Austria had the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Communists and the Association of the Independents – 
all other parties were prohibited. Up until Haider took over the FPÖ, everything was divided in Austria between red and black. 
There were red banks and black banks, red social insurance institutions, black social insurance institutions, red car clubs and 
black car clubs. So, everything was split, and these masses of officials were tied to each party. No other party could place 




(Österreichische Gesundheitskasse, ÖGK). In addition, the Insurance Institution for Public-Sector 
Employees (BVA) and the insurance institution for Railway and Mining workers (VAEB) were 
merged into the Public-Sector Employees, Railways and Mining (BVAEB) and finally, the 
insurance institutions for trade and industry and for farmers were merged into a common insurance 
institution for the self-employed (SVS). 
The most criticized components of this reform were a) the proportional representation of 
employer and employee organizations in the newly merged insurance institutions b) the emergence 
of a three-tiered medical system (privately employed, state employed and self-employed citizens) 
depending on what type of profession you work in and c) the reduction of administrative costs 
(Hofmarcher, 2019) by 1 billion Euros (Jungwirth, 2018), in line with Haider’s vision 30 years 
prior. The critical fact was, however that the reform was projected to cost more to execute than it 
would save. 
This reform created a proportional representation system within the newly merged social 
insurance institutions leading to a further power shift in favor of employer organizations and a 
degradation of the role of labor unions (Hofmarcher, 2019).  
The FPÖ sought to change the governance model of the social 
insurances at its very core. Before the 2000-2003 ÖVP/FPÖ 
government, we had a worker’s majority in the governance of the social 
insurance institution – meaning 2/3 representation came from trade 
unions and 1/3 came from employers. The FPÖ wanted to change this 
to a parity, OK? And in 2000 they did not succeed in making any 
changes. Immediately after they came to power again in 2017, the FPÖ 
took up this issue again and succeeded in really transcending this idea 
of parity of employers and employees on all levels of social insurance 
and not only on the executive level (Interviewee 1.14 Health Economics 
Expert & Advisor). 
 
Furthermore, even though the reform targeted a merger of health insurance institutions, the 
differentiation between professions remains an integral part of the Austrian social insurance 
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system. Consequently, existing inequalities were not resolved because the reimbursement is still 
different depending on which institution citizens are assigned to. One of the main reasons the 
ÖVP helped the FPÖ push this reform was to change the “governance model towards supporting 
more liberal economic interests” (Interviewee 1.14 Health Economics Expert & Advisor) 
however, “the savings that it was supposed to produce was just recently negated through a report 
meaning that it will cost a lot more than it will save” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician). In fact, 
“nobody has been able to present this savings potential in a credible way” (Interviewee 1.5 
Politician). 
The ÖVP wanted to reduce health expenditures through the merger, while the FPÖ 
wanted to buy themselves into more high-level positions within the social insurance system. 
Through the combination of their interests what they achieved was the end of the majority 
representation within the social insurances thereby weakening the trade unions, increased high-
level positions for the FPÖ within the system thereby getting rid of many SPÖ officials and huge 
merger costs due to increased bureaucracy instead of the savings promised by the ÖVP. As to 
whether the merger idea was ÖVP or FPÖ driven, this can be debated: 
I would think it was an FPÖ idea. If I remember correctly, already 
under Haider, one of the biggest demands was the merger of the over 
20 different health insurances and thus I think that the driver in this 
reform was the FPÖ. But the other, and this is where the ÖVP enters 
the game, was a wonderful chance to expand their political power. To 
change things (structures and positions) completely, i.e. To construct 
the self-administration in such a way that the influence of businesses 
and employers expanded greatly compared to what it previously was. 
So, the demand by the FPÖ that they want to take on the red/black 
juggernaut, which fit into the plans of the ÖVP as they saw it as an 
opportunity to expand their power by being able to put their people 
(new ÖVP-turquoise) in positions of power (within the healthcare area 
– previously a “red”/SPÖ stronghold) (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). 
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One thing however remains to be the case “the population still has a social insurance system and 
there are very few that are excluded from that and when one changes the structure of the social 
insurances there will still be no change in the fact that the people will be insured” (Interviewee 
1.1 Health Expert / Politician). However, “in several years we will see that it cost the system a 
lot of money which will result in less services for the patients. For me this is neo-liberalism pure 
and goes into the direction that debt gets nationalized and profit get privatized. And here the 
ÖVP and FPÖ are on the same ideological spectrum.” (Interviewee 1.15 Politician).  
 The predicted result of the merger according to countless interviews with politicians and 
healthcare professionals is an increase in bureaucracy leading to an increase in costs and an 
eventual decrease in health care services covered by the social insurances. The merger, as 
reported by the LSE in 2017, should have addressed the broader structural problems of the 
Austrian social insurance and the health system in general (London School of Economics, 2017). 
Some of the most important points laid out by the LSE report, commissioned by the SPÖ/ÖVP 
government in 2016, were adjusting the risk between the different health insurance providers and 
the nine provinces; rethinking the centralized planning for budget and services; and harmonizing 
the quality of services provided in the nine provinces. However, the result, ended up 
concentrating on institutional issues in the narrowest of senses and does not come close to 
solving the major structural problems of the Austrian social insurance, most specifically the 
health insurance system.  
In addition, because the merger created three different health insurances, each directed 
towards a different working class group (bureaucrats, self-employed and employed) we will not 
see an equitable decrease in services (Fink, 2018). Instead, I predict that the employed coupled 
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with the migrants will likely be subjected to the biggest cuts thereby bypassing a two-tiered 
healthcare system and moving right up to a three-tiered healthcare system. 
 
A Separate Social Insurance for Migrants 
In 2017, when the ÖVP and FPÖ were speaking about the merger of the 21 health insurances, the 
FPÖ wanted to create a 6th insurance just for migrants. The idea was to establish a parallel health 
insurance for non-EU nationals living in Austria who would receive less services than others, 
with more out-of-pocket-payments. This information was never released to the public, nor was it 
ever discussed in any media, so people outside of the political realm did not know about these 
plans. Interviews confirm this fact: 
 
Yes, I have heard about this (the creation of a parallel insurance for 
migrants), but I don’t take this very seriously. I have heard about this, but 
I have no further information. It is consistent with the FPÖ because if you 
think about the redistribution of risks and what they have done with the 
merger. They have pooled the higher risks and pooled the low risks. So 
again, we do not have risk equity process which would be useful. Creating 
a migrant insurance is another risk layer. Now they are at least in the pool 
of the 7 million insured by the ÖGK, but they (ÖKG insured) themselves 
have already higher risks compared to the smaller merged insurances 
because you have in those smaller funds you have the self-employed, 
officials, civil servants, and they do not have many risks compared with 
those in the ÖGK (Interviewee 1.14 Health Economics Expert & Advisor). 
 
I have heard about these plans for a parallel insurance more as a rumor. 
They were brought up in some speeches about the reform of the regional 
health insurance funds, […] that this foreigner insurance fund too, is still 
a dream of the FPÖ, and has been aggressively discussed [...]. I think 
many constitutional lawyers who still exist in the ÖVP have not gone that 




                                               
 
24 Interview taken from (Spahl and Falkenbach, 2021). 
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Naturally, this separate social insurance for migrants did not come to fruition, but it clearly 
demonstrates the FPÖs welfare chauvinistic intentions if they would not have been hindered by 
the institutions (Parliament) or their own coalition partner, as one assumes happened. 
 
Private Hospitals Financing Fund 
Another health policy decision that can be traced back to the FPÖ was the passage of a law that 
led to the financing reform of private hospitals. Private for-profit hospitals make up 20% of all 
the hospitals in the country (public hospitals make up 50%, religious orders and trusts 15% and 
insurance and pension funds 15%) (Sheshabalaya, 2010). Private hospitals are usually run by 
private operators and their capacities are typically larger than those of public hospitals. For the 
most part patients with private health insurance are treated in private hospitals. As far as 
financing is concerned, private for-profit hospitals receive compensation for the services they 
provide via the social insurance system if they belong to Prikraf (private hospital financing 
fund). Prikraf is financed through a lump sum contribution from the social insurance system, 
adjusted annually to the increased contribution rate (Bachner et al., 2018). 
The FPÖ helped pass this aforementioned law for the benefit of private hospitals in 
exchange for financial support. As of 2018, the Prikraf was given an additional €15 million, 
representing an 11.5% increase, marking a shift towards strengthening private providers within 
the Austrian health care system (Fohringer, 2020).  
When this PRIKRAF fund originated, it was a good move because it 
helped contain cost growth for the social health insurance. This was 
very important because we had double digit cost growth within the 
hospital sector prior to the budgeting of hospitals at the end of 1997 
(Interviewee 1.14 Health Economics Expert & Advisor). 
   
The initial Prikraf regulations were quite simple: 45% of the private hospitals in Austria can 
receive money from the Prikraf if they provide medically necessary services for the compulsorily 
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insured. Which hospitals are allowed to do this is determined by law; the hospitals that can get 
money out of this fund must be named in the law and who gets named is decided by the main 
health insurance association (ÖGK) and the professional association of healthcare companies 
(“Fachverband der Gesundheitsbetriebe”), following the principle of “self-administration.”  
What happened is that Walter Grubmüller, head of the private clinic in Währing 
approached his longtime friend Heinz-Christian Strache at the beginning of 2017 asking if the 
clinic could be added to the Prikraf. Text messages between the two confirm that Strache 
explicitly asked which law needed to change so that Grubmüllers clinic could be included. While 
the FPÖ initiated the deals, the ÖVP under previous finance Minister Löger and Chancellery 
Minister Blümel agreed to the deal.  
When recently questioned about the case, now Finance Minister Blümel stated that the 
ÖVP had nothing to do with it: "The reform of the Prikraf and the admission of the Währing 
private clinic was due to Strache’s insistence and falls under the competencies of the Ministry of 
Health (FPÖ). In essence, it was an implementation of the government program" (Schmid 2020). 
This has been proven false in court; the ÖVP were very much involved and benefited greatly 
from the reform, although it was instigated by the FPÖ. “I think it is amazing, how easily this 
happened. I mean discussions about this were really very minor. It is quite impressive that they 
got away with doing this” (Interviewee 1.14 Health Economics Expert & Advisor). 
This reform is not only problematic because of its highly clientelistic components, but also 
because 70% of the additional money in the fund is paid for by the ÖGK (the Austria health 
insurance fund), who was not even informed of the deal until after the draft law to the ASVG. In 
addition, those insured through the ÖGK contribute a significant amount of money to the Prikraf 
fund, but they only use 50% of the beds, the rest are used by the self-employed and civil servants 
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(covered by a different insurance company) 25 (Fohringer, 2020). The FPÖ played the game of 
clientelism without thinking about which voters would be most impacted by the policies they pass, 
namely their own26.  
 
The New E-Card 
The National Council decided that starting on 01.01.2020 all newly issued or exchanged e-cards 
(health insurance cards) for people over the age of 14, must depict a photo clearly showing the 
cardholder (Section 31a (8) ASVG). By 31.12.2023 all old e-cards must be exchanged for new e-
cards with a photo. The introduction of the e-card with a photo was introduced and justified by the 
ÖVP/FPÖ government at the beginning of 2019 with the argument that one wanted to prevent 
misuse. Health and Social Minister Hartinger-Klein (FPÖ) stated: “The new e-Card can do 
everything - it brings security against misuse and security with regard to unique identification for 
the electronic health database ELGA" (FPÖ, 2019). 
Despite lacking actual evidence as to the scope of the misuse, the FPÖ pushed for changing 
all e-cards in Austria to the new photo e-card, which former chairman of the umbrella organization 
of the Austrian social insurance agencies, Alexander Biach, estimated the cost to be about 18 
million Euros (Kleine Zeitung, 2017). Before the implementation of the new law at the beginning 
of 2019, the FPÖ released a video wherein the laws intention became very clear (see Figure 9). 
The Austrian regulatory authority for broadcasting and audiovisual (KommAustria) decided that 
the video violated the Austrian law against discrimination (Austrian Press Agency, 2019) and was 
                                               
 
25 Interviewee 1.12 Austrian Public Health Expert. 
26 Considering that the FPÖ emerged into the political scene because of their desire to prevent the party book economy and 
subsequently clientelism, their involvement in this scandal was not readily accepted by their voters. 
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therefore quickly removed from the internet. Not only is the cost for reissuing e-cards 
exceptionally high, but the amount of money saved in terms of misuse is comparably low (Austrian 
Press Agency, 2020b). 
 
Figure 9 FPÖ Video27 
 
According to Chancellor Kurz, this “misuse” was “costing Austrian tax payers dearly” and 
“around 200 million Euros could be saved” (John, 2020).  This argument was simply not factually 
based, in fact, the damages caused by e-card fraud as reported by the Viennese health insurance 
company, the largest health insurance company, in 2016 was only 9,935.74 euros and the Lower 
Austrian health insurance company reported only 4,863.76 euros in damages. All other health 
insurance companies in Austria reported no damage due to improper use of the e-card during this 
time (Egyed, 2018). In light of this fact, Chancellor Kurz, at this point already in coalition with 
the Green Party, called upon the Minister of Interior Karl Nehammer (ÖVP) in 2020 to put together 
a special police force to look into welfare fraud. The result was 11,5 million Euros in damages 
from e-card misuse (Schlager, 2020), a far cry from 200 million Euros. 
 
                                               
 
27 In the video released by the FPÖ, uninsured Ali, who appears to be a Muslim, wants to use health care services with the e-card 
of another person (his cousin Mustafa). Because of the newly introduced picture on the e-card, he fails to do so. 
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The Austrian Smoking Ban 
The prevalence of smoking in Austria is among the highest in Europe. On average, around 25 
percent of the Austrian population report to be daily smokers (European Social Survey, 2014). 
This is one of the highest scores in the EU (only Hungary has a higher prevalence of daily 
smokers). Furthermore, the smoking rate is particularly high among young people (Berger and 
Neuberger, 2020). One reason for this high rate might be the liberal smoking regulations. In fact, 
until recently, Austrian citizens were allowed to smoke in bars and restaurants, despite 
overwhelming scientific evidence that smoking bans in bars and restaurants were able to reduce 
smoking behavior and limit initial smoking habits among youth in particular (Johan P Mackenbach 
and McKee, 2013; Siegel et al., 2005). Despite this evidence, the Austrian road towards stricter 
tobacco regulations has been rocky (See Table 8). Some observers see close links between the 
tobacco industry and Austrian politics (Burki, 2018). 
In 2015, the Austrian parliament, at this time dominated by the two traditional parties, the 
Social Democrats and the Conservative People’s Party (ÖVP), adopted a general smoking ban in 
bars and restaurants, which was to come into effect by May 2018. There was, however, another 
election between the adoption of the ban and its actual enforcement. In 2017, the FPÖ joined the 
ÖVP in government wherein one of their campaign pledges was to scrap the scheduled smoking 
ban law (Burki, 2018). Even though the conservative coalition partner was not fond of this 
decision, it relented to the pressure of the FPÖ and voted to overturn the smoking ban. Media 
reports speculated that this was a political horse-trade, in which the FPÖ agreed to sign the EU-
Canada Comprehensive Economic and Free Trade Agreement (CETA) in exchange (Neuberger, 
2018). 
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The key arguments used by the FPÖ in overturning the smoking ban were framed in terms 
of a) individual freedoms (the ordinary people’s right to smoke in their bars) and b) economic 
consequences (the survival of bar owners). The individual freedom framing followed the argument 
that bar and restaurant owners should be able to choose freely as to whether or not smoking should 
be allowed within their establishments. Furthermore, they argued that customers would be free to 
go to smoking or non-smoking bars based on their personal preferences. In this context, the FPÖ 
often spoke of the so-called “Zwangsverordnungen” or coercive regulations imposed by the 
government. The economic consequences frame identified a negative impact for bar and restaurant 
owners, especially for “small” bars, wherein regular customers that were used to smoking indoors 
would no longer frequent the bars.  
 
Table 4.2 A rocky road of smoking regulations in Austria 
Year Policy 
1974 Smoking ban in school buildings (with exceptions) 
1993 Mother protection 
1994 Smoking ban for bus drivers (while driving) 
1995 Smoking ban with exceptions / employee protection law 
2001 Smoke-free workplace regulation 
2006 Smoking ban in school buildings 
2007 Smoking ban in trains 
2009 Smoking ban in restaurants and bars with many exceptions 
2015 General smoking ban in bars and restaurants as of May 2018 
2018 Repeal of the 2015 general smoking ban 
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2018 Smoking ban in schools (incl. school yards) 
2019 Repeal of the repeal of the 2015 general smoking ban 
2019 General smoking ban comes into effect as of November 1 
 
The Role of the ÖVP 
The Conservative center right Austria People’s Party (ÖVP) played a significant, yet distinctive 
role each time the FPÖ was in government. In 2000, when the FPÖ under Haider was in 
government as the minority coalition partner, the ÖVP was described as being “very neo-liberal, 
influenced by catholic values and promoting somewhat of an achievement society” (Interviewee 
1.10 Public Health Expert; Interviewee 1.11 Public Health Expert; Interviewee 1.12 Public 
Health Expert). In fact, this description held true for the ÖVP until Sebastian Kurz took over the 
ÖVP in 2017 changing not only the party’s corporate design and color from the traditional black 
to turquoise but also its name “List Sebastian Kurz–the new ÖVP” (Bodlos and Plescia, 2018; 
Plescia et al., 2019). In addition, Kurz made ideological changes as well, largely renounced its 
pro-European and anti-sovereigntist positions (Heinisch et al., 2020) as well as dropping the 
parties strongly catholic values and adopting instead a PRR agenda implying a clear shift to the 
right and away from the center (Gady, 2017; Wodak, 2018). Politicians, political scientists and 
researchers alike draw parallels between Kurz and Haider stating that  
Kurz did it smart in that he presents himself as a very eloquent, well-
behaved son-in-law type. But in truth, if we analyze his political style, 
90% is that of Haider. He didn’t invent anything new; he also doesn’t 
have the intellectual capacity to invent anything new, but he manages 
it well. It is enough if Mr. Kurz stands there, formulates it (policies) a 
bit more moderately than Haider did, and he will get 40%. And Haider 
would have gotten 40% today in Austria (Interviewee 1.3 Politician).  
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Put in a more neutral, moderate tone, “Haider always gave the big promise that he will change 
this party membership structure, classical populist, one of the first, a great communicator and 
many believed him. We can probably see some parallels to Kurz that communicates this very 
similarly” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). 
These changes in ÖVP leadership are crucial to consider when evaluating the policies 
initiated by the FPÖ given that the ÖVP was always the more powerful coalition partner during 
the FPÖs times in government. From 2000-2005 many of the FPÖ’s policy proposals failed (health 
insurance merger, a 40% reduction in the compulsory levy for the chamber of labor within the 
pension reform and many other migration and integration reforms) because they were deemed too 
radical and not in line with the catholic and economic values of the ÖVPs agenda. 
In 2017, however, when Sebastian Kurz won the election for the “new ÖVP”, the parties 
agenda was much more in line with that of the FPÖ’s (both the ÖVP and the FPÖ focused on 
immigration as an issue (Plescia et al., 2019)). With this common ground and shared tendency 
towards neoliberal and welfare chauvinist policy making (Interviewee 1.12 Public Health Expert) 
the FPÖ was able to get many of its policy initiatives passed. 
 
Conclusion 
The FPÖ influenced health outcomes via indirect (social) and direct (health) policy choices. Based 
on a wealth of research on the social determinants of health (Braveman and Gottlieb, 2014), I first 
looked at social policies. The analysis of the FPÖ’s social policies indicated that the FPÖ moved 
from a populist welfare approach under the leadership of Haider to one based more on welfare 
chauvinism when Strache took over the party. The pension reform in 2000 can be seen as welfare 
populist in character as it not only broke the unions hold on pension reforms, but also increased 
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the retirement age for many bureaucrats. The reduction of the minimum income for foreigners or 
the discriminating “family bonus” could be interpreted as welfare chauvinist as the welfare benefits 
of natives were increased while simultaneously decreasing the benefits of foreigners. These social 
policies significantly impacted the health of the individual. Lengthening working careers is not 
beneficial to everyone, much depends on a person’s health and more importantly their willingness 
to continue working (Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2018). In addition, a lack of income severely 
impacts a person’s participation in society and subsequently their ability to receive the necessary 
services (healthcare) (Marmot, 2002). These examples of FPÖ social policies depict a potential for 
increased inequalities not only within the social policy realm, but also spilling over into healthcare.  
Next, I looked at how the FPÖ influenced health outcomes directly via health policy 
decisions. Bearing in mind that in health politics the “FPÖ wants to strengthen the influence of 
the government and weaken the institutions outside of the government that are also involved in 
healthcare decisions” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician), their policies can be divided into two 
categories: 1) structural reforms of the health system such as the social insurance merger and the 
introduction of a private hospital financing fund and 2) policy choices targeting behavioral 
outcomes, such as the introduction of new e-cards and the reversal of the smoking ban.  
The structural health reforms took on welfare chauvinist and liberal chauvinist 
characteristics wherein the liberal chauvinist approach was more prominent, very likely due to the 
close involvement of the ÖVP. These structural reforms were very important because “they 
changed the color of who is in charge” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist) thereby giving the FPÖ 
more influence within healthcare structures (Haider’s initial goal in the 90’s). The ultimate result 
of the merger was a breakdown of the SPÖ stronghold in all things health wherein the FPÖ and 
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the new ÖVP could now position key players within the newly created health insurance company 
ÖGK (resulting from the fusion of the nine regional health insurance companies).  
Looking at the other structural reform initiated by the FPÖ, PRIKRAF, or the private 
hospital reform, we see just how prominent clientelism continues to be within the political realm. 
Accusations of clientelism were also geared towards the ÖVP implying that clientelism is not only 
a PRR problem, rather one that is deeply imbedded within the structures of the political system in 
Austria, as well as in other countries no doubt. This reform was not only problematic because of 
its highly clientelistic nature, but also because much of the money that is used to support the private 
hospitals is paid for by patients’ contributions. In addition, those insured through the ÖGK 
contribute a significant amount of money to the PRIKRAF fund, but they only use 50% of the 
beds, the rest are used by the self-employed and civil servants (covered by a different insurance 
company) (Fohringer, 2020). While this reform can clearly be considered clientelistic, it also has 
a hidden welfare chauvinistic flair to it. The FPÖ, more often than not sells itself as a worker’s 
party catering to those that see the brunt of globalization, however the FPÖ is also a party that 
caters to the Burschenschaften (traditional student fraternities), largely made up of wealthy 
extremely right leaning educated FPÖ voters. By modifying the PRIKRAF to include more private 
hospitals the FPÖ was catering to its much smaller electorate by increasing the welfare benefits of 
those that can afford private insurance on top of the mandate public insurance while potentially 
decreasing benefits for all non-privately insured Austrians covered by the ÖGK. 
The reforms targeting individual behavior, however, can be classified as welfare chauvinist 
with regards to the e-card changes and anti-science with respect to the overturned smoking ban, 
increased corona measures and a general lack of support for vaccinations. While several of the 
health policy reforms passed were done so with the help of the ÖVP, the FPÖ distinguishes itself 
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from its conservative coalition partner by also putting forth policy decisions that sharply contrast 
scientific evidence. The most important example is the FPÖ’s role in overturning the smoking ban 
which had been introduced by the former SPÖ-ÖVP coalition. Against overwhelming scientific 
evidence, the FPÖ portrayed itself as the protector of small business owners and ordinary people 
propagating individual choice over top-down regulations.  
In summary, the FPÖ’s policy choices incorporate both clear markers of well-known PRR 
characteristics as well as elements influenced by its conservative coalition partner. Favoritism 
towards the native, ordinary people and the systematic exclusion of foreigners from the eligibility 
of health and social services is the predominate FPÖ policy mantra. Examples can be found in the 
introduction of a photo-based e-card, the new minimum income law or the Family Bonus Plus 
regulation. Also, in line with conceptualizations of PRR parties is the liberal chauvinist approach 
coupled with anti-elitist sentiments, which became apparent in the structural reform of the health 
care system. The legitimization of this reform, which the ÖVP actively supported, was to create a 
system “closer to the ordinary people”. Interestingly enough, however, it decreased the 
representation and thus the self-administrative power of the worker group, represented by 
established labor organizations. The short term “aims” appeared to decrease bureaucratic costs and 
relieve the SPÖ of their monopoly in all things health. The long-term aim will presumably result 
in more bureaucracy (we are seeing this already), which will lead to higher costs to run the health 
insurances (already happening – need governmental support) and will very likely result in a 
decrease in services for the insured.  
The anti-elitist/anti-science nature of the FPÖ’s policy preferences also manifested in its 
harsh opposition to stricter anti-smoking laws and increased corona measures. In fact, this type of 
“science populism” is common in PRR parties, which often position themselves against theories 
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of climate change and are more prone to support conspiracy theories (Mede and Schäfer, 2020). 
In this case, the FPÖ propagated the interest of particularistic groups (smoking customers and 
small bar owners) while ignoring the advice of public health authorities. Although in opposition 
during the corona pandemic, the FPÖ went from approving the governments strict measures in the 
Spring of 2020, at times even saying that the measures were not strict enough, to finding the 
measures over-exaggerated and unnecessary by summer 2020. Upon the onset of the 2nd wave in 
the fall of 2020, the FPÖ settled on criticizing the governments lack of cohesion and their inability 
to present clear and legally sound measures. 
Welfare chauvinism, particularly in social policies, along with conservative and liberal 
chauvinist structural health policies supported by the ÖVP and a general anti-science approach to 
health can be seen as the characteristics of FPÖ health and social policies. With the FPÖs current 
political standstill, however, further research would do well to look into the new ÖVP’s health and 
social policies as they creep further to the right on the political spectrum.  
The following chapter will look closely at two specific subnational cases in which the 
FPÖ spent a considerable amount of time in government. The cases of Carinthia and Burgenland 
will investigate the FPÖ’s impact on health and social policies at the subnational level in order to 
leverage the national case.  
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 : Austria’s Subnational Cases 
 
“I would say health politics is always a very central question because health isn’t everything, but 
without health everything is nothing” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). 
 
Carinthia 
The political case of Austria’s Southernmost province, Carinthia: population 561,077 
(Eurostat, 2017), is one dominated by consistent charismatic faces, a populace whose National 
Socialistic past was not, like in the rest of Austria, repressed into unconsciousness (Ringel, 1988) 
and a historical border conflict that provoked political positioning surrounding the Slovene 
minority group. These distinctive legacies along with an atypical voter structure and a declining 
tolerance for the party book economy gave rise to the 14-year reign of the Populist Radical Right 
FPÖ as the strongest party in Carinthia.  
This chapter will first lay out the political history of the province touching on the changes 
and shifts of political power since 1980. It will then analyze the uniqueness of the province by 
exploring the political persona of Jörg Haider (FPÖ) and his ability to dominate elections in a 
previously Social Democratic stronghold. The third section will depict the relationship the FPÖ 
in Carinthia had with health and health policies and the conclusion will disclose the provisional 
findings the case offers the study.  
 
Political History 
The province of Carinthia was “initially split under Napoleon’s administrative reform in 1815: 
Upper Carinthia was controlled by Ljubljana and the southern Carinthian portion was controlled 
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by Graz as a so-called administrative body” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). Up until the referendum 
of 1920, wherein the borders of Carinthia were defined and remained unchanged until this day, 
territorial claims against the province by the SHS state (Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia – former 
Yugoslavia) leading to defensive battles were typical.  
It is with this historical background that the border conflict and the animosity towards the 
Slovenian minority groups living in Carinthia can be better understood. This important piece of 
history was never taken seriously by the Social Democrats and not politicized until the FPÖ 
came to power. 
Up until 1989, the political landscape in Carinthia was dominated by the Social 
Democrats (SPÖ)28 who claimed to stand for strengthening the Democracy, ensuring fair 
incomes, securing jobs and providing the Carinthian youth with work (Ratheiser, n.d.). 
Throughout the 70’s and the 80’s the Carinthian governors’, Leopold Wagner (SPÖ), program 
for the province entitled “The Carinthian Way” reflected the Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky 
(SPÖ) similar national program entitled “The Austrian Way”. Both supported full-time 
employment despite the oil crisis as well as increased workers’ rights and the general 
democratization of the state and the society (Ratheiser, n.d.) and were in turn supported by 
officials, professors and the well employed.  
By 1984, Wagner’s SPÖ found much support (31%) amongst those under the age of 35 
and the charismatic leader had managed to install party representatives in all political districts 
thereby expanding his parties reach. By the late 1980’s, however, membership in the SPÖ 
                                               
 
28 Aside from the governor position, there are always two provincial deputy governors and four councilors. Up until 1975 this 
SPÖ led Council was made up of a majority of SPÖ council members and a minority of ÖVP members. After this period, the 
FPÖ would have at least one seat in the Council at all times. 
 115 
declined due to the premature resignation of Wagner as a result of a gunshot wound. Wagner was 
attacked and shot by a man furious at missing out on a promotion because he supported a 
different party; a phenomena known as “party book economy” (Ratheiser, n.d.).  Replaced by 
Peter Ambrozy (SPÖ), a more pragmatic figure, the SPÖ lost its control over Carinthia to the 
FPÖ in 1989 and would not regain it until 2013. 
The young charismatic Jörg Haider (FPÖ) managed to become Governor of Carinthia in 
1989 despite the fact that the SPÖ held the majority in Council29. “This was a man that never 
said, ‘we can’t do this’ or ‘that doesn’t work’. He always had a proposal for a solution, and he 
was someone that could speak to everything; he had an opinion about everything” (Interviewee 
1.3 Politician). Charisma alone did not give him the edge over Ambrozy (SPÖ), he addressed 
critical issues such as the system of proportional representation which gave way to a “party book 
economy”. He advocated for the fair treatment of people despite what party they belonged to or 
what occupation they held, he criticized the SPÖ under Wagner for their failed restoration of the 
Pulp Mill and most importantly, he sided against the Slovene minority group.  
As Governor, Haider, backed by the ÖVP minority in Council, propagated a “policy of 
renewal” that was most reflected in the “objectification procedures” which saw to it that the 
hiring of state services were objective (Austrian Press Agency, 2004b). Haider’s first stent as 
Governor was short lived as he lost the vote of confidence in 1991 after having mentioned the 
“ordinary” employment policy in the Third Reich (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). Haider was 
                                               
 
29 The SPÖ was still the strongest party after that election, but they were missing 800 votes thus unsuccessful in obtaining the 
18th seat as there were only 17 left of the 36. The FPÖ gifted the ÖVP a seat and therefore Haider got the governorship with the 
ÖVP backing (19 to 17) (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). 
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succeeded by the head of the minority state parliamentary party, Christof Zernatto (ÖVP), a price 
the SPÖ gladly paid to overthrow the populist governor (Interviewee 1.5 Politician).  
The ÖVP in Carinthia was divided into three big sub organizations form the very 
beginning: The Carinthian Farmers Association (KBB), the Austrian Workers and Employers 
Association (ÖAAB) and the Austrian Business Confederation (ÖWB). The latter association 
was the leading representative for the interests of businessmen and due to its financial strength 
had a significant influence on the ÖVP as a whole. In addition, the party was supported by the 
Hage-Bund, a national liberal trade federation that represented various professional trades. The 
ÖVP never really had a stronghold in Carinthia as their politics of solidarity, federalism and 
often austerity did not go over well with the Carinthia populous. In addition, this Christian 
Democratic party took a very lax stance towards the border situation with Slovenia and 
ultimately lost the governorship to Haider in 1999. 
After the short period of ÖVP leadership, Haider led his party (FPÖ) to a victory in 
Carinthia and became Governor once again in 1999. During this time he suggested things like 
without immigrants the government’s austerity budget would not be necessary (BBC News, 
2000) and stressed the need to make Carinthia a more attractive workplace using his party’s’ 
position in the national government in 2000 to bring several projects – Magna, Mediaprint, etc. – 
to the southern province (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). Until his premature death in a car accident 
in 2008, the alluring man would retain the position of Governor, however the FPÖ would never 
have the majority within the state government30.  
                                               
 
30 A majority in Parliament would consist of obtaining at least 19 of the 26 seats. The most the FPÖ/BZÖ ever attained was 17 in 
2009. 
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After Haider’s death, the BZÖ/FPK (Freedom Party Carinthia) under Gerhard Dörfler led 
the Carinthian government until 2013 when the finance scandal of the Hypo Bank (see Appendix 
C for details) was uncovered.  
Between everyone that was involved in the Hypo scandal, 42 years of 
jail time was passed. The people, the voters of Carinthia, knew there 
was a big scandal and that the bank director was sentenced to 10 years 
in prison and many others stood accused before the court; the only 
people that were not directly involved or sentenced to jail time were 
from the SPÖ and the Green party (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 
And thus, the SPÖ was once again placed at the head of the Carinthian government and 
remains there to this day. In fact, since the 2018 election, the FPÖ party is no longer represented 
in the regional government31. 
The original FPÖ, founded in Carinthia in 1955, was based on the Association of 
Independents (VdU) and started as a “community of community” until it became a party of the 
masses in the 1990s (Ratheiser, n.d.). Initially, the FPÖ catered its program towards former 
National Socialists (NS) thereby supporting a reduction of the NS laws32, fighting against the 
excesses of the state, opposing nationalism except in minority politics, campaigning for 
unrestricted competition and advocating for personal property. In addition, the FPÖ were able to 
cater to an enemy image created through the border situation in a very agrarian structure. 
In the mid 1970s, under Mario Ferrari-Brunnenfeld (FPÖ), then Council representative in 
Carinthia, the FPÖ entered into a liberal phase campaigning with their “Manifesto on Social 
Order” (Ratheiser, n.d.). During this time, the FPÖ was against community consolidation, they 
                                               
 
31 A major reason for this is because the election system in Carinthia was changed from a “proportional representation system”, 
where every party – depending on its vote share - had a seat in government, to a Coalition government where it would be easier 
to tell which party was leading government and which was in opposition.  
32 NS laws are National-Socialist Verbotsgesetz or the Austrian Prohibition Act of 1947. This was a law against national socialist 
activities.  
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used Haider to fiercely target the youth and they initially prided themselves in having no national 
image. While in Council, Ferrari-Brunnenfeld installed a Tourism Department in Carinthia, 
which became the most successful in all of Austria. It was during the 80s that the “Wörthersee 
and the city of Velden were just as popular as Cannes and Monte Carlo” (Interviewee 1.3 
Politician). Despite this liberal turn and the touristic successes, the FPÖ election results were 
poor and the 1979 National Council and Regional Council elections marked the end of the FPÖ’s 
short lived liberal phase.  
By 1986, Haider became chairman of the FPÖ wherein a significant push to the right 
ensued as the party began supporting the ethnic, anti-Slovene, policies brought forth by the 
Carinthian Homeland Service33 (Kärntner Heimatdienstes – KHD). These policies included the 
rejection of bilingual traffic signs and the elimination of bilingual elementary schools. 
With this movement to the right, Haider managed to win a seat in the National Council and 
became chairman of the health and environment committees. He was very active producing over 
40 applications of which over 50% were successful. One of the most important applications was 
the 1993 referendum he brought forth entitled “Austria first”. This was a reaction to the 
thousands of migrants that fled the warzone in former Yugoslavia and, among other things, 
wanted the Austrian Constitution to state that the country of Austria was not a migrant country.  
 
Everything in this proposal from restrictive immigration to longer 
proceedings to become a citizen was subsequently implemented by the 
grand coalition SPÖ/ÖVP on a national level, but Haider was not 
given credit for it. Thematically, Haider quickly took control, but he 
was personally excluded from national politics (Interviewee 1.2 
Political Scientist). 
                                               
 
33 A German nationalist advocacy group in Carinthia that served as an illegal platform for the Nazi Party in Austria’s 1st Republic 
where it supported anti-Slovene, anti-Slavic and anti-Communist policies. It was re-established in 1957 and significantly 
influenced political parties during public campaigns against Slovene minorities. 
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For the rest of the 90s Haider’s flame at the national level diminished, mainly due to the 
dominant power of the SPÖ und ÖVP, while his support in the Carinthian state continued to 
increase. The FPÖ’s share in the elections rose from 5% in 1983 to almost 27% in 1999 and by 
the 2004 elections in Carinthia, the last Haider would experience, his support reached 42%.  
 
Jörg Haider and Carinthia 
Some argue Haider rose to power because of the SPÖ’s failed renovation of the Pulp Mill in 
Sankt Magdalen near Villach costing the province 1.3 billion Schilling (€95.5 million) and 
marking the decline of the all-powerful SPÖ in Carinthia (Coby and Papst, 2004). Others believe 
that his immense success in Carinthia was due to the fact that he was able to break up the 
proportional representation that gripped the country (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). A further line of 
thought argues that  
Haider’s success had a lot to do with the atypical voting structure in 
Carinthia wherein the high percentages of Protestants in the province 
along with the agricultural structures and the conflict with the Slovene 
minorities created a prime place for a leader that was good at speaking 
to lines of conflict and mobilizing them (Interviewee 1.2 Political 
Scientist).  
 
 The truth can be found in the combination of all three. To begin with, the decline of the 
SPÖ began with the refinancing of the Pulp Mill, however many people in the province were 
already hungry for change before that financial disaster took place (see (Amt der Kärntner 
Landesregierung, 1999) for the Carinthian election results in 1999). The reasons for this desired 
political change can be seen in several different ways. For one, the SPÖ had been in power for 
such a long time that the party became rigid in its ways and appeared unable to adapt to the 
changing landscape of the world. They saw to it that professional promotions were given to those 
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who held the SPÖ party book (Grashäftl, 2017), they failed to see the struggles of the workers in 
the face of globalization (Nowotny, 2017) and their anti-fascist mentality prevented them from 
taking the border situation seriously (Heinisch and Marent, 2016). Haider used these points to 
propel his success helping him break up the proportional representation in the province. 
 Proportional representation, as described in the previous chapter, meant that there was a 
historic dominance of the SPÖ and ÖVP parties after the WWII. “Up until Haider came to 
power, everything in Austria was divided between red and black. There were red banks and 
black banks, red social insurance institutions, black social insurance institutions, red car clubs 
and black car clubs” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). Everything was split between these two parties 
and the masses of officials that were tied to them left little room for the success of people that 
did not belong to one of those parties. The ÖVP, as previously mentioned, did not have a 
stronghold in Carinthia, but the SPÖ, always seen as the workers party, lost many of their voters 
to the FPÖ when it became apparent that the party book economy was only benefiting a few and 
the representation of the workers was becoming less important to the party line. 
In addition, Carinthia’s interesting voter make-up also played a significant role in the rise 
of the FPÖ. First of all, Carinthia had and still has the second highest percentage of protestants 
(10,3%) in the country next to the Burgenland (13,3%) whereas the provinces of Tirol and 
Vorarlberg only had 1,6% and 1,5% respectively. This is significant because in the provinces 
where Catholics dominated the populace the catholic ÖVP could count on a clear victory as was 
the case in Vorarlberg and Tirol where no other party ever had control of the government. Highly 
Protestant provinces were much more likely to vote for the FPÖ. Secondly, the Slovenian 
partisan raids in Carinthia during WWII and the disparate views over the minority protection 
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rights for the Slovenes after the war resulted in the problematic relationship between German and 
Slovene speaking Carinthians.  
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Carinthia was always seen as the outsider within 
Austria and thus “the Carinthian mentality was made up of caution and southern fatalism with a 
bit of a Slovenian imprint” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). My interviews with officials, politicians 
and political scientists confirm that Haider, coming from Upper Austria, saw his goal in making 
the Carinthians proud of their province and this he successfully accomplished by increasing the 
provinces importance within Austria (Interviewee 1.3 Politician; Interviewee 1.5 Politician; 
Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). In the first black/blue national government with Schüssel and 
Riess-Passer (FPÖ) in 2000 Haider was able to “bring a lot of projects - Mahle, Mediaprint, 
Merks, Magna, etc. -, translating into jobs, back to Carinthia. This was significant as Vienna and 
Lower Austria were generally awarded these federal grants and projects” (Interviewee 1.3 
Politician) and this led to an “immense increase in the Carinthians feelings of self-worth” 
(Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 In addition to these points, Haider’s triumph can also be attributed to his populist nature. 
The charisma that was Jörg Haider first showed when he was able to unite the scattered and 
extremely divided radical right in Austria under the FPÖ (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). At this 
point it became clear that the FPÖ was “not based so much on an ideology, but on just one leader 
– Haider – he held the party together” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). Considered one of the 
first populists, Haider always made the big promise that he would change the above mentioned 
party membership structure as he was, from the very start of his career in the 1970s, very critical 
of mainstream Austrian politics (Bailer and Neugebauer, n.d.). Due to his great communication 
skills and his general charismatic appeal many believed him. A former colleague claimed that 
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Haider “`made politics with money´ whether it was in the form of giving money to pensioners or 
handing out subsidies for heating bills. Haider was an excellent communicator and political 
tactician, and he knew what people wanted” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician).  
Very typical of populist leaders and their parties is their ability to very 
quickly pick up issues that they believe should be different and issues 
that they want to change, with the main focus always resting on the 
destruction of big coalitions, structures and social partnerships 
(Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 
In Carinthia, and for Haider, these structures and elites were the SPÖ. 
Haider introduced many structural reforms during his time as he knew that only by 
changing the structures would he get his people, the FPÖ, into positions of power normally held 
by the SPÖ. “This is something that Haider was exceptionally good at: combining departments, 
changing them, or splitting them and thus being able to place new people in positions of power” 
(Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  He used simple slogans to exploit issues where he saw that 
the populace perceived injustice or the self-interest of big party politics (Bailer and Neugebauer, 
n.d.).  
In addition, Haider started criticizing the elites, in Carinthia the SPÖ, arguing that:  
Those people up there, they don’t understand you (the normal worker). 
He even went so far as to call Chancellor Vranitsky (SPÖ) a 
`Nadelstreifsozialist´ (a pin stripe socialist) as he had previously been 
the director of a bank, thus `pin stripe´, and he vehemently supported 
the interests of the industry workers or the simple people, `socialist´. 
Haider was very talented in finding contrast and visually presenting it 
to people (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 
Through such communication, Haider, the populist, was able to get Communists, 
Socialists and Social Democrats onto his side.  
Unlike the Social Democrats at the time, Haider was able to pick up on and use 
globalization to his advantage. He realized that there were groups that were not able to cope with 
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these extreme transitions, political science terms these people the “modernization losers” 
(Luther, 2003; Minkenberg, 2000), the introduction of computers, the opening of borders and the 
development of the European Union (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist). Throughout the 90s 
many people, particularly those that were less educated, felt increasingly threated by immigrants 
and generally feared that they were being left behind, those were exactly the type of people that 
he was able to get on his side (Quinones, 2017; Wischenbart, 1994). Haider led an aggressive 
populist style campaign throughout the 90s stressing issues such as political corruption, “over-
foreignization and immigrant criminality and the values of the “little man” to win over these 
voters (Luther, 2003). This was the beginning of the shift for the working-class people from the 
SPÖ to the FPÖ. 
 
The FPÖ and Health 
In the case of health, there was a long-standing tradition that the Social Democrats 
dominated the health portfolio both nationally and sub nationally. The reason for this is that “the 
SPÖ had the most pronounced health political ideas and also the greatest acceptance amongst the 
population in this area” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). Thus, it comes as no surprise that in 
Carinthia the reds (SPÖ) were always health advisors. “In general, health is not only a difficult 
job, it is a red stronghold” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician).  
There were a few things the FPÖ did do however within the Carinthian health sector. 
First, they “dominated the supervisory board of the KABEG34, Carinthia’s hospital management 
                                               
 
34 In the Carinthian hospital management structure there are five houses located in: Klagenfurt, Villach, Hermagor, 
Laas und Wolfsberg, as well as six additional so-called fund hospitals (Fondskrankenanstalten). The fund hospitals 
are in part considered private as they are managed by a religious order and in part considered to be public hospitals 
as they can be accessed by anyone.  
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company, thereby limiting the competencies of the health advisor” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). 
As head of the company, in accordance with the ÖVP, they wanted to reduce/eliminate the 
influence of the provincial government on the provincially owned hospital infrastructures and to 
“privatizes” these. Meaning, “the FPÖ and ÖVP worked together to turn these structures into 
self-made companies so that the political influence, that was primarily present through the SPÖ, 
could be reduced” (Interviewee 1.2 Political Scientist).  
 In addition, a major FPÖ goal was to minimize the structures within the hospitals, which 
was significant as “a not so small portion of the provincial budget” was dedicated to the hospital 
infrastructure in the province, meaning that this allowed them to place significant funds 
elsewhere if they kept administrations thin (Interviewee 1.4 Politician).  
In fact, during Haider’s second term 2000-2005, the “FPÖ wanted to close several 
regional hospitals and medical institutions to save money and produced several studies that 
would have led to clear cuts” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician). The SPÖ, in charge of the province’s 
health department, argued that costs needed to be saved, no question, however these savings 
should be acquired through a better suited work distribution of the regional hospitals and a better 
endowment of the central hospitals i.e., the Klinkium Klagenfurt and Villach and not through the 
closure of any hospitals. The SPÖ argued that “closing these hospitals would have had major 
consequences as the regional hospital and medical institutions were important employers and 
built up important social structures” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician). The FPÖ on the other hand, 
wanted to employ people through the various projects Haider was bringing to the province:  
He wrapped the city of Villach in gold when he brought them Infineon, 
the central warehouse for the supermarket chain Billa was moved to the 
city of St. Veit and he supported Wolfsberg, his argument was always 
why the metropolitan area (Klagenfurt)? It’s so bourgeois we want to 




The SPÖ easily deflected deals involving healthcare because it could be proven that such 
takeovers – privatization – would never be beneficial to the patients, rather it would only benefit 
the investor.  
Aside from this disagreement over the hospitals and potential cuts, where the SPÖ 
position prevailed, the two parties initially agreed on all other healthcare related aspects which 
left the SPÖ to follow their agenda. The main goal of the Carinthian SPÖ with regards to 
healthcare, their flagship, was to provide “the best care for all no matter how much money is in 
your wallet.” This is something the “people of the province gladly accepted, and we (SPÖ) were 
praised for never straying from this path” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician). 
 
The general problem with the FPÖ and health was that “they did not have an identified 
health program” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician), this became increasingly clear after 2005 where the 
mostly harmonious relationship with the SPÖ run health department turned sour.  
The FPÖ took what the SPÖ health advisor had and made its 
prioritizations as they saw fit. There were of course many things that 
the two parties still agreed upon, but in many areas the FPÖ wanted to 
forcefully pass things and disempower the political advisor 
(Interviewee 1.4 Politician). 
 
The FPÖ was “always vulnerable to proposals where services upheld their quality, but 
money could be saved” (Interviewee 1.4 Politician). German companies wanted to take over 
Carinthian medical structures time and time again and the FPÖ were easily persuaded by this as 
promises of increased savings were made. A prime example of such a case was  
When the FPÖ appointed a certain Ms. Manegold from Germany as 
KABEG supervisor in 2010. She worked very closely with the FPÖ 
health speaker Kurt Scheuch which resulted in several lawsuits, 
Manegold’s dismissal, and most importantly a very weak and 
inconsistent regional structural plan for health that lacked 
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implementation due to the political opportunism practiced by the FPÖ 
(Interviewee 1.5 Politician).  
 
After a non-contested position was reached on the point of healthcare between all 
involved parties the SPÖ resumed complete control of the health advisory position 
without the interference of the FPÖ.   
 
Conclusion 
The FPÖ under Haider implemented many projects that, although financially questionable, 
instilled much pride into a province that was generally shunned by the rest of the country. 
Beginning with the Klinikum Klagenfurt, the most modern medical center of its time to the 
football stadium where sporting events, concerts and art installations are held, Haider’s 
megalomaniac vision for the province took no end and was generally supported by the ÖVP; as 
was apparent in the finance scandal that erupted after Haider’s premature death. With regards to 
health politics, not a classical strong suit for PRR parties, the FPÖ was able to relate more and 
better to the SPÖ and turned to them for parliamentary support.  
Haider, although now suffering from a questionable reputation, undoubtedly created more 
jobs for the province and was successfully able to instill a sense of pride into the populace. 
However, “to give Haider any profile relating to health would be presumptuous. The health 
sector and the employee representation sector are two things that Haider didn’t touch, he left 
these to the SPÖ” (Interviewee 1.3 Politician). This meant that decisions such as prevention 
strategies, ensuring public health services and implementing the federally regulated decisions 
generally fell into the hands of the SPÖ. The FPÖ for their part favored structural and 
administrative minimalism and privatization so that they could use the generous budget given to 
hospitals for other priorities. Surplus budget was used by the FPÖ to “take care of their own, 
while successfully shutting out the rest. They tried to do this using as little resources as possible 
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(in, for example, the healthcare sector) so as to be able to `buy´ political success” (Interviewee 
1.4 Politician) in other areas. 
The maintenance and survival of the healthcare sector in Carinthia can be attributed to the 
SPÖ as without their years of experience, diligence and conscientiousness many hospitals would 
have been closed, thereby significantly reducing the health budget. They also saved the province 
from sell outs to Germany, which would have left the healthcare budget severely strained, the 
unemployment rate higher than necessary and a very likely scenario of a two-tiered hospital 
system.  
The provisional findings in the case of Carinthia come down to two main points: 1) avoid 
the health sector and leave it in the hands of the SPÖ. This generally worked out well unless the 
FPÖ thought they could squeeze money out of mergers, new appointments or proposed hospital 
closures. 2) focus instead on making the people happy. Bring back jobs to Carinthia, make the 
province important again in the eyes of Austrians, show the people that you are on their side not 
the Slovene or elite (SPÖ/Vienna) side. In summary, the Southeastern most province was 
dominated by a “Carinthian first” mentality during the FPÖ governorship, while the SPÖ 
involvement in the health politics saved the province from permanent health related catastrophes, 




Located in the countries Eastern most corner, Burgenland is home to only 293,433 people 
making it the region with the lowest population in Austria. In addition, the province of 
Burgenland is also the youngest addition to the country of Austria as it did not join the country 
 128 
until 1921 (News, 2005). Previously, the province belonged to the Hungarian Soviet Republic, 
but was promised to Austria in the treaties of Saint Germain and Trianon after WWI. Switching 
between ÖVP and SPÖ led governments after its initial founding, the province settled on a 
steady stream of SPÖ governors starting in 1965 with the ÖVP as their coalition partner. In 2016, 
this dynamic changed, the SPÖ still had the majority in the province, but chose to form a 
coalition with the FPÖ. While this decision caused outrage amongst the federal SPÖ party, the 
cooperation worked mostly in favor of the SPÖ for several reasons: By giving the FPÖ a 
governmental role, 1) the FPÖ’s criticism towards the government significantly decreased as 
they were no longer in opposition 2) the FPÖ’s political support in the region decreased as they 
were given less significant roles that. These occurrences coupled with the general makeup of the 
region took the wind out of the FPÖ’s short-lived sails making it an essentially uninfluential 
party in the governmental history of the province. This chapter will begin by looking at the 
countries historical and geographical makeup, then the political history of the country will be 
introduced followed by a section on the FPÖs impact on Burgenland. The conclusion will 
highlight why the FPÖ had no significant influence on the province and how this is different 
from the province of Carinthia. 
 
Historical and Geographical Makeup 
Three main historical developments are noteworthy to explain how Burgenland developed so 
differently from other Austrian provinces and perhaps more interestingly, how these 
developments then led to limited electoral ground for the FPÖ.  
To begin with, and as previously mentioned, Burgenland was created out of a part of 
Hungary and this fact coupled with its geographical location (borders Hungary, Slovakia and 
 129 
Slovenia) makes it a prime region for immigration. Croatians had been living in Burgenland 
since the 16th century (when the province was still a part of Hungary) and naturally Hungarians 
also resided in the province (Böse et al., 2001). “Burgenland never had any problems, contrary to 
Carinthia, with having Hungarian or Croatian town signs, it was just never a problem there” 
(Interviewee 1.5, Politician). In 1989, the province saw massive immigration with more than 
45,000 former German Democratic Republic (GDR) citizens crossing the Hungarian border into 
the province (Fassmann & Münz, 1994) and again in 2015 the migrant crisis brought many 
immigrants over the Hungarian border into Burgenland. This implies that the province was used 
to immigrants as it was practically made up of immigrants from its formation making FPÖ anti-
immigration slogans less appealing.  
Secondly, when Burgenland was created in 1921 there was no natural center, meaning it 
did not have a single bigger city and was often referred to as the “Land of villages” (ORF, 2000). 
This also meant that the region had:  
No area of high population density from which, social, economic and 
educational impulses could be set. So, it was very much an 
agriculturally structured area without identity. The population was 
very poor, the income, the possibilities the perspectives were 
significantly less than those present in other provinces and the problem 
was made worse by the lack of infrastructure. There were no 
connections from North to South. In the Hungarian monarchy the 
important infrastructural connections moved from East to West 
(Interviewee 1.8 Politician).  
 
What developed out of this infrastructure deficiency, even decades later, was a significant lack of 
education as well as a general absence of economic structures in the province. In 1960, the 
governor of Burgenland, Theodor Kery (SPÖ), referred to his province as the “Land of School 
Shame”, meaning nothing more than that there were no educational institutions, and the 
Burgenland was an utterly underdeveloped region in every possible way (Lang, 1991). The rest 
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of Austria saw the province as “the poorhouse of Austria” (Wiener Zeitung, 2001). These 
sentiments began to change in the mid 1950’s when the SPÖ led province invested a substantial 
portion of its budget into road construction (Atlas-Burgenland, n.d.) resulting in Northern 
Burgenland becoming better connected to Vienna and Southern Burgenland finding connection 
to Graz, the capital of Styria. With the beginning of motorization in the primarily agrarian 
province, income rose rapidly (Atlas-Burgenland, n.d.) and education was given more priority. 
These positive developments coincide directly with the beginning of the SPÖ’s governmental 
majority as the party always had  
1) a strong orientation towards blue collar workers, that involved 
support for transportation infrastructure, expanding commuting 
possibilities and increasing the provinces income. 2) The crucial point, 
however, is that they put immense effort in creating educational 
opportunities (Interviewee 1.8 Politician).  
 
The creation of educational opportunities leads into the final significant development that the 
province underwent. Prior to the 1960s, Burgenland had a particularly low number of high 
school graduates and an even lower number of university graduates. This trend changed 
significantly when the province received its own educational academy in 1962 as agreed to by 
the school act of that same year (Lang, 1991). The Burgenland made a substantial transformation 
with regards to its population moving “from a previously agriculturally based population with a 
high number of blue-collar workers to now becoming a region, along with Carinthia, that has the 
highest number of matriculations in all of Austria” (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). 
While substantial improvements have been made in the province, there is still much 
catching up that needs to be done. 
If we look back at these last 10 years, we are still trying to align with 
the prosperity, education, healthcare and income level of the other 
Länder, but has had a distinctly steeper development curve than other 
regions, and this is also a part of the identity of Burgenland. Things are 
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moving forward, there is positive development and there are also 
positive future perspectives (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). 
 
Interestingly, the three developments that embossed Burgenland were further supported by the 
European Union (EU) when Austria joined in 1995. Burgenland “was given an additional 
positive impulse not only through freedoms granted by the EU in the economic sense (free 
movement of persons and goods), but it was also given more financial aid as it belonged to those 
areas where the per person economic power was under 75%. This meant it was eligible for and 
received ‘Objective 1’ funding (European Commission, n.d.), the highest funding possibility 
from the EU regional development pot” (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). Burgenland profited 
significantly from the European Union contributions (ORF, 2014) causing them to have a very 
favorable attitude towards the EU. In fact, the FPÖ called for a EU exit referendum in 2015 
wherein the countries citizens were put to vote – Burgenland was the country with the least 
amount of votes supporting the referendum (Bundesministerium fürs Inneres, 2015) making it 
clear that the FPÖ could not count on support from the province. 
 
Political History 
Theodor Kery (SPÖ) was the figure that broke through the ÖVP majority in Burgenland 
controlling the fate of the province for 21 years and granting the SPÖ the majority in parliament 
four times. The party did not lose the majority until 1987 after which Kery himself stepped 
down. Initially Kery inherited a very underdeveloped Burgenland, however, he was able to 
promote growth. The agricultural sector shrank in Kery’s term by two-thirds, the structural 
change favored the SPÖ: They advertised in the 1982 election campaign “Theodor Kery: The 
Straight Path” – and all understood that it was a way of modernity (Seidl, 2010). People 
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remember him as being confident and convincing (Schwarz, 1998), but he was criticized for not 
supervising the associations (Genossenschaften). After 1987, the then head of the FPÖ, Jörg 
Haider, created a pact with the ÖVP general secretary, Michael Graff, that Burgenland would no 
longer have an SPÖ governor, rather the ÖVP candidate Franz Sauerzopf. This agreement failed 
when an FPÖ official, Gregor Munzenrieder, voted against the plan resulting in a tie between 
SPÖ candidate Hans Sipötz and Sauerzopf (Standard, 2002). The result was that the SPÖ, being 
the strongest party, had the right to propose the governor. 
Hans Sipötz was quickly replaced by SPÖ governor Karl Stix, but both were rather 
unremarkable governors. The one thing worth mentioning is that in 1996, during Stix’ second 
term, the SPÖ/ÖVP provincial parliament was infiltrated by the FPÖ for the first time taking 
away one of the SPÖ’s four member seats.  
By 2000, the red province was turned over to Hans Niessl (SPÖ). His parliament went 
back to being dominated by the SPÖ/ÖVP, which lasted until 2015. In the 2015 provincial 
elections the dominant parties SPÖ and ÖVP lost 6,34 % and 5,54 % of the votes respectively 
while the FPÖ gained over 6%. This put the FPÖ in third place, but with the change of the 
provincial constitutional law in 2014, the proportional representation was eliminated and thus the 
free formation of government ensued. The SPÖ, therefore decided to form a coalition with the 
FPÖ instead of the ÖVP and thus the PRR party was allotted two seats in the Nissl IV 
government. Johann Tschürtz (FPÖ) became deputy governor under Nissl and responsible for 
security while Alexander Petschnig (FPÖ) was given the economic and tourism portfolios. This 
constellation was kept when Hans Peter Doskozil (SPÖ) became governor in 2019. 
Choosing to govern with the FPÖ was an intelligent strategy as the SPÖ ended up with 
five seats in Parliament instead of only having four if they would have chosen to form their 
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coalition with the ÖVP again. The drawback was that Nissl and later Doskozil were heavily 
criticized for going against the Vranitsky doctrine as the SPÖ was always strictly against 
coalitions with the FPÖ. This “forbidden” coalition led to two consequences on the national 
level: First, in 2015 shortly after the FPÖ was asked to join the government of Burgenland, the 
then chancellor of Austria Werner Faymann was called upon to resign by his own party members 
as they claimed he no longer had his party under control. Secondly, several prominent SPÖ 
officials threatened to leave the party due to the newfound red/blue coalition in Burgenland 
(Hasewend, 2015). 
Niessl’s accomplishments for the province are many beginning with the creation of 30% 
net additional jobs, followed by the fact that the Burgenland generates 150% of the electricity 
demand through renewable energy and with regards to tourism, boast more than three million 
overnight stays. In addition, Burgenland is the number one start-up company in Austria with 
80% more startups since 2001 (Stefanitsch & Millendorfer, 2019). With regards to health and 
social services the former governor alludes to the creation of 30 nursing homes as well as 
providing location guarantees for all the hospitals in the province. In a 2019 interview he stated: 
“Good care, that’s the short way to a long life” (Stefanitsch & Millendorfer, 2019). Under his 
guidance, Nissl claims that the province had “the highest economic growth of Austria within the 
last 18 years, the highest graduation rate and the best skilled workers. In addition, the purchasing 
power also moved from Vienna to the Burgenland” (Stefanitsch & Millendorfer, 2019). 
Starting in 2016, the SPÖ in Burgenland entered a coalition with the FPÖ – a taboo 
break. Former governor Nissl states, “the three and a half years with the FPÖ were a successful 
time for Burgenland and that times with the ÖVP were oft difficult is normal over a period of 15 
years” (Stefanitsch & Millendorfer, 2019). 
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Burgenland and the FPÖ 
The 1956 Parliamentary elections were the first in which the FPÖ was present. Contrary to the 
country’s more Southern province, Carinthia, the FPÖ did not have nearly as much electoral 
success. By 1987 the party reached over 5% in the parliamentary elections (7,31%) and began 
slowly growing (see Table 1 below) making itself known as an opposition party that was not 
afraid to criticize the SPÖ/ÖVP provincial government. Although the FPÖ had a short stint in the 
1996 SPÖ/ÖVP coalitional government, the FPÖ was clearly the junior party and was only given 
one portfolio encompassing both the cable care system and food control, while the other two 
parties received three portfolios a piece including the governorship and vice-governorship. 
Beginning in 2000, the FPÖ found themselves constantly in, a position that suited them 
(Interviewee 1.8 Politician) as they consistently criticized and spotlighted things that were not 
going well, i.e., patronage and not sufficient civic involvement in political decision making.  
The FPÖ in Burgenland always had the lowest provincial parliament 
election results, I think, in relation to other Länder. Why? I think one 
point, the Burgenland was, longer than in other regions, made up of 
predominately blue-collar workers. Here in Burgenland, you can 
probably count on two hands the amount of industrial business there 
are and 97% of all business are small or middle. So, here the SPÖ found 
a population structure that more than not meshed well with their 
program as elsewhere. Another point, the small structure of the 
province. It is very assessable, meaning that politicians here can be 
everywhere and have this closeness with the people that it is often hard 
to establish elsewhere. It doesn’t matter if they are promoting a new 
fire truck, if it’s a sports match, something cultural, 300.000 inhabitants 
have the possibility to be in contact with politicians in a very 
uncomplicated way (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). 
 
The SPÖ was able to keep a closeness with the citizens over the years and being a more 
established and bigger party, they did not leave any room for the FPÖ. By the 2015 elections, the 
migration crisis was in full swing and the FPÖ, both nationally and subnationally, used this to its 
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advantage. Slogans such as “The flood of asylum seekers is rising unchecked!” or “Did you 
know that you will become a stranger in your own country?” (Hengst, 2015) filled campaign 
posters and speeches creating uncertainty in the country and in the province. Not surprisingly, 
the FPÖ profited electorally from this occurrence gaining 6%, putting them at 15,04%. The votes 
gained by the FPÖ came from dissatisfied SPÖ/ÖVP voters as both parties lost 6,34% and 5,54% 
respectively. 
Although the FPÖ was still in 3rd place by far with regard to the overall election results, 
former governor Hans Niessl, now potentially entering his 4th term, noticed the growing strength 
of the FPÖ (See Table 1 below) and decided to join forces with them.  
I wouldn’t excessively romanticize this. This was a quick decision that 
could have probably only been reached as such. Because if Nissel didn’t 
quickly form an agreement with the FPÖ, then the ÖVP would have 
formed a coalition with the FPÖ and then the governor would have 
been gone despite having the strongest party and a clear electoral lead. 
I saw this less ideologically motivated and more pragmatic. But, of 
course, there is – Pause – In a party with these anti-fascist traditions 
and with a clear delimitation towards the FPÖ such as the Social 
Democrats have – Pause – This became an issue beyond the party itself 
(Interviewee 1.5 Politician). 
 
Niessl found forming a coalition with the FPÖ as being “the lesser of two evils as he knew that 
the FPÖs role as being the protest party would disappear when in government seeing as one 
simply does not criticize their own government” (Interviewee 1.8 Politician). The FPÖ was given 
two roles in Nissels 4th government: Party head, Johann Tschürtz (FPÖ), became deputy 
governor and was in charge of the security portfolio and Alexander Petschnig (FPÖ) was given 
the portfolio Tourism and economy, all of the other portfolios including health stayed in the 
hands of the SPÖ.  
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While it seemed like the FPÖ played a rather insignificant role in the Niessl government, 
their hardline on immigration began influencing the SPÖ governor. In 2016, Niessl told the 
media that “in areas where unemployment is particularly high, the free movement of people must 
be restricted, for example in construction and related trades,” which gained him prompt support 
from his coalition partner Petschnig (FPÖ), who added, “In view of the drama of the situation 
(referencing the migration waves), a sectoral closure of the labor market is the order of the day” 
(Orovits, 2016). Interestingly, both SPÖ and FPÖ were only speaking about the construction 
industry and not the tourism industry seeing as foreigners made up 54% of the tourist industry in 
Burgenland whereas construction “only” counted for 35% (Orovits, 2016). Looking at the other 
industries, agriculture boasts 74% foreign workers in the province and healthcare, specifically 
carers, are made up of mostly “independent”, self-employed, female, foreign nurses who are 
placed through agencies (Sitar, 2019). Currently, there are about 2,300 people living in 45 
nursing homes in the province and it is estimated that of the approximately 1200 employees in 
these homes, around 300 are from abroad, including an estimated 200 from Hungary (Fohringer, 
2020).  
As to actual accomplishments, the FPÖ Burgenland party head, Géza Molnár, stated in an 
interview: “we put an end to the debt policy, there are more jobs, more employers and the 
tourism numbers are better than ever, and we made Burgenland safer” (Tscheinig, 2019). In 
addition, the FPÖ official claims that the coalition does not argue as was previously common 
under SPÖ/ÖVP and instead works together in a very solution oriented, trusted partnership. 
The FPÖ managed to stay in government with two portfolios (safety and the economy as 
well as tourism) from 2015 until 2020 after which the new governor Hans-Peter Doskozil (SPÖ) 
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won the absolute majority and did not need a coalition partner. This election was very unique in 
that: 
Contrary to the national elections (took place in September 2019) 
where disappointed FPÖ voters moved to the ÖVP, here in the 
Burgenland the disappointed FPÖ voters moved to the SPÖ. And I will 
say it like this, distinct from Hans Niessl who actually followed the same 
concept, but stood still. Niessl tried to win an election solely on this 
terrain and didn’t realize that one has to move a bit into the terrain of 
the FPÖ or ÖVP. Instead, Doskozil understood how to prioritize the 
areas that were also important to the FPÖ voters (those that felt left 
behind) such as making childcare free. He introduced a minimum 
income. Although this is a small number with regards to the number of 
employed, but the signal he sent out was very big (Interviewee 1.8 
Politician). 
 
In the 2020 Burgenland elections (see Table 9), former FPÖ voters (37%) as well as former ÖVP 
voters (19%) and even non-voters moved to the SPÖ (SORA, 2020). This was surprising not 
only because of the distribution of votes, but also because the SPÖ, just a few months prior 
during the national elections, had to accept historic losses (Jaeger, 2020). So, how and why did 
this happen? 
One explanation is that Doskozil had always been known to stand for and pursue rather 
strict immigration policies, which is very distant from the federal SPÖ party focus. A further 
explanation, more closely related to the SPÖs traditional support for the welfare state, was that 
his campaign leading up to the provincial elections actively promoted a strong socio-political 
orientation. He promised that state employees would receive a minimum wage of 1,700 euros net 
and that mobile care would be further expanded and improved.  
Doskozil understood how to prioritize the areas that were also 
important to the FPÖ voters (those that felt left behind) such as making 
childcare free. He introduced a minimum income. Although this is a 
small number with regards to the number of employed, but the signal 
he sent out was very big. Finally, there is someone that cares and sees 
that the gap between rich and poor is drastically increasing 
(Interviewee 1.8 Politician).  
 138 
 
This combination of a more generous welfare state and a hardline on immigration was very 
likely what prompted FPÖ voters to move to the complete opposite side of the party spectrum 
and also made it more palatable for ÖVP voters to make the jump as well, albeit one that was not 
as far. 
 
Table 5.1 FPÖ Election Results in Burgenland. 
Year Votes in 
% 
% Change 
1991 9.74% +2.43 
1996 14.55% +4.81 
2000 12.63% - 1.92 
2005 5.75% - 6.88% 
2010 8.98% + 3.23% 
2015 15.04% + 6.06% 
2020 9.79% - 5.25% 
Source: (SORA, 2020). 
Conclusion 
As can be deduced from this section, the influence of the FPÖ on health and health policy in 
Burgenland was slim to none. This, in itself is an important finding as it confirms that the FPÖ’s 
preference for the issue of health is subject to the power of the SPÖ since that is their preferred 
portfolio. This is also reflected in the national case (Chapter 4) where the FPÖ is only given the 
health ministry when the SPÖ is not included in the governmental coalition. Without a health 
portfolio it is difficult to impact health or health policy.  
The case of Burgenland is nonetheless and interesting one in that it clearly demonstrates 
how the FPÖ can be shut down. By joining forces with their most critic filled opposition party, 
the SPÖ managed to silence the FPÖ thereby decreasing their power and influence. In addition to 
this strategy, the SPÖ in Burgenland also adopted the FPÖ’s anti-immigrant stance coupled with 
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their own position on welfare expansion to win the absolute majority in the province. This shows 
that a PRR party can, in fact, be defeated.  
 
Carinthia and Burgenland Conclusion 
There are three significant differences between the two provinces that are very likely also the 
reasons as to why the FPÖ was so much more present and successful in Carinthia as opposed to 
Burgenland. To begin with, there is the element of demography coupled with geography. 
Burgenland was and still is the least populated province in Austria wherein the biggest city, 
Eisenstadt, only has an inhabitance of about 15,000 people. This demographic fact resulted in the 
provinces close knit community wherein the “municipalities that makeup the province felt a 
stronger responsibility towards one another and made a great effort to stick together” 
(Interviewee 1.8 Politician). Carinthia, by contrast, has two city centers, Klagenfurt (almost 
100,000 residents) and Villach (61,000 residents), making strong connections more difficult to 
form. This disunification played into the FPÖ theme of creating in and out-groups much more 
easily and was thus also more acceptable to the Carinthians than to Burgenlanders. 
Secondly, both provinces had very different histories with regards to immigration. 
Burgenland was essentially made up of ethnic groups since its existence as an Austrian province 
with everything from Croatians to Hungarians to Roma and Sinti groups making up the 
population. In addition, religions were also very mixed, with everything from Jews to Protestants 
and Catholics living side by side. Carinthia on the other hand spent most of its post war history 
fighting against the Slovene minority group in the province. There were always “little conflicts 
and political positions that one could take to support the Germanness of the province and the 
 140 
Austrian homeland” (Interviewee 1.5 Politician). This made Carinthia ripe for anti-immigrant 
sentiment more so than in any other Austrian province. 
Finally, because Burgenland was such a poor province, recall the previous description 
“poorhouse of Austria”, there were no elites that the FPÖ could rally citizens against. So, while 
the FPÖ pitted Carinthians against the SPÖ as being elite and detached from the everyday 
worries of the blue-collar laborer, the FPÖ in Burgenland was unable to assume a similar role 
because the SPÖ was, in fact, very supportive of the blue-collar workers in the province, seeing 
as that was the predominant voter group. 
In addition to these differences in geographical make-up, history and population, 
Austrian provinces have a relatively small role in shaping health policies. To being with, the way 
the competencies are divided in the realm of health (see Figure xx in Chapter 4) leaves the 
provinces with no legislative power. In fact, the provinces are tasked with ensuring 
implementation for legislation passed by the federal government, ensuring hospital care and 
ensuring health promotion and prevention strategies. In combination with the federal 
government, they are also tasked with the planning of in-patient care in hospitals and the 
implementation and administration of public health services. This distribution of powers implies 
that holding the health portfolio within a given province is rather uneventful when thinking about 
health policy impact. The bottom line is that provinces do not make health policy, the health 
ministry does. This dynamic can be clearly seen with regards to the COVID-19 pandemic 
response highlighted in Chapter 8. 
In addition, in no province has the FPÖ ever held the health portfolio. Thus, even if the 
subnational level was responsible for health policy making, there were never any FPÖ party 
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members in charge of that portfolio. Thus, it is safe to say that the FPÖ’s influence on health as 
demonstrated by the subnational cases was rather minimal.  
In summary, PRR parties are only able to develop into strong parties under certain 
conditions and they are only able to directly impact health if given that portfolio and power 
(which is nearly impossible at the subnational level seeing as health policies are made at the 
federal level). In both of these provinces the FPÖ’s impact on health was limited not only by 
design, but also because they were not given the health portfolio seeing as they were in a 
coalition with the SPÖ (Burgenland), or they simply chose to focus their efforts on something 
else (Carinthia) because health was out of their league and better left to the SPÖ. In both cases, 
as well as generally speaking, health policy is not made on the subnational level. 
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 : The National Case of Italy 
 
The Italian System 
In Austria, a Bismarckian healthcare system was observed, while Italy follows the Beveridge 
model. This implies that in Italy healthcare is financed through taxation as opposed to social 
insurance contributions. A Beveridge system brings with it a meticulous budget that one will 
never find in a country like Austria, however, I chose not to focus on the money flows within the 
public sector of Italian national and subnational governments and instead chose to focus on the 
policies passed on both levels of government. I do this in order to find some common ground 
between the very different cases.  
There are three vital things to remember when thinking about Italy as a case. The first is 
that the Italian NHS is a “three layer” universal healthcare system free at the point of care. The 
second point is that healthcare is decentralized in Italy implying that there are essentially 21 
different healthcare systems in the country. The final point is that the Northern regions are 
substantially wealthier and have better medical facilities than those of the South. These three 
factors become even more relevant when thinking about the COVID-19 pandemic discussed in 
chapter 8. 
The chapter is structured similarly to chapter 4, beginning with an overview of the Italian 
system, including the political and healthcare systems. A short section on healthcare financing 
and exceptions to the general healthcare rules follow before turning to the national case of Italy. 
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Within the case section the history of the Lega Nord is explored followed by the health policies 
the Lega advocated for and passed over time. The chapter ends with a short conclusion. 
 
The Political System 
The Italian state is a parliamentary, democratic republic with a multi-party political system 
(Ferré et al., 2014). According to general classifications, Italy is considered a parliamentary 
regime meaning that parliament and the prime minister have more authority than the president. 
Some scholars would go as far to say that Italy, post WWII, is neither a presidential nor a 
parliamentary regime, but rather a particracy (Calise, 1994), which can be defined as a form of 
government for which political parties are the primary basis of rule. This form of “party 
government” occurs when one or more parties hold a monopoly of access to government 
personnel, government resources, and government policies (Lowi, 1992). 
The role of Italian President was initially designed to be more of ceremonial one known 
as a rather “ambiguous” office (Paladin, 1986).  Since the turbulent governments starting in 
1994, this role has been redefined to take on more of a political presence (Pasquino, 2012). Some 
authors go so far as to say that the President of the Italian Republic has the most powers among 
all the parliamentary governments of Europe (Tebaldi, 2014), despite not having any executive 
powers (Amoretti and Giannone, 2014). Generally speaking, the most important powers that the 
Italian President holds are: 
• the formation of government and the appointment of its ministers, including 
the Prime Minister 
• the dissolution of Parliament 
• the power to call new elections  
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• the ability to authorize the introduction of governmental bills  
• the declaration of the laws  
 
The President of Italy, does not however, have the ability to influence the timing of and 
the dynamics surrounding a governmental crisis.  
Before 1992 no Italian President was ever called upon to decide whether Parliament 
should be dissolved, however as will be explained, after 1994 this became more frequent 
beginning with Berlusconi and then Prodi in 1998 (Pasquino, 2012). When political parties in 
Italy are weak the ability of the President to act on his institutional and constitutional powers 
expands. Essentially this is what happened during the 1992-1993 period in Italy when the entire 
party system collapsed and a new party system emerged in 1994 (Newell, 2000). 
The first case of the Italian Constitutional Court was heard in 1956 (Volcansek 1999) and 
it was assessed as having a very progressive role within Italian politics (Sassoon 1986).  
Important variables to consider when assessing any court system, but particularly the Italian one 
as the criteria was written for Italy according to (Volcansek 1999) are:  
Independence – judges must be able to decide impartially meaning they have “some 
degrees of freedom from one or more competing branches of government or from centers of 
private powers such as corporations or religious organizations” (Schmidhauser 1992). The 
selection of judges to the Constitutional Court is solely a political one, however judges can only 
be appointed for a single nonrenewable term (Volcansek 1999) thereby minimizing the political 
clout. 
1. Maintaining constitutional equilibrium – how does the court treat executive 
decree laws versus the legislative branch? 
2. Accountability – the assessment of the judge’s standings 
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3. Access – who can bring a case. This Court decides on the constitutionality of laws 
and actions having the force of law and it resolves conflicts within the 
government. 
 
Unlike in the Austrian case, the Italian justices are never appointed for life (Cole 1959). 
The requirement here is that five of the judges must be selected by a three-fifths majority of the 
two houses of parliament. In both countries, the courts have the power review the 
constitutionality of federal and state, or provincial and regional, legislation intervening in 
disputes involving "conflicts of competence" between the central governments and the states, 
provinces, or regions, as well as between these latter political units. They also can decide 
jurisdictional disputes between organs of government, however only in Austria are they able to 
decide jurisdictional disputes between the courts, or courts and administrative authorities (Cole 
1959). As far as impeachment is concerned both countries can try accusations against certain 
officials at the national level, but only in Austria can the Courts try officials at the federal and 
provincial levels. In both Austria and Italy, individual access to the Court is limited, whereby it 
is more limited in Italy as there is only one procedure of judicial review – in Austria there are 
two. Constitutional complaint, as it exists in many other countries is unknown in Italy and only 
available in a modified form in Austria. Thus, it seems that the Italian courts have implemented 
the most restrictive view on equal protections (Cole 1959). 
In Italy, the appointing authority is divided to incorporate three separate branches of 
government: 15 judges in total are appointed for one non-renewable nine-year term. Five judges 
are named by each, the President of the Republic, parliament in a joint sitting, and judges on the 
ordinary and administrative courts (Volcansek 2001). Before the reconfiguration of political 
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parties in 1994, there was an allocation of appointment among political parties meaning that two 
judges were appointed by Christian Democrats, one by the Socialist party, one by the Communist 
Party and one was a rotating appointment between the three main parties (Volcansek 2001). 
Judicial independence cannot be counted on as appointments are made based on party loyalty, 
meaning that the appointments are very much influenced by which parties are currently in power 
(Volcansek 1999). To offset this fact, judges can only be appointed for a single nonrenewable 
term (Volcansek 1999) thereby minimizing the political clout.  
The Italian Constitutional Court is an important political actor (Volcansek 1999) and has 
been established as a significant example of a veto player, in other words as an influential actor 
(or agent) in the policy-making process (Baschiera 2006). The role of the Court is one of a 
watchdog, keeping an eye on what the executive and parliament do and making sure these 
actions hold up in the Italian Constitution. Because this Court has the power to review legislation 
in order to monitor the rules, the position of the Court is elevated to one of a major decision 
maker or breaker (Volcansek 2001). 
The failure to decide jurisdictional disputes between courts, the inability to try officials at 
a national level and the fact that judges are very influenced by political parties despite their 
single unrenewable term give the Italian Constitutional Court slightly less independent power 
than the Austrian one. Three important parts of the Italian constitution pertaining to health are 
Articles 2 and 21 that guarantee the human rights and freedom of expression, respectively, as 




The Italian parliament is a bicameral legislature with a total of 945 elected members. The 
Chamber of Deputies is the larger of the two chambers and has 630 members (each elected on a 
national basis) while the Senate of the Republic only has 315 members (each elected on a 
regional basis with six senators for life). Although these two houses are independent, they each 
possess the same powers, no distinction is made between senators and deputies other than their 
age at the time of election and both are elected every five years (Senato della Republica n.d.).  
The main function of the Italian Parliament is to enact laws. Similar to the United States, 
in order for a bill to become a law it must be approved by both chambers containing the identical 
text. A further important function of Parliament is also to review the actions of the Government 
and when necessary, provide political direction. In fact, they are the ones that bring a new 
Government to life through the “vote of confidence” thereby also establishing guidelines that 
executive has to follow (Senato della Republica n.d.). 
An interesting fact about the Italian Parliament is that it has one of the highest rates of 
legislative production in the world (Giuliani 2008). See Appendix B for an analysis of the 
various Parliaments starting in 1996. 
 
Clientelism 
The notion of clientelism played, and still plays an exceptional role in Italian politics. While 
clientelism was present well before the 90’s35, I will use a concrete example from the 90s to 
explain its expansive influence: 
                                               
 
35 Before the 90s, Italian parties avoided placing too much emphasis on political leaders, such as the Prime Minister, this 
radically changed with the introduction of Silvio Berlusconi, Umberto Bossi and Romano Prodi (Pasquino, 2001). With these 
strong figures, Italians began linking their support for these men to the political parties they belonged to, and not the other way 
around. 
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Corruption in parliament was one of the main reasons people started 
looking for new parties to vote for. With the end of the 1st Republic (1946 
– 1999)36 and the beginning of the 2nd Republic in 1999, everything was 
different politically. And it was during this time that Berlusconi was 
strongly connected with the Socialist Party, particularly Bettino Craxi. 
There were investigations later showing that Craxi was a relevant player 
in allowing Berlusconi to have all the conditions to develop his media 
empire. Because Berlusconi was the first to develop a private media 
empire. What happened is that Berlusconi decided to enter into politics 
because of the risks he was confronted with seeing as he no longer had 
people in politics to support his interests. He was no longer covered in 
politics because the old politicians were no longer in power. So, the first 
modern populist was born with Berlusconi in 1994. Not an extreme right 
as defined now, but right at the time (Interviewee 2.16 Political 
Geographer). 
 
Put differently, “The institutional penetration of the Christian Democrats (DC) into Italian 
society was strengthened insofar as individuals found political advantage in working through DC 
links … Patterns of clientelism and favoritism spilled over into outright corruption, however, 
popular revulsion against which eventually triggered the collapse of the old party system” 
(Gunther and Montero, 2001, p.139) and the birth of the Second Italian Republic. This is to say 
that the amount of corruption scandals had increased so sharply leading up to the Second 
Republic, that Italians declined to identify themselves with any party (Gunther and Montero, 
2001; Menapace, 1974). This led to the decreased support for the traditional parties, the Christian 
Democrats, known as the white party, on the one hand and the Italian Socialist Party, known as 
the red party, on the other. With less support for the two largest parties in Italy, the Catholics and 
the Communists, spaces on the political spectrum for new parties were beginning to open. It is 
because of this opening that parties such as Forza Italia (FI, center right), the National Alliance 
                                               
 
36 Dominated primarily by the Christian Democrats who retained their influence by keeping the Italian Communist Party (PCI) 
out of power. 
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(AN, far right) and the Lega Nord (LN, between FI and AN) could begin to find support on the 
national level. 
 
National Healthcare System 
The Italian healthcare system has a mixed-public private system of provision, wherein healthcare 
is provided by a regionalized tax-based the Italian National Health Service or (SNN – Servizio 
Sanitario Nazionale), following the Beveridge model of healthcare. This National Health 
Service, “very similar to the British health service, was created with the healthcare reform in the 
late 70’s. Originally, it had a very limited, very small role for private providers” (Interviewee 2.6 
Medical and Public Health Expert). During the last few decades Italy, like many other countries, 
has seen a transfer of health competencies from the national to the regional level (Greer, 2016).  
This step was solidified in 2001, when the final constitutional amendment relating to health was 
implemented in Italy. Herewith, the regions gained full autonomy in organizing and managing 
their healthcare services while the Senate was given the task of formulating general principles 
and the national government provided the finances (Toth, 2014).  In essence: 
The national government decides for general issues, like a frame, but then 
article 117 of the constitution asks regions to freely organize themselves 
inside the given frame. And the frame is pretty wide. Law 552 of 1992 
outlines the general, universalistic criteria (LEA or essential levels of 
care), but then the region decides. The government gives the budget, and 
the government checks every year whether the minimal standards (LEA’s) 
are respected, but it is up to the region to decide how to spend the money. 
The regional government has more power on the realization of the 
services, of course every year each region says, ‘we need more money’ 
(Interviewee 2.1 Health Official).  
 
Thus, since the early 90s every regional government has created its own healthcare system, and 
each region, not the national government, is solely responsible for creating, organizing and 
financing its Regional Healthcare System (RHS) in relation to specific territorial peculiarities, 
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health needs and resources (Perna, 2018; Tediosi et al., 2009). Therefore, one can consider the 
country being made up of 21 different regional health services (Mapelli, 2012).  
As can be seen in Figure 10 below, the Ministry of Health, despite the devolution, still 
plays a rather central role within the SSN. The biggest task given to the Ministry is determining 
the overall budget for the SSN (Ferrario and Zanardi, 2011). Funds are allocated according to a 
complex formula that is based on population size, average age, mortality rates and other regional 
characteristics, such as spending levels (Giannoni and Hitiris, 2002). The money from the 
Ministry of Health is given to the Regional Health Authorities (RHA) and then further 
distributed to the Local Health Agencies (ASLs). An additional task assigned to the Ministry is 
to define what services are included within the guaranteed basket of services provided by the 
‘essential levels of assistance’ (Livelli essenziali di assistenza – LEA). The national government 
has the exclusive authority of determining what is in the guaranteed basket of care (WHO, 2016) 
and each region must provide, at least that. They can provide more services, but not fewer. 
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Figure 10 Overview of the Italian Healthcare system 
 
Source: (Ferré et al., 2014). 
In summary, when thinking about the healthcare system in Italy it is important to realize 
the that there are three key actors: 1) the central government (Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Finance), 2) the regional government and 3) 200 local health units (ASLs) whom are responsible 
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for the health of the population in a given area and 100 independent hospitals (Anessi-Pessina et 
al., 2004). Figure 11 gives a quick overview of the ASL structure: 
Figure 11 Local Health Units (ASL) 
 
Source adapted from (Mapelli, 2007). 
 
This dissertation and the following chapters will not focus on the devolution of the Italian 
healthcare system as the time period of interest is post 2000 for my national and subnational 
cases. For an overview of the devolution see (Toth, 2014) and for healthcare reforms pre 2000 
see (Giannoni and Hitiris, 2002).  The rest of this section will instead, touch on a few important 
points that one needs to know about the Italian system and how healthcare is implemented. 
 
Financing Healthcare 
The country’s main source of health financing is national and regional taxes, supplemented by 
co-payments for medicine and outpatient care (WHO, 2016). 95% of the NHS is funded through 
direct and indirect taxation, the rest comes from the regional health institutions and from 
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“tickets”37 paid directly by patients (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 2016). As explained by an Italian 
health official: 
The national health budget is discussed year by year, to decide whether it 
should be increased and by how much. Under Matteo Renzi (2014-2016), 
for example, there was a time when the health budget was not increased 
because it was decided that it was not possible to give more money to 
healthcare because of a deficit with Europe. Then there was an agreement 
to increase the budget a little bit, and that is how we arrived at the current 
number. Now, the new government will have to either take money from a 
different area or increase taxes, if they want to increase the health budget. 
Healthcare needs an increase in budget: more elderly people, longer life 
expectancy, new medicines, new technologies, it’s a growing trend. To 
keep it the same, it’s the same as reducing it (Interviewee 2.1 Official for 
Health, Welfare and Sport). 
 
In essence, what occurs, is that the citizens of the regions pay taxes, these taxes, for all 
but five regions38, go to the national government. The government then, depending on the 
country’s economic situation, the party in charge and how well the region met its health goals, 
decides how much money to allocate to a specific region for health.  
The financing of the health system is, even though in many documents or 
in papers is written something else, is absolutely centralized, so that all 
the money necessary to finance the national services are collected in Rome 
at the central level. There is an overall budget that is taken from general 
taxation (Interviewee 2.5 Public Health Expert).  
 
The distribution to the regions is calculated via formulas whose goal it is to ensure coverage, 
including primary care, hospital care and community-health services. The formula takes into 
account the age structure and health needs of the region’s population when determining the 
allocation of funds (Ferré et al., 2014).  
                                               
 
37 A ticket is a small copayment per referral that is fixed by each region. The price of the ticket is calculated by considering 
household income or considering the value of the service prescribed in the referral (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 2016). Exemption 
from the ticket costs vary per region. 
38 Sicily, Sardina, Valle D’aosta, Friuli and Trentino are Regiona statuto speciale, or regions with a special statute.  
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The number of the population is element number one, the you know, the 
stratification of age is another element in part certain chronic conditions 
disease conditions are recently included in this calculation. Nevertheless 
they are always struggling different regional presidents in order of course 
to add the most convenient formula for them, in general the northern 
region receive a per capita expenditure that is higher and most of this is 
due to the average age. When they calculate the regional budgets before 
giving the budget to the region, they also take into account internal 




The most important point in calculating the funds received per region is not only how many 
people live in that particular region, but also how old those people are. “The older the people, the 
more money a region receives. Therefore, each region receives different funding amounts” 
(Interviewee 2.3 Health Official). “Politicians don’t have a say on the amounts, it is a nation-
wide criterion. Changing it would require a proposal presented by all regions, agreeing on the 
parameter that need corrections” (Interviewee 2.1 Health Official). 
 Regional health systems are financed in the following three ways: 1) value added tax 
(VAT) revenues, of which a percentage is put into the balancing the Fund, 2) the production tax 
(IRAP), which is a local tax on productive activities within a regional territory 3) a combination 
of minor things such as the percentage of personal income taxation (IRPEF), and a tax on 
gasoline consumption (Brenna, 2011). A regions own revenue sources cover almost 45% of 
regional expenditure, although there is still considerable variety amongst the regions. For 
example, in 2003, Lombardy had the highest fiscal capacity, with a coverage capacity for current 
expenditure of 69% against a value of 26% for Calabria, at the lowest end of the regional 
spectrum. If you added in VAT revenues, Lombardy would have reached 87% coverage and 
Calabria 51%. Once the regions passed through the equalization mechanism, the situation turns: 
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Calabria, because of sources from the balancing fund, is able to cover almost 91% of its 
healthcare needs, while Lombardy, who gets no extra funds, remains at 87% (Caruso, 2009).  
 The goal here is redistribution, trying to make the health allowances of regions “more 
equal”. These thoughts however, fueled initial resentment from the North towards the South, 
sentiments PRR leaders and parties capitalized on.  
 
Exceptions to the Rule 
Piani di rientro or re-entry plans 
There are two instances where healthcare financing does not run exactly as described above: 
At the beginning of the millennium, in 2001 2002 and so on, most of the 
regions, not only in the south, most of the regions did not have a balanced 
budget. They thus received strict orders from Rome, in theory, to introduce 
more taxes or do something in order to balance the budget. While the 
deficits of most of the northern regions were you know limited, some of the 
southern Italian regions had huge deficits especially Campagna, that is 
the region of Naples, and Lazio, the region of Rome (Interviewee 2.5 
Public Health Expert). 
 
 
To address the continuously increasing healthcare expenditures in Italy, the Italian government 
introduced a program for regions that were overspending. The creation of the ‘financial recovery 
plans’, or Piani di Rientro were designed within the Finance Law (311/2004) passed in 2005: 
The central government could take over the regional government when it 
came to healthcare. If there was a very high deficit the Ministers of Health 
and the Economy and finance Ministers would enter into an agreement 
with individual regions imposing either very strict or soft rescheduling 
plans (Interviewee 2.14 political sociologist). 
 
The operational programs for the reorganization, redevelopment and strengthening of the 
regional health service are known as re-entry plans and contain both rebalancing measures of the 
disbursement profile of the essential levels of assistance (LEA) and measures to guarantee a 
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balanced health budget (Ministro della Salute, 2020). Actions taken to balance the budget are, for 
example, addressing structural determinants of costs as well as reorganizing areas of palliative 
care, prevention or laboratories (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 2016). 
The State-Regions Agreements (Article 8, paragraph 6, of L 131/2003 in implementation 
of Article 120 of the Constitution) are agreements between the national government (the state), 
wherein the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Economic and Finance are the 
representatives, and the regions (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2020). The conditions 
of these agreements, the decrees and regulations passed change every three years. See (Ministero 
dell’Economia e delle Finanze, 2020) for specific details.  
The important thing to know, however, is that within these agreements, both parties’ set 
the level of funding by the NHS for the period of the agreement. They also define the rules for 
governing the health sector and the methods of verifying the obligations of the regions. If the 
regions do not achieve the objectives set out in the re-entry plans, the repayment plans continue, 
lasting three additional years. Table 10 below depicts the ten regions that have been subjected to 
the re-entry plans since their inception. The table also illustrates whether the regions have simply 
presented a repayment plan (RP) or if the failures in the implementation of the latter have also 
led to the implementation of a Commissioner (RPC). As is clearly visible, Lombardy and Veneto 
have never been subject to such measures. 
 
 157 
Table 6.1 Regions subject to re-entry plans 
 
Source: (Bordignon et al., 2019). 
The regions with high health budget deficits typically have an unsustainable budget 
imbalance and present shortcomings in the provision of LEAs (mandate basket of care by the 
central government). This implies that they are not able to meet the quality indicators set forth by 
the national government. In addition, these regions often have very high levels of pharmaceutical 
expenditure that reach far beyond the parameters set within the legislation.  
If the regions subjected to these re-entry plans do not abide by the agreement and thereby 
upholding the budget, “a commissioner from Rome comes and relieves the region of its 
healthcare autonomy” (Interviewee 2.5 Public Health Expert). 
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Regiona Statuto Speciale or Regions with a special statute 
The second exception to the normal health financing rules in Italy pertains to the five regions that 
have a special statute. Sicily, Sardinia, Valle D’Aosta, Friuli and Trentino are “Regiona statuto 
speciale. This implies that these five regions function like Federal States. This means that the 
taxes collected in these regions do not go to Rome, rather they are kept in the regions and pay for 
healthcare directly. So, they have a different amount of money” (Interviewee 2.15 Health 
Economist). 
 Again, to clarify, neither Lombardy nor Veneto fall into these two exception categories, 
thus these rules do not apply. It is, however, important to mention that such regions exist, and 
they are subjected to different rules and conditions when thinking about healthcare financing. 
 Contrary to Austria, where health policies are made at a national level, within the Italian 
case, the subnational cases will likely be more telling with regards to what the PRR do in terms 
of healthcare policy. In addition, the healthcare models as were described above could have 
potentially been chosen based on the party in charge at the time.   
 
The National Case: Italy 
The parliamentary republic of Italy is the 4th most populous country in Europe with over 
61 million inhabitants. According to the most recent OECD report, Italy has the 4th highest life 
expectancy in the world (OECD, 2019), but sees the largest internal differences of GDP/capita 
for health of any European country (Health Consumer Powerhouse, 2019). Over the last 25 
years, the Italian National Health Service (NHS) has transformed from a centralized to a 
regionalized and semi-federalized system (see Pavolini & Vicarelli, 2012 and Lynch & Oliver, 
2019 for more detailed information) wherein the 19 regions and two autonomous states (Vatican 
 159 
City and San Moreno) provide universal health coverage. The central Italian government 
controls the distribution of tax revenue for healthcare and defines the essential levels of health 
services (ELS). While much of the health competencies have devolved to the regions, the goal of 
this chapter will be to identify health policies directly or indirectly passed by the populist radical 
right (PRR) Lega Nord (LN).  
While the main policy areas prioritized by the Lega Nord (LN) have always been 
immigration and fiscal autonomy through either federalism, secessionism or devolution (Bull, 
2011), there are instances when they attempt to frame health policies to fit into these realms. The 
LN has been in national government over the course of several different election periods: ’94, 
’01-’05 and ’08-11 (Figure 1) wherein they participated in Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition 
government briefly in 1994, were in another Berlusconi led coalition from 2001 to 2006 and 
formed another coalition with Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party in 2008. During this time 
the healthcare system was plagued with efforts to contain public health spending. Naturally, this 
led to retrenchment measures in healthcare typical of Conservative governments. After a name 
change leading up to the 2018 elections, the Lega made their last appearance in government 
through a coalition with the populist, anti-establishment party Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S; 5 Star 
Movement). During this period, the party’s new leadership becomes apparent through increasing 
anti-scientific rhetoric coupled with indirect welfare chauvinistically motivated health policies.  
 The chapter will continue with a history of the Lega Nord establishing that it does belong 
to the populist radical right party family. Starting from 2001, when the LN was in government, 
the health policies (direct) or policies relating to or impacting health (indirect) passed and/or 
addressed will be looked at in detail. Then, a section on the corona pandemic and the PRR 
response to it will follow leading into the chapter’s conclusion.  
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History of the Lega Nord 
Founded in 1991 by Umberto Bossi as a regionalist populist party (see Mazzoleni & Mueller, 
2016; Spektorowski, 2003), the Lega Nord (LN; Northern League) was born out of the success 
of several regional leagues (Veneto, Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna and 
Tuscany). At this time, the Lega Nord was considered a “a populist movement with protest and 
identitarian features” (Tarchi, 2008 pg 91) whose goal it was to protect the Northern region’s 
economy and culture (Giordano, 2001b; Lega Nord, n.d.). Much support was garnered due to 
citizens increasing resentment of economic and political problems, which the party used to 
criticize the South for being lazy and profiting from the transfer of hard-earned Northern 
resources (Betz, 2001; Savelli, 1992). During this time, the LN focused primarily on two 
political issues: 1) the “northern question” (Diamanti, 1996), implying a break between the 
wealthy North and the much poorer south, and 2) increased regional power because of the 
increasingly corrupt political and institutional elites (Bulli & Tronconi, 2011).  
The LN’s evolution into a full-fledged PRR party can be observed in how it participated 
in government and what issues became most pressing for them. Always being part of the centre 
right coalition, Casa della Libertà (CDL; House of Freedom) led by media tycoon Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, the Lega initially chose to concentrate its efforts on regional topics, 
specifically, advocating for the independence of the North and thus showing little presence on 
the national stage. By the time the party entered into its second coalition with Berlusconi’s’ 
Forza Italia in 2001, the LN began solidifying its national issues: anti-immigration, devolution 
through constitutional reform, protectionism and a strong aversion to the EU’s (European Union) 
single currency (Albertazzi et al., 2011). At this point, the party took on more nativist and 
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authoritarian positions (Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005) although not entirely dropping its 
enthnoregionalist (Spektorowski, 2003a) ideology. The party’s success during this period can be 
attributed to its passage of both the Bossi–Fini immigration law and the Constitutional Reform 
bill (devolution). While both of these laws had their faults (see Albertazzi et al., 2011), they 
allowed the Lega to establish “issue ownership” (Albertazzi et al., 2011) through their proactive 
participation in government. 
The third and final coalition with Berlusconi, now head of the Il Popolo della Libertà 
(PdL; The People of Freedom, came in 2008. By this time, the LN had become the oldest party 
in Italy’s parliament (Albertazzi et al., 2018). Rather than dissipate or be consumed by other 
parties, as happened to many other Italian parties, the LN became a primary force within Italian 
politics (Biorcio 1999) because it was able to change and adapt its rhetoric thereby adjusting to 
the changing political situation in Italy. The two pillars of discourse and themes were still greater 
northern autonomy coupled with the immigration of people from outside the EU; but the rhetoric 
of the party started to intensify with slogans such as “Let’s close our borders” and the number of 
policies that were passed increased. LN Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni saw to the passage 
of two very strict security packages, the first of which, Law n. 94, went into effect in August 
2009 and the second became law in 2010. Both laws increased the barrier of entry for 
immigrants specifically tightening the controls on convenience marriages and allowed for 
citizens to patrol the streets to help fight crime (Brunazzo & Roux, 2013). In addition, the 
government implemented eight decrees that supported further devolution and federalism (see 
Brunazzo & Roux, 2013). 
With the issues immigration, security and devolution at its core combined with the classic 
populist (Taggart, 2000) manner in which its leader, Umberto Bossi, justified its actions and 
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policies, the Lega Nord was in government three times - 1994, 2001, 2008 and becoming 
increasingly radical. 
 
From Bossi to Salvini 
After a corruption scandal, Bossi had to step down as the leader of the LN, handing the party 
over to Roberto Maroni in 2012. Maroni’s leadership ended shortly after it begun as Matteo 
Salvini took hold of the party reigns in 2013 thereby moving the party even more to the right on 
the political spectrum.  
Figure 12 General Elections (Chamber of Deputies) Results 
 
Source (Governo italiano Ministero dell’interno, 2018). 
According to scholars, Salvini’s aim was to transform the LN from a regionalist party to 
one centred in anti-immigration and anti-EU policies, thereby following the sentiments of the 
population (Albertazzi, 2016; Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017; Mancosu & Ladini, 2018). He went so 
far as to create a sister party to the LN known as “Noi con Salvini” (Us with Salvini) in 2014 in 
order to amass more support from the Southern regions (Perrone, 2018) and subtly dropped the 
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“Nord” from the party’s name (Albertazzi et al., 2018), thereby officially putting an end to the 
Lega’s regionalist ideology.  
Lega, Lega nearly disappeared 10 years ago, now it is the strongest party, 
is the strongest party in Italy. What means? It means that its, its leadership 
has a, has a perfect understanding of what people want. On the contrary, 
social democrats are nearly disappearing, are, are inconsistent now. And 
the problem is that the leadership, of the left, of the social democrats are, 
are apparently unable to understand the will of the common people 
(Interviewee 2.6 Medical and Public Health Expert). 
 
Although Bossi had always proposed strict immigration policies (Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017), 
Salvini took this a step further embracing the unconditional rejection of foreigners (Albertazzi et 
al., 2018) emphasizing the defence of the Italian people against external pressures such as the 
European Union (Caiani, 2019), and thereby appealing not only to neo-fascists but also to the 
many Italians fearing increased migration into the country.  Both Bossi and Salvini are 
charismatic leaders, typical of populist parties; however, Salvini was able to increase his 
popularity, communication range and political influence through the use of social media 
(particularly through the use of Facebook and Twitter) (Albertazzi et al., 2018). While Bossi was 
most known for his alliance with Berlusconi, securing three government terms in a centre right 
coalition and his more conservative governing style (Brunazzo & Roux, 2013), Salvini shifted 
the Lega’s direction towards radical right-wing populism (Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017). 
 Salvini was increasingly successful because he understood that the Social Democrats 
failed to address the problems of the average man and woman.  
That is one of the reasons why the Populists have such appeal. The appeal 
is that they are talking TO those people that are upset that they are being 
overheard and overlooked because they don't appear as intelligent as 
somebody that has a degree (Interviewee 2.10 Public Health Expert). 
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Salvini, and in turn the Lega, found increased success because he was able to do what other 
parties could not – connect with the average Italian and make them feel understood. 
 
PRR Lega? 
 While many scholars classify the Lega Nord, before Salvini (pre-2013), as PRR (H. Betz 
& Johnson, 2016; Ruzza, C. & Fella, 2009; Stefano & Ruzza, 2009; Verbeek & Zaslove, 2015; 
Zaslove, 2011), arguing that its ideology, political organization, and voter profile match other 
“third wave” PRR parties that emerged in the 1970s (Zaslove, 2011 pg 5-6); others disagree. 
Some state that while the LN was certainly always a populist party, its qualification as radical is 
more difficult to establish (Bartlett et al., 2012; Mudde, 2009). They argue that it does not meet 
the PRR criteria of having a nationalist, populist and authoritarian ideology and is instead 
nationalist, populist and regionalist with secessionist aims, an ethnoregionalist position, and a 
preference for decentralization (Zaslove, 2011). Others attest “If you want to talk about the Lega 
as a PRR party, start with its takeover by Salvini in 2012, before it was a regionalist RR party 
under Bossi” (Interviewee 2.11 Political Scientist) or “the current definition of PRR parties is 
more reflective of the Lega under Salvini” (Interviewee 2.13 Political Scientist). 
For the purpose of this dissertation, I will follow the former logic that the Lega, although 
overwhelmingly regionalist pre Slavini, did fit into the original third wave categorization of PRR 
parties that emerged in the ‘70s. In the rest of this chapter, the health and social policies passed 
by the Lega or with the help of the Lega will be investigated starting in 2001. The parties first 
term in government will be left out because it was too short (six months). 
It is also important to note that in addition to the Lega there are several Italian parties that 
have been interpreted as being PRR by scholars over the years. While some scholars include the 
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Alleanza Nazionale (AN; National Alliance) in the PRR family (Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, 
2006; Norris, 2005), they provide no reasoning or justification for doing so. The AN, born out of 
the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI; Italian Social Movement) in 1995, had its roots in fascism 
(see Griffin, 1996), evolved into a modernization party 1998 – 2000 (Tarchi, 2003) and then 
settled into the position between the Forza Italia and the Lega on the political party spectrum, 
also identifiable as “proto-conservative party” (Ignazi, 2005) or “post-industrial far right” 
(Kopecek, 2007). In 2009, the AN as well as Berlusconi’s Forza Italia merged into the newly 
formed Berlusconi led Il Popolo della Libertà (PdL; The People of Freedom). Currently, the AN 
is considered to be a part of the Fratelli d'Italia (FdI; Brothers of Italy), a former faction of the 
PdL. 
The Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) can, since their founding in 2012, very much be classified as 
PRR (Gattinara & Froio, 2018) as it is a hard-right, nationalist, conservative and populist party 
that has origins in neo-fascism (Bruno & Downes, 2020). Although the party has never been in 
government, it is one worth looking out for in the coming years as it is gaining increasing 
momentum under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni (Bruno & Downes, 2020; Nadeau, 2018). 
In addition to the PRR party family in Italy, there is also another type of Italian populism 
that has influenced the choices of the not only the Lega, but of other parties as well (Caiani & 
Padoan, 2020). The populist radical left led by the M5S is a relevant player in the Italian party 
system not only because the party has been in government over the course of two periods, but 
also because it has pushed for institutional reforms securing their biggest accomplishment 
through the 2020 referendum to reduce the size of parliament (Balmer & Fonte, 2020). 
 
Health policies of the Lega 
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Berlusconi Government II & III (2001-2006) 
The Italian Welfare state, including health and social policies, in the 2000s can best be described 
as an almost “frozen” (Naldini & Saraceno, 2008) landscape as all national healthcare reforms 
(decentralization, managed competition and different forms of privatization) took place in the 
90’s (Legislative Decrees no. 502/1992 and no. 517/1993); see Maino & Neri, 2011; Neri, 2019 
for more detailed information.  There was however an attempt by the centre-right Berlusconi 
coalition, fuelled by pressures from the LN, to dismantle some provisions of the constitutional 
health reforms (Constitutional Law no. 3/2001), such as those regulating doctors and managers 
in the public sector. The national government wanted to further increase opportunities for private 
sector involvement within the health care system at all levels, particularly in financing, through 
private health insurance. In addition, the LN presented a bill aimed at changing the constitutional 
reform approved just before the 2001 elections. According to the new proposal, the regions were 
supposed to be granted exclusive – instead of shared – legislative power in the health sector 
(Fargion, 2006). While decentralization continued, the proposed reform was rejected per 
referendum (LSE Health, 2006). 
Between the years 2001 and 2006, Umberto Bossi (LN Minister of Institutional Reforms 
and Devolution) took on the task of introducing a stricter law on immigration; Roberto Castelli 
(LN Minister of Justice) promoted a controversial reform of the judicial system; and Roberto 
Maroni (LN Minister of Labour and Social Security) was at the forefront of efforts to restructure 
the pension system (Tarchi, 2008). The policies implemented by the Berlusconi government 
from 2001 and 2006 did not satisfy the voters as many of these policies turned out to be more 
moderate than those originally proposed by the LN. While the Bossi-Fini law introduced more 
stringent procedures for checking up on and expelling illegal foreigners by linking employment 
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to the ability to obtain a work permit or visa (Zaslove, 2004), it also led to the regularization of 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants already resident in the country (Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 
2008).  
Okay, in the Bossi-Fini, I remember that there was a part of the law saying, 
if a physician accepts to treat a refugee, he can be legally persecuted, and 
he must denounce this person. The physician must call the authorities and 
be like... he's an immigrant. And there was a huge strike by physicians, a 
huge opposition which eventually led to a strike and the slogan was 
something like, "We are physicians, not police officers. We treat people, 
we don't care about where they're from." And that was possibly one of the 
biggest interferences with healthcare from Bossi-Fini. However, this part 
of the law was declared unconstitutional and therefore never enforced 
(Interviewee 2.9 Medical Professional and Public Health Expert). 
 
What happened instead was that regional governments provided health care for 650,000 
regularized immigrants with no extra funding (Fargion, 2006). This reality was in stark contrast 
to the one presented in the LN pre-election manifesto, where the party asserted that immigrants 
would have to contribute to the national wealth before asserting the right to health insurance 
(Zaslove, 2004).  
Compared to the previous centre-left government, the Berlusconi government had a 
different attitude toward operational agreements between public administrations and/or with 
representatives of the private sector. As it became clear with the publication of the White Paper 
on the Labour Market in October 2001, the centre-right government and, particularly, the 
Minister of Welfare, Roberto Maroni, wanted to create new forms of “social dialogue”, wherein 
the role of the government and civil society would be more distinct, thereby also splitting the 
trade union front (Maino & Neri, 2011). The consensus of social actors would no longer be 
considered necessary in order to promote structural reforms (Maino & Neri, 2011). While it was 
very active in labour market and pension policies (see Laws no. 30/2003 and no. 243/2004 and 
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Ascoli & Pavolini, 2015), the Berlusconi government II and III did not promote any structural 
reforms in health care.  
 
Berlusconi IV government 2008-2011 
In 2009, the Berlusconi government began removing competencies for healthcare from 
the Ministry of Welfare transferring them instead to the Economic Ministry as cost-containment 
in the Italian NHS became the primary goal (Pavolini et al., 2015). This left the Health Minister, 
Ferruccio Fazio (Independent), with little to no powers to plan, coordinate and monitor regional 
health services. The result was cost containment programs that began in 2009 (Law Decree No. 
39/2009) and 2010 (Law Decree No. 78/2010) and increased after 2011. These programs put 
spending caps on pharmaceutical expenditures, strictly controlled staff expenditures in public 
services (i.e., reducing the number of NHS employees, a suspension of collective bargaining and 
wage stagnation), increased patients co-payments, and decreased the expenditure allotted to 
purchase goods and services (Neri, 2019). In addition, while public spending for health stagnated 
at around 6.3% in terms of GDP and per capita expenditures, private health expenditure 
(predominately in the form of out-of-pocket-payments) as a percentage of total health 
expenditure significantly increased from 22.5% in 2007 to 25.8% by 2018 (OCPS Report, 2018). 
These measures cannot be specifically attributed to any party in government, rather they were a 
direct result of the economic and financial crisis and the subsequent controls the EU imposed on 
Italy due to its high debt (the relationship of GDP and public debt has been over 100% since the 
early 90’s, surpassing 130% by 2014) and healthcare spending (Neri, 2019). 
What can however be linked directly to the LN is the security package (Pacchetto 
Sicurezza) designed by Lega Minister of Interior, Roberto Maroni. This package was made up 
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five laws grouped together essentially characterizing immigrants as security risks (Meyer, 2015). 
While the package certainly contained several desperately needed revisions to security in Italy 
such as provisions making it easier to address crimes of human trafficking or increased 
collaboration with worldwide agencies (Maccanico, 2009), some articles (Law 94/2009, article 
10 or Law 286/1998, article 35) impacted healthcare in a very negative way. The Pacchetto laws 
(or security package), as they are commonly known, most directly impacted the health of 
immigrant care workers (Meyer, 2015) (see Table 1). Article 10 made the status of being an 
undocumented immigrant a criminal offense and article 35 declared that undocumented 
immigrants could receive only emergency and essential medical care from the Italian National 
Health System. These laws had two different effects on immigrants: 1) Some immigrants felt 
scared deciding not to even come to Italy or the ones already in Italy decided to return to their 
home countries. 2) More experienced immigrants would simply ignore the laws knowing that 
they would continue to receive care. See Meyer, 2015 for the detailed interviews with 
immigrants regarding the security package.  
By the end of 2011, the Berlusconi IV government was replaced by a technocratic 
government (Monti government) because international markets as well as the European Union no 
longer believed that the government could contain the countries debt. At this time the cost-
containment programs increased and a spending review on public administration was put into 
place in 2012 (Law Decree No. 95/2012, converted into Law No. 131/2012) (Neri, 2019). Severe 
inequities, stemming primarily from geographic differences in health systems, in health status 
and health-care provision across the various Italian socioeconomic population groups resulted 
from these measures. Increased waiting times, and inequities in specialist care, favouring 
wealthier patients over poorer ones made access increasingly difficult (Ferré et al., 2014).  
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 The LN’s resume in government up until this point with regards to health can be seen as 
consistent with their coalition partners and the technocratic governments that replaced them. 
Governments across the board, whether technocratic, PRR or Conservative had the same 
approach to health – classic conservative cuts for the entire population. While the LN tried to 
mark some of their policies with a Liberal chauvinistic – cuts for all, but specifically for 
immigrants – characteristic, the general message was clear: public health expenditure was cut for 
all in order to adhere to the debt containment measures. 
 
Conte I Government 2018-2019 
At the general elections held in March 2018, the Lega gained over 17 per cent of the national 
vote – i.e., 7 per cent more than its previous best result in a general election back in 1996 (10.1 
per cent) and secured its 4th term in a coalition government with the populist left M5S as a 
coalition partner (Albertazzi et al., 2018). During the election campaign, Salvini said that he and 
his party would put "Italians first" and that he would begin cracking down on illegal 
immigration, but he also had things to say in terms of health and health policy. 
One of the first things M5S and Lega politicians did was prepare a proposal to eliminate 
the mandatory vaccinations for pre-school children (Lorenzin decree No. 73 of 2017) against 10 
diseases including measles, tetanus and polio (Davenport, 2018) put forth by the centre left 
government in 2017. The new populist coalition argued that vaccinations benefited 
pharmaceutical companies (5SM) and claimed they could cause autism (Lega) (Harris & 
Monella, 2018). On the other hand, the coalition said that they were in favour of vaccines but 
were against coercion (Rezza, 2019) with the Lega insisting that the Lorenzin decree violated 
Article 2 of the Italian Constitution seeing as it opposed the freedom of care for minors (Casula 
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& Toth, 2018). Despite vehemently arguing to overturn the decree, this was never done. Instead, 
the government passed a measure allowing children to stay in school as long as their parents 
affirmed that they had been vaccinated; no proof was required (Horowitz, 2018). The problem 
with this decision was that already in 2017, the WHO reported a spike in measles cases due to 
misinformation about vaccines, with the greatest surges being in Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean regions (WHO, 2018), hence the Lorenzin decree. Mandatory vaccinations in 
countries with declining coverage, such as Italy, have proven to produce positive effects (Rezza, 
2019), which is why members of the scientific community have doubts that the changes made to 
the Lorenzin decree were guided by scientific evidence (D’Ancona et al., 2019). 
The next attack on the scientific community came in December 2018 only months after 
the new government was elected. Health Minister, Giulia Grillo, dismissed the entire health 
advisory board wanting to signal that this government would be doing things differently thereby 
discarding some of the biggest names in Italian medicine (Giuffrida, 2018). Political opponents 
presumed that the decision was made to suppress scientific opinions (Dyer, 2018). Shortly 
thereafter, Walter Riccardi, President of the Italian National Institute of Health and 
internationally recognized expert on vaccinations resigned stating “representatives of the 
government (by which he explicitly meant Salvini) have endorsed unscientific or frankly 
antiscientific positions on many issues” (Day, 2019 pg 1). In addition, Ricciardi claimed that this 
populist government was “playing politics with public health by pressuring health officials to 
adopt policies favorable to antimigrant views” (Day, 2019 pg 1). 
In December 2018, the Decree-Law on Immigration and Security aka “Salvini Decree” 
(Corsi, 2019), pushed forth by Salvini came into effect (Law no. 132) as a modification of the 
previous Legislative Decree of 25 July 1998, n. 286 (see Table 1). Migrants had been accused of 
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exploiting the Italian welfare system and taking advantage of its services such as social housing 
and universal health care. Thus, the decree saw to it that not only the humanitarian protection 
status for migrants would be abolished, but it would also become easier to strip migrants of 
Italian citizenship, stops asylum seekers from accessing reception centres designed to combat 
social exclusion and generally weaken the public services available to them (Carlotti, 2020).  
Anti-scientific rhetoric and actions were best displayed during this short-lived 
governmental coalition. No specific implemented health policies can be tied to the Lega during 
this time, however observations as to how the party dealt with health discussions and policy 
proposals point to a fundamental PRR characteristic, namely pursuing policies and making 
arguments without scientific evidence. In addition, the “Salvini Decree”, although labelled as a 
security or immigration law, had profound effects on the health of undocumented migrants and 
continues to negatively impact public health throughout the corona pandemic.  
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The health policies passed or supported by Lega politicians can be summarized as being typically 
Conservative due to the strict debt containment measures during the Berlusconi coalitions (II-IV) 
and welfare chauvinistic coupled with anti-scientific rhetoric during the Conte government (I). 
While the LN was not in the position to directly pass health policies during the Berlusconi 
coalitions, they did support the retrenchment measures proposed during Berlusconi II. During the 
third Berlusconi government, the LN also supported further healthcare retrenchment efforts and 
attempted to reduce access to healthcare for undocumented migrants indirectly through the 
security laws.  
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During Conte I, the anti-scientific vaccination rhetoric and the welfare chauvinistic 
policies passed in the Salvini decree dominated the short-lived government. The already difficult 
situation surrounding the corona pandemic in Italy was made even more difficult due to the 
Lega’s consistent criticism of the government, their attempt to uphold anti-immigrant sentiments 
by blaming migrants for importing the disease and their inconsistencies regarding the wearing of 
masks. 
PRR politics in Italy, and elsewhere, can generally be summarized as having a lot of bark, 
but no bite. This was formulated more eloquently by Anna Cento Bull when she described the 
politics of the Lega as “a form of political communication that articulates demands which are not 
supposed to be taken seriously and implemented, but which are nevertheless constantly 
rearticulated” (Bull, 2010, 431). This is to say that manifestos and rhetoric are filled with action 
points, however when it comes to implementation policies, these can be counted on one hand. In 
fact, “policy proposals and even detailed legislative initiatives are made as mere instruments of 
political communication” (Ruzza, C. & Fella, 2009, 231-32). Put differently: 
They don't touch healthcare, because that actually can have consequences 
and I don't think they know what to do about it. No one, literally, no one 
wants to be associated with certain decisions. Yeah, they don't even 
mention it because as I told you, regarding healthcare is way more 
important, the local politics compared to the central government 
(Interviewee 2.9 Medical Professional and Public Health Expert). 
 
Future research on the PRR in Italy should continue to follow the Lega, but also keep an 
eye open for Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. In addition, health policies in the country might 
be better studied on a regional level seeing as the devolution of the health system has left the 
national competencies rather sparse. The next task will engage in exactly this task: determining 
the health policies passed by the Lega on a regional level.
 175 
 : The Subnational Cases of Italy 
 
This chapter is split into three sections. The first, somewhat loosely defined, section introduces 
the regional system in Italy. I begin by explaining regional politics very broadly focusing most 
specifically on the devolution of the Italian system. Then I move to the regional healthcare 
system describing the different models and what regions are responsible for in terms of health. 
Finally, to conclude section one of this chapter, I give. A high-level overview of the Lega Nord 
as the party pertains to the regions. The second section of this chapter focuses on the case of 
Lombardy, and the third section deals with the case of Veneto. A short conclusion will end 
Chapter 7.   
Regional Politics 
From a political perspective, every region in Italy has a statute that serves as a regional 
constitution, determining the form of government and the fundamental principles of the 
organization and the functioning of the region, as prescribed by Article 123 in the Constitution 
(Senato della Repubblica, n.d.). Five of Italy’s 21 regions (Valle d’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Sicily, and Sardinia) have special financial and political autonomy (regioni 
a statuto speciale) (Bianchini, 1990). The fundamental difference between the two statuses is that 
while the ordinary statute is adopted and modified by regional law, the special statute is adopted 
by constitutional law (European Committee of the Regions, n.d.). This is essential when 
considering regional politics, party development, and healthcare financing, seeing as the regions 
with a special statute have greater legislative, administrative, and financial autonomy than the 
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other regions. However, because the two regions focused on in this dissertation are Lombardy 
and Veneto – neither fall into the special statute – the issue becomes important to realize but 
irrelevant for these cases. 
What is, however, relevant is that the Lega Nord, with the help of Forza Italia, was key in 
giving regions more power (Kogan, 1975). Up until the 1970s, the Christian Democrats were 
consistently able to ignore the issue of regional autonomy. The issue of regional autonomy was 
not raised until the regions of Northern Italian expressed their discontent (which would 
eventually become the basis of the formation of the Lega Nord). Real legislative changes did not 
come until the 90s. The law 142/1990 surrounding the autonomy of local authorities marked the 
beginning of the devolution process. This structural reform was followed by the reformation of 
the accounting systems or local administrations (77/1995) and the “Bassannini Reform” 
(59/1997) that further decentralized the administrative powers of different governmental units 
(Calamai, 2009).  
In 2001 the Constitutional Law 3/2001 of Title V of the Constitution was approved, 
devolving all subnational administrations. This culminating step in the devolution process gave 
the regions far more power, including almost unconstrained local revenue collection and grants 
from the central government that were not subjected to overbearing conditions. In addition, this 
change allowed regional presidents to not only hire and fire bureaucratic ministers at the regional 
level, but they were given much more power to create and enforce legal changes (Bull and 
Gilbert, 2001).  
While this process of decentralization is now twenty years in the past, some people are 
wary of their actual allegiance: 
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Regions are a strange institution in Italy. They are supposed to be close to 
the territory, but my impression is that actually they are big institutions that 
are not very close to the people. It is much more a matter of lobbying to the 
national government. The regions have developed this function of doing a 
lot of lobbying and redistributing money, that’s basically what they do. In 
some respects, there is a lot going on in terms of politics, much more than in 
terms of services and practices. The region is really a lobby kind of 
institution. They are much closer to Rome, and they are always trying to 
influence the national government, which is probably one of the reasons why 
the regions are losing popularity in Italy because you do not see the regional 
politicians around, they are in the shadows trying to deal with Rome and 
trying to get money and funding for their constituents. The regions are more 
active because the healthcare system is very much in the hands of the regions 
and the hospitals, and all the system are at the regional level (Interviewee 
2.13 Political Scientist). 
 
While the quotation is more of a general statement directed at all regions, it would be interesting 
to see if my two cases (Lombardy and Veneto) also fit into this general description of being more 
loyal to Rome than their own constituents. But before jumping into the case of Lombardy, it 
necessary to take a closer look at how the regional healthcare system in Italy is structured and 
what it is responsible for.  
 
Regional Healthcare System 
The healthcare system in Italy changed in the 90s39 , wherein the regions were granted more 
powers from both an institutional and an economic point of view (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 
2016). Institutionally, they are tasked with creating the governance structure of the regional 
healthcare services. Economically they manage the national government's resources, which vary 
                                               
 
39 law n. 229/1999 is responsible for the devolution of healthcare to the regions and title V of the Constitution (D.Lgs.vo 




based on the agreement reached between the regional health authorities, the Minister of 
Economics, and the Minister of Health. 
It is important to note at this point that: 
The national government doesn’t choose the assessore alla sanita (essentially 
the regional health minister), nor the presidente della regions (President of 
the Region). These people are chosen every five years, and every region has 
its own schedule for that (they are not changed altogether, because some 
regions had problems in the past, their government fell, and this changed their 
timing as opposed to the other ones) (Interviewee 2.1 Official for Health, 
Welfare and Sport). 
 
In combination with the President of the Region and the Regional Health committees, 
Regional Health Ministers make the decisions regarding health in any given region. While the 
regions have to adhere to the general principles laid out by the national government, they can 
decide how to distribute resources and establish their own priorities and objectives in pursuit of 
health provision for their region. The regions have three important powers when it comes to 
healthcare. Firstly, they control the local health authorities (ASL – Azienda Sanitaria Locale), 
who plan and organize the population's health for each specific region. The ASL are divided 
according to districts within the regions, and these districts are responsible for the medical 
treatment, GP referrals, etc., of the people living within that district. In addition, the ASL’s are 
responsible for guaranteeing the essential levels of assistance (LEAs). Secondly, the regions are 
responsible for appointing the healthcare agency's general managers. This is important because 
the criteria for both crediting and renumerating public and private suppliers are also handled at 
this level. Finally, the regions control the hospital authority (AO – Azienda Ospedaliera), a trust 
that manages one or more hospitals. In order to be considered an AO, the hospital must meet 
certain conditions laid out by the federal government. If the hospital does not meet these 
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conditions, the hospital is placed under the control of the ASL in charge of the territory where 
the hospital is located. 
With regards to hospitals, there are three other types aside from ASL controlled and 
AO’s. The first is University Hospital Authorities (AOU), which are typically public and 
managed by university institutions. The second is Scientific Research Institutes (IRCCs - Istituto 
di Ricerca e Cura a Carattere Scientifico), which can provide public and private care. The final 
hospital option is simply the private hospital.  
Regional systems are very different, as you know one from the other in terms 
of organization in terms of contracting out of services to the private actor to 
the private providers in terms of the division of the overall expenditure 
between hospital care and territorial health care and so on. So, in certain 
regions, we have many local authorities. In others, there are just a few; in 
some regions, for example, in Lombardia, there were many hospital trusts 
while there were none in other regions. So even from the organizational 
models, the various regions are different. And this is true starting from the 
beginning of the 90s (Interviewee 2.5 Public Health Expert). 
 
Over time four standard models of regional health services developed to reflect these 
differences. The first is the classic model (See Figure 13), initially implemented in all regions 
(except for Lombardy). Within this model, the ASL provides all health services. With regards to 
hospital care, the ASL assumes a double role: on the one hand, it provides hospital care through 
the hospitals under ASL control, and on the other, it funds all services that its patients receive 
from other hospitals (AOs, private hospitals, AOUs and IRCCs). 
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Figure 13 Classic Italian Healthcare Model 
 
Source (Biselli, 2016). 
The second model is the Lombard model. The difference in this model is that ASL’s do 
not control any hospitals and are therefore only in charge of providing health services. Thus, 
when looking at Figure 13, above, the relationship between the ASLs and the hospitals, on the 
very right, does not exist. Hospital services in this model are provided exclusively by AOs, 
private hospitals, AOUs, and IRCCs; however, the ASLs pay for the services provided.  
The third model is used by the central Italian regions of Marche and Molise and generally 
works like the classic model. The major difference is the number of ASLs in the region. In this 
third model, there is only one ASL per region as opposed to numerous ASLs per territory. So, 
this model looks exactly like Figure 13, except it only has one ASL. 
The final model known as the “Aree Vaste” Model is also similar to the classic model 
except that it has some intermediary authorities between the regional authorities and the ASL, 
namely the Aree Vaste (translated as “Extended Areas”) See adapted Figure 14 below. Emilia 
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Romagna, Veneto, Tuscany, and Piedmont use this model. The Aree Vaste determines 
purchasing related to pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and non-medical goods; it is responsible 
for the logistics; information technology; financial administration; and human resources. The 
ASLs, on the other hand, are responsible for health services only in these regions.  
Figure 14 Aree Vaste Model 
 
Source (Biselli, 2016). 
To summarize: 
From the beginning of the mid-90s onward regional governments could 
decide their own healthcare organization models, we are talking about 
provision not financing, and they have chosen different models. And maybe 
it is interesting from the point of view the color of government to say that 
at least in the 90s, so in the first year of implementation of this regional 
autonomy, sometimes not always, but often, right-wing governments, we 
are talking about the alliance between Forza Italia, Berlusconi, AN and 
the Northern League, just in the north. So, the right-wing coalition prefer 
to be more open to private providers and emphasize the competition 




Put more simplistically: “In the case of Lombardy, the private sector has a very large role, while 
regions such as Emilia Romagna, Umbria, etc., the public sector plays a much greater role” 
(Interviewee 2.14 Political Sociologist). 
 Before jumping into the case of Lombardy, I find it important to also give a short 
overview of the Lega Nord, seeing as this is the most relevant party in my two cases. 
 
The Lega Nord 
The Lega, as described in the previous chapter, was created out of the Lega Nord (LN) or, as it 
was formally known, “Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania” (the Northern League for 
the Independence of Padania) in 1991. Padania, derived from the Latin Padus, refers to the 
territories bordering the Po River (Giordano, 1999). These regions originally included 
Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Piedmont, Liguria, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino-Alto 
Adige, and the Aosta Valley. With the LN’s Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of 
Padania in 1996, the LN would add Tuscany, Marche, and Umbria to its “nations” (Lega Nord, 
1996). However, the two most important regions were the Lega Lombarda in Lombardy and the 
Liga Veneta in Veneto (Giordano, 1999). The LN was born in Lombardy, and in both regions the 
party would consistently garner success allowing for its expansion across the North and then 
eventually throughout the country. 
It is important to note that the Lega Nord had existed for a much more extended period of 
time at a subnational level than at a national level; in fact, the earliest mention of “Padania” was 
around 1945 by Gianfranco Miglio (Miglio, 1990). Miglio’s work covers the period where these 
local movements had limited political impact. They were unable to offer a suitable alternative to 
the dominant Christian Democratic parties in the North between 1945 and the early 80s (Natale, 
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1991). Not until the Christian Democrats began losing touch with their Northern voter base did a 
position on the political spectrum open (Mannheimer, 1991). In 1982, the Lega Lombarda, 
headed by Umberto Bossi, was formed, soon to be followed by several other regional leagues 
(Liga Veneta, Lega Piedmont, etc.), and eventually uniting to form the Lega Nord. 
Lombardy and Veneto are both part of what Arnaldo Bagnasco coined the “Third Italy” 
(Bagnasco, 1977). He described this area as being made up of specialized industrial districts 
located in small towns across the regions of Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia 
Romagna, the Marches, and Abruzzo. This contrasted the large industrial industries that 
dominated the North West (First Italy) and the industry sparse South (Second Italy)(Messina, 
1998).  
Focusing specifically on the “Third Italy”, it is important to note that the Catholic and 
Christian Democrats (DC) in the Northeast (Lombardy, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) and 
the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the country’s center (Emilia Romagna, the Marches, and 
Abruzzo) were the major political players in the area. The reason for this difference is because 
different actors (the church vs. trade unions) assisted the farmers during the agricultural crisis in 
the 1880s (Allum, 1985). With increased globalization and intensifying economic pressures that 
the late 80s early 90s brought with them, the “Catholic world” of the Northeast was no longer 
able to offer viable solutions to increasing unemployment and economic unrest. The LN, on the 
other hand, offered solutions to the struggling small businesses through alternative development 
conditions (Messina, 1998), thereby successfully replacing the DC as the dominant party in the 
region. One of the main solutions proposed by these regional leagues, specifically the Lega 
Lombarda, was decentralized politics. Regionalism and the push for decentralization responded 
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to the failures of nation-state politics to combat corruption and provide satisfactory public 
services (Ruzza and Schmidtke, 1993). 
 
Lombardy 
This section will begin with a political overview of the region, followed by an in-depth view of 
the region's healthcare system. Then, I will look at the impact that the Lega had on this region's 
health policies.  
The Politics of Lombardy 
 
The region of Lombardy is located in the far north of the country, surrounded by the regions 
Trento Alto-Adige and Veneto on the East and Piedmont on the West. Lombardy is a 
representative democracy, where the President of the Region (Presidente della Regione) is the 
head of government. The President of the Region is elected directly by the people every five 
year. In general, as defined by Article 121 of the Constitution, s/he “represents the Region, 
directs the policymaking of the Executive and is responsible for it, promulgates laws and 
regional statutes, directs the administrative functions delegated to the Region by the State, in 
conformity with the instructions of the Government of the Republic” (Senato della Repubblica, 
n.d.). More specifically, however, the duties and role of the President are defined by the Statute 
in force in each region. In the case of Lombardy, there are no additional functions that the 
President assumes. The President of the Region is also the Regional Health Authority and thus 
issues decrees for the entire territory or for part of the territory in the case of emergency. See 
Table 12 below for an overview since 2000. 
Table 7.1 Presidents of the Region in Lombardy 
President of the Region Party Year 
Roberto Formigoni Forza Italia & Il Popolo della Libertà 1995 - 2010 
Roberto Maroni Lega Nord 2010 - 2013 
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Attilio Fontana Lega 2013 - Present 
 
The executive power is found within the Regional Government (Giunta Regionale). The 
regional government functions through resolutions adopted by a majority of its members, such as 
bills and administrative acts within the competence of the Regional Council. The President of the 
Region can approve regional regulations, except for those delegated by the national government. 
See Tables 13-17 for some of the most important (for my dissertation) ministries and which party 
held them. 
Table 7.2 Regional Government Fontana XI (2018- 2023). 
Name Party Position 
Attilio Fontana Lega - Lega Lombarda President 
Davide Carlo Caparini Lega - Lega Lombarda Budget Councilor 
Stefano Bolognini Lega - Lega Lombarda 
Councilor for Social, Housing and 
Disability 
Giulio Gallera Forza Italia Councilor for Health and Welfare 
Alessandro Mattinzoli Forza Italia Councilor for Economic Development 
 
Table 7.3 Regional Government Maroni X (2013- 2018) 
Name Party Position 
Roberto Maroni Lega Nord President 
Mario Mantovani 
Il Popolo della Libertà (for Forza 
Italia) 
Vice President responsible 
for Health and the EU 
Maria Cristina Cantù Lega Nord 
Councilor for Family, Social 
Solidarity and Volunteering 
Cristina Cappellini Lega Nord 
Councilor for Culture, 
Identity and Autonomy 
Massimo Garavaglia Lega Nord 
Councilor for Budget, 
Economy and Simplification 
 
Table 7.4 Regional Government Formigoni IX (2010- 2013) 
Name Party Position 
Roberto Formigoni Forza Italia President 
Mario Malezzini  Councilor for Health (2012-2013) 
Luciano Bresciani Lega Nord Councilor for Health (2007-2012) 
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Table 7.5 Regional Government Formigoni VIII (2005- 2010) 
Name Party Position 
Roberto Formigoni Forza Italia President 
Alessandro C’è Lega Nord Councilor for Health (2005-2007) 
Luciano Bresciani Lega Nord Councilor for Health (2007-2012) 
 
Table 7.6 Regional Government Formigoni VII (2000- 2005) 
Name Party Position 
Roberto Formigoni Forza Italia President 
Milena Bertani  Councilor for Health  
 
The legislative power is vested in the Regional Council (Consiglio Regionale). This 
council was established in 1970 and currently consists of 80 seats, including the President of the 
Region. See Table 18 for an overview of how many seats the majority party had starting in 2000. 
Table 7.7 Majority Party in Lombardy 
Election Year Majority Party and Seats out of 80* 
2000 FI 27 
 LN 11 
2005 FI 25 
 LN 15 
2010 PdL 29 
 LN 20 
2013 snap election PdL 19 
 LN 16 
2018 LN 29 
 FI 14 
Source (la Repubblica, n.d.). 
*Only the top two parties were chosen from the majority coalition. 
FI è Forza Italia 
LN è Lega Nord  
PdL è The People of Freedom 
 
From Lega Lombarda to Lega Nord 
The Lega Autonomista Lombarda (more commonly known as the Lega Lombarda or LL) was 
created in 1984, just a few years after the Liga Veneto, by founder Umberto Bossi. In its first 
appearance at the general election in Lombardy, the LL gained 2.6% of the votes in the region. 
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Similar to the motivations behind the Liga Veneto, and all other Leagues, the original focus of 
the LL was on autonomy and problems of corruption and taxation. According to an interview 
conducted by Benito Giordano with an LL official, “the Lega was born out of problems 
stemming from taxes. They continually increased during this time” (Giordano, 1999).  
The rise of the LL and thus the Lega Nord's strength can best be explained by looking at 
the province of Varese in Northern Lombardy, close to the border of Switzerland. In the late 80s 
early 90s, Varese was an industrial area known for manufacturing, textiles, and especially its foot 
ware industry, making it one of the wealthiest in all of Italy (Giordano, 1999). According to 
Benito Giordano's interviews with the politicians of Varese in the 90s, the people of the province 
became increasingly aggravated by the fact that they were paying high taxes and were receiving 
poor public services in return (Giordano, 1999). The LL used this opportunity to enter the 
political spectrum by giving the people of Varese an outlet to blame, namely the central 
government and the Southerners. The LL criticized the central government and the Christian 
Democrats (as the representing party) for being unable to provide the province with adequate 
public services. At the same time, they accused the Southerners of receiving too much 
governmental support based on Northern taxes.  
In 1991, the LL took charge of federating all the regional leagues into the Lega Nord 
(LN), thereby endorsing greater autonomy for Northern Italian regions while simultaneously 
rejecting the bureaucracy and corruption surrounding the national government (Maraffi, 1994). 
There were six regional movements from the North, including the Lega Lombarda, Liga Veneta, 
Piemont Autonomista (all entho-regionalist movements), and the Union Ligure, Lega Emiliano-
Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana, who were more recently established and primarily supported by 
the LL. Shortly after this union of the six regional parties, two addition regional parties from 
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Trentino and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia joined what would become better known as the Lega Nord. 
What united these regional parties was the longing for cultural, political, and economic 
independence based on the community's interests (Ruzza and Schmidtke, 1991; Stacul, 2003a). 
 Varese is also important because it was the birthplace of the Lega Lombarda (LL), and 
thus the Lega Nord (LN), as well as party leader Umberto Bossi. The commune of Varese was 
the first to elect an LN mayor, and the province of Varese was the first to elect an LN President 
(Giordano, 1999). This trend continued at a national level as well with the election of Bossi as 
senator in parliament in 1987. By December 1990, the regional elections showed that the 
previously dominant Christian Democratic party’s (CD) vote share decreased to 28.6% from 
36.03% in 1985, while the LL was able to increase its share to from .46% in 1985 to 18.94% in 
1990 (Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali, 1992). See Figure 15 below for a visual 
of the creation of the LN after 1990 and the complete disappearance of the DC. The LN replaced 
the Christian Democrats and were now seen as the protectors of the local, small business model 
(this was particularly relevant in the North East – see Veneto case) and community life, both of 
which seemingly disappeared with the disintegration of the nation-state (Stacul, 2003a). Ethnic 
criteria were defined to recreate a sense of community sheltered by the LN. These criteria were 
not based on language, rather by territory, thereby creating the ‘Northern identity’ (Stacul, 
2003a). 
The political appeal of the LN was much different than for other PRR parties as it was 
not based on ethnic or cultural factors (Vampa, 2016b). Instead, the LN stressed that Lombardy 
and the other Northern regions were the wealthiest in Italy and that their wealth was being used 
to subsidies the poorer and “lazy” Southern regions. The party went so far as to invent an 
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ethnicity based on strong localisms, a culture of hard work, free-market values, self-enrichment 
as well as ingrained racism towards Southerners and immigrants (Ginsborg, 1996).  
The LN, however, was not the only party that occupied the ideological space of 
neoliberalism, anti-statism, and fiscal protest (Ignazi, 2005). Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), 
created in the mid 1990’s offered voters similar views, although FI was not bound to the North as 
was the LN at the time. So, while the LN movement LN was 
created by Umberto Bossi, it remained a very local one. The one who really 
made the movement acceptable on a national scale was Berlusconi. 
Berlusconi in the 90s made alliance with the AN (hard right post-fascist, 
comparable with FdI now) and the Lega. Berlusconi made these “people” 
acceptable, to make these parties voteable and acceptable to parliament. So, 
even if we now consider Berlusconi to be moderate compared to these other 
two parties, at the end of the day, we should never forget that he was the first 
that really gave these parties a platform and cleaned them up somehow 
(Interviewee 2.16 Political Geographer). 
 
Because of the similarities between FI and LN along with the Alleanza Nationale (AN), 
they formed a coalition. This coalition has led the region of Lombardy since 1995 and promotes 
a region-specific model of welfare in Lombardy (Vampa, 2016b). 
Figure 15 Percentage of votes won in the regional election 
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The Lombard Healthcare Model 
 
Upon the Italian healthcare reform in 90s (decrees 502/92 and 517/93), where the 
national government decided to decentralize healthcare leaving it up to the regions how they 
wanted to spend public money, Lombardy, at that time under the leadership of Roberto 
Formigoni (FI) took a different route than the other regions (regional law 31/1997). While most 
regions continued to use the central government's reimbursement rates and quality standards, 
Lombardy passed the regional law 31/1997 and set up a quasi-market model (Brenna, 2011).   
The regional law saw an increase in quality standards, set its own reimbursement rates, 
and made public and private hospitals each eligible for public funds (Ferré et al., 2014). In 
addition, all hospital and specialist services were delivered by either hospitals or private 
providers (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 2016). If a hospital, whether public or private, meet the 
quality standards and charges for the agreed upon reimbursement rate, it would qualify for public 
funds. Therefore, patients in Lombardy are free to choose between public or private hospitals 
without being subject to extra costs; their co-pay would remain the same in either case. The 
benefits of a system with such competition (Stancati, 2010) are threefold: 1) the quality of 
services are improved, and (Colombo, 2008), 2) the variety of the services are increased 
(Colombo, 2008), and 3) it is a good way to control health expenditures, meaning the system is 
efficient (Brenna, 2011). The unique thing about Lombardy is that it does not have a Regional 
Health Agency (RHA) by choice. There is, however, a regional epidemiological observatory that 
performs some of the functions of the RHA (Mapelli, 2007). To get a better sense of these 
differences, see Figure 17 below.  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the difference between the Lombard model 
and the classic model is that ASL’s do not control any hospitals and are therefore only in charge 
of providing health services. Hospital services in this model are provided exclusively by AOs, 
private hospitals, AOUs, and IRCCs; however, the ASLs pay for the services provided.  
Figure 16 Lombard Health System Model 
 
The system has 15 Local Health Units (ASL) organized in 86 Districts. The region raises 
and manages funds for healthcare and then plans activities in cooperation with ASLs. While the 
ASLs manage the healthcare on the provincial level, smaller units known as Districts are 
responsible for care within their areas. The Districts not only manage the primary and 
ambulatory care but are also responsible for the residential care of a given area (Brenna, 2011).  
From the patient's point of view, the difference between for example the 
regional Emilia Romagna model and the Lombardy model is the freedom of 
choice. So, in Lombardy, they pay the same, but they have a wider freedom of 
choice as they can choose freely between public and private providers. So, the 
idea is that they do not pay more and just choose between the different public 
and private facilities. While in Lombardy, the philosophy was all the private 
providers can be chosen. So it was, you know, wider the freedom of choice. 
But in terms of what was given to the patients, there were no differences in 
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terms of the rights the service provided and even the waiting times 
(Interviewee 2.5 Public Health Expert). 
This implies that the while the patients in Lombardy patients are able to freely choose between 
private and public facilities without extra costs, the services provided in those facilities are 
exactly the same in a region like Emilia Romagna, where private facilities can only be freely 
used if contracted by the region (naturally there are not many of these). 
Criticisms of the quasi-market model refer to cream-skimming, cherry-picking, voluntary 
up-coding, and skimping (Anessi-Pessina et al., 2004; Berta et al., 2009; Fattore, 2019; Jones and 
Cullis, 1996). Other points to consider are relatively high out of pocket costs for financing the 
healthcare system (Universita Bocconi, 2017) as well as the fact that the model is too hospital 
oriented (see chapter 8 on COVID-19), general practitioners are typically not seen as a valued 
doctor, and their role of addressing the patient pathway is largely ignored (Colombo and Parisi, 
2019). Put differently, 
Lombardy invested its money in the hospital network. This division of 
labor has led to less bargaining power for those who organize care, 
overloaded hospitals with work and reduced the activities of professionals 
outside the hospital, damaging continuity of care (Interviewee 2.19 
Medical Professional). 
 
While there might have been advantages of a hospital centric system in the early 90’s, it seems 
that the disadvantages of such a system began increasingly apparent over time – culminating the 
corona pandemic (See Chapter 8). 
 
The Lega and Health 
 
Roberto Formigoni (FI), President of the Region from 1995 until 2013, is important to 
discuss despite the fact that he does not belong to the Lega party. According to (Gori 2010), 
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Formigoni, and thus FI, along with the regional health council, was responsible for adopting the 
Lombard regional health model (previously described). This very hospital centric model 
considered “GP’s useless under Formigoni and even under the Lega” (Interviewee 2.17 
Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). Formigoni adopted this new model on the basis 
of the subsidiary principle (the sharing of competencies between public and private actors see 
Groppi and Scattone, 2006). Not only did Formigoni and the Forza Italia party as a whole play 
an important role in this transformation, but catholic interest and business groups were also 
brought on board to solidify the quasi-market model (Vampa, 2016b)  What is important to 
understand is that: 
The President of Lombardy for almost 20 years, Formigoni, came directly 
from their (Comunione e Liberazione) ranks. So, what Formigoni did for 20 
years, was practically occupy the healthcare system in Lombardy. So, it means 
that every time they had to substitute someone like... I don’t know... the head 
of departments of surgery or whatever, they tried as much as they could to put 
their own people in, people loyal to the traditional Catholic Church 
(Interviewee 2.17 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). 
 
The involvement of the catholic church in the Lombard healthcare system made it even 
more unique. For example, in Lombardy, “you could not become, or you were not able to 
become a doctor in Gynecology if you were not supported by the Catholic’s” and it was really 
difficult at the time to “use your right of abortion because most doctors did not allow it” 
(Interviewee 2.17 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). Furthermore, 
They (the Lombard government led by Formigoni) opted for a very 
different framework, where the private sector had the upper hand over the 
public. So actually the main structures in Lombardy are from private 
systems, San Raffaele, San Raffaele hospital, San Donato hospital. If you 
look at the name, you, you may have an explanation for these choices, 
because if you look all the hospital, all the private hospital in Italy are 
named after a Saint: San Donato, San Raffaele because the majority of the, 
of the, of the hospitals in Italy were originally founded by the Catholic 
Church (Interviewee 2.6 Medical and Public Health Expert). 
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During the Formigoni presidency (1995-2013), welfare (specifically health) was also 
heavily associated with the freedom of choice and the will of the market (Pavolini, 2008). In 
addition, “the provision of health services, both in hospital and in the community setting, 
depended solely on hospitals” (Interviewee 2.18 Medical Professional and Public Health Expert), 
implying that the system was hospital centric. This association did not change when the Lega 
took over in 2013. Although Roberto Maroni (LN 2013-2018) recognized and attempted to 
change the imbalances of the system he, as well as his successor Attilio Fontana (2018 – present) 
were unable to change the existing market-based model. 
Not only did the Lombard model heavily rely on the free market principle, but it was also 
constructed so that “matters could (and should) be handled by the lowest, or closest possible 
level to where they will have their effect” (Colombo, 2008, p182). This principle made itself 
clearly visible as the regional government opted to control only the regulating, programming, 
and financing, while the management and delivery of healthcare and other welfare services were 
left to the provinces and municipalities. This principle of “hands off” governing was coupled 
with the desire that citizens should be given the maximum amount of freedom to choose 
providers for their required services. 
What is interesting to note in the healthcare governing principle in Lombardy is that 
while the new healthcare model was constructed around the concept of ‘horizontal subsidiarity’ 
between public and private sectors, the Lombard government itself preferred a more vertical 
governing system. The horizontal system most readily applied to hospital competition in the 
region, implying that both the public and private sectors were equal players and had to compete 
for resources. The vertical system, or hierarchical system as it is more commonly known, that the 
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Lombard government assumed saw to it that sub-regional, provincial authorities were seen as 
rather passive executors of decisions made by the regional institutions (Pavolini, 2008, p 175). In 
addition, the regional government opted against a formalized system of institutional bargaining 
with social partners and left this to the municipal level. It was usually provincial leaders from 
centrist or center left-leaning parties that bargained with social partners (Regalia and Colombo, 
2011).  This implied that national centralism was replaced by regional centralism, which is 
exactly the vision of governance supported by the Lega Nord (Stacul, 2003b).  The Lega Nord 
saw regional institutions as the most important for political action to push against Rome's central 
pressures and the provincial demands of the center-left coalitions (Vampa, 2016b). As can be 
observed in Table 19 below, while the regional government of Lombardy has been consistently 
in the hands of the center-right or the PRR, the mayors are predominately of the center-left (i.e., 
Democratic Party – PD), thus it was in the center-right, and later, the Lega’s best interest to 
support regional centrism. 
 
Table 7.8 Lombardy: Provinces, Mayors, and the Parties they are associated with 
Province Mayor (since) Party 
Milan Giuseppe Sala (2016) Independent (close to PD) 
Varese Davide Galimberti (2016) Democratic Party (PD) 
Monza Brianza Dario Allevi (2017) Forza Italia (FI) 
Brescia Emilio Del Bono (2013) Democratic Party (PD) 
Como Mario Landriscina (2017) Independent (Center Left) 
Bergamo Giorgio Gori (2014) Democratic Party (PD) 
Pavia Fabrizio Facassi (2019) Lega 
Mantova Mattia Palazzi (2015) Democratic Party (PD) 
Cremona Gianluca Galimberti (2014) Democratic Party (PD) 
Lecco Mauro Gattinoni (2020) Independent 
Lodi Sara Casanova (2017) Lega 
Sondrio Marco Scaramellini (2018) Lega 
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Starting in 2005, the LN almost constantly controlled the regional health department 
(Vampa, 2016b). In 2005, Alessandro Cè (LN) became Councilor of Health and controlled the 
regional department of health, thereby marking the LN’s increasing strength as a coalition 
partner in the center-right Formigoni government. However, because Formigoni played such a 
strong role within the health sector, Cè’s opinions matter little and “practically crushed by 
Formigoni” (Interviewee 2.17 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert).  
In 2007, Cè left the party stating that the Lega only “served the interest of the strong 
powers (Forza Italia)” and that these powers were “very interested in the board of directors, but 
less so in the interests of the people.” He continued his criticism stating that “the League was 
born against the excessive power of the parties, now it has become like the others” (Riosa, 2007). 
In Cè’s opinion, the LN’s coalition with FI was “absolutely negative” as the FI was too 
“attentive to the interests of the corporations, lobbies, and clienteles. For the Lega, it is a mortal 
embrace” (Riosa, 2007). Heart surgeon Luciano Bresciani (LN) replaced Cè in the fall of 2007. 
In 2012, Bresciani stepped down after a fraud investigation (involving President Formigoni) 
regarding bribes paid to a medical supply company (Redazione, 2014). These accusations 
eventually also led to the resignation of Formigoni, who Roberto Maroni then replaced in 2013. 
In sum, the LN’s role in healthcare at this time was essentially appeasing Formigoni. 
Formigoni included the Lega in his government, very similarly to Berlusconi on the national 
level, and made the party more acceptable to voters by toning down some of their rhetoric 
(Vampa, 2016b). Because there no significant changes to the Lombard welfare system had even 
been suggested since its inception through Formigoni, it appears that the LN was either also a 
strong promoter of the quasi-market and has not been willing to drastically change it (Vampa, 
2016) or simply did not have the political power to change anything.  
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Roberto Maroni (2013 – 2018) 
Upon becoming the President of Lombardy in 2013, Roberto Maroni (Lega) highlighted 
the continued importance of supporting a regional healthcare system based on the freedom of 
choice. However, Maroni attempted to modify the system to make it more integrated and less 
hospital based: 
The healthcare reform approved by Maroni in 2015, and following 
reforms, tried in some ways to change some elements of the Lombardy 
Healthcare system especially what they tried to do was to bring more 
integration. Because this, the quasimarket system implemented by 
Formigoni, had given great priority to the hospital care. And so, there was 
awareness of this, the need to rebalance the system, and in some ways, 
Maroni reform tried to do it, but they were unable to do this balance 
(Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). 
 
In 2015, the law 23/2015 not only promised to enhance the social welfare aspect of the 
healthcare model by increasing support for community welfare, but it also rebuilt the local 
structure of governance to decrease institutional fragmentation. In essence, the goal was to 
centralize the region in certain aspects. In addition, the Maroni government introduced a new 
“autonomous income” (reddito di autonomia) in 2015, which was specifically created to support 
the more disadvantaged sectors of society (the unemployed, elderly and disabled) (Vampa, 
2016b). The autonomous income plan was designed with civil society's help, most notably the 
Caritas Ambrosiana, the trade unions, and some voluntary associations (Guidetti, 2016). 
Researchers commented on the income package in a short volume, concluding that it “seemed to 
offer a package of categorical, episodic and non-structural actions with a strong welfare stamp” 
(Dessi, 2016, p4).  
Table 7.9 Regional Laws and Resolutions 
Law / Resolution Impact 
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Regional Law no. 23 / 2015 Evolution of the Lombardy health and social system - territorial 
social and health care reform 
Resolution no. X / 4662 of 
23 December 2015 
Regional guidelines for the management of chronicity and fragility in 
Lombardy 2016-2018 
Resolution no. X / 5117 of 
29 April 2016 
Regional guidelines for the adoption of strategic business 
organization plans of the health protection agencies 
Resolution no. X / 6164 of 
30 January 2017 
Start of the treatment of chronic and fragile patients 
Regional law n. 6 of 3 
March 2017 
Evolution of the Lombard social and health system 
Resolution no. X / 6551 of 4 
May 2017 
Reorganization of the supply network and methods of taking care of 
chronic or frail patients 
Source: (Senato della Repubblica, 2017). 
Criticisms of the 2015 law came from the central government. The brief (Senato della 
Repubblica, 2017) explained that with the resolutions X/5117 and X/6164 (see Table 20 above), 
Lombardy was completely modifying healthcare by replacing some of the founding pillars of the 
health reform law no. 833 of 1978 through the attempt to privatize public care for the chronically 
ill. With these resolutions, Lombardy divided the “chronic and fragile patients” into three levels 
according to the severity of their clinical condition and would receive letters through which the 
region would invite them to choose a “manager” to whom to entrust, through a “pact of care,” 
one’s own health. This manager could be recommended to them by their general practitioner or 
chosen independently from a specific list. Basically, what it comes down to is that a manager and 
a company would replace a general practitioner's role. 
While this reform was initially seen as improving the situation for this societal group, as 
mentioned above, the brief found that it would likely lead to the reduction of health benefits of 
millions of citizens in the long run. By driving the elderly and chronically ill into the hands of 
private healthcare, the reform is aimed at privatizing the assistance of the chronically ill (Senato 
della Repubblica, 2017). So, what ended up happening was, “many health needs were left 
uncovered and the links with the local stakeholders were cut. In addition, the reform was never 
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fully applied in cultural and organizational terms” (Interviewee 2.18 Medical Professional and 
Public Health Expert). 
Another action point supported by the Maroni government was the regional resolution 
(7631/2017). Herein, the territorial borders of the Area Social Plan (Piano di Zona) responsible 
for social services would be given greater financial compensation in order to be able to provide 
innovative answers to newer and more complex social needs whilst also improving the working 
relationship between the social and healthcare systems (see (Previtali and Salvati, 2019) for more 
detailed information regarding the Area Social Plans). Essentially, this further decentralized 
social services in order to strengthen the relationship between all actors at the municipal level. 
A final action point worth mentioning about the Maroni government is that Roberto 
Maroni threatened to cut regional transfers to municipalities that hosted refugees (Vampa, 
2016a). In an open letter to the municipalities, Maroni stated the following: 
I decided to write a letter to the Prefects to warn them about bringing new 
illegal immigrants here to Lombardy. I also decided to write to the mayors 
to tell them to refuse to take them. If mayors accept them, we will reduce 
regional transfers as a disincentive because they do not have to. Whoever 
accepts illegal immigrants is violating the law and will suffer this 
consequence (la Repubblica, 2015). 
 
These words were supported by the President of Veneto, Luca Zaia, who backed up Maroni, 
stating that “we are mad at the inadequate government that, in official documents, invites us to 
manage the ‘acute phase’ of immigration. When we all know that it is not acute, it is chronic” (la 
Repubblica, 2015). Zaia continued to argue that Veneto, along with Lombardy, have thousands 
of regular migrants wherein many of them do not have jobs, and thus he believes the northern 
regions are helping enough. Much backlash came from other regions, especially those of the 
south accusing Lombardy of using Mafia methods to threaten its municipalities. A further 
example of Maroni’s attempt to centralize the power of the region can be seen here. 
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There appeared to be three reasons for the changes brought forth by the Maroni 
government: 1) the government recognized that the overwhelming hospital-centric healthcare 
system would no longer be able to address new healthcare challenges (Salvati, 2018); 2) the 
increasing economic pressure caused by both the economic crisis of 2015 leading to increasing 
health expenditure costs; and 3) increased migration. 
While Maroni certainly made changes to the healthcare system during his time as 
President, he never strayed far from the original principles set forth by Formigoni.  
 
Attilio Fontana (2018 - Present) 
Attilio Fontana, a lawyer, was the mayor of Varese (the Lega stronghold in Lombardy, as 
mentioned in Chapter 6) before becoming the President of Lombardy in 2018. Politically, 
Fontana has very close ties with Roberto Maroni and Giancarlo Giorgetti, both big Lega names 
and Varese residents (Rotondo, 2018). Put a bit differently and more in context of the COVID-19 
pandemic: 
Fontana is very much connected to the central party, to Salvini, because 
he (and Giulio Gallera) were not so strong by themselves. They needed the 
central party to help them get the positions they got. They weren’t strong 
and still are not strong, particularly considering the management of the 
pandemic. Fontana was a nightmare (Interviewee 2.16, Political 
Geographer). 
 
Fontana’s right had man for health when he took over from Maroni was Giulio Gallera 
(Lega). Gallera was replaced by Letizia Moratti (FI) in 2021 after massive criticism surrounding 
Lombardy’s response to the pandemic. For more information on the COVID-19 pandemic and 




The Lombard healthcare system chose to go its own way following a quasi-market approach that 
was supported by the former regional President Formigoni. Under Formigoni’s (FI) rule, 
competition between public and private hospitals was welcomed, GP’s were seen as useless, and 
a regional centrist control over the municipalities was sought. These points did not change 
drastically when Roberto Maroni (Lega) took over Lombardy in 2013. In fact, he seemed to 
increase the private healthcare market by subjecting the elderly and the chronically ill to the 
private market while further disempowering general practitioners. He also continued to centralize 
the power of the region by threatening mayors who wanted to bring illegal immigrants into their 
municipalities. Attilio Fontana's legacy will likely revolve around how poorly he and his minister 
of health managed the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in the death of countless people in the 
region. While Maroni might have wanted to follow in the footsteps of Veneto, his reform efforts 
failed as the system was already institutionalized and there was not much room for successful 
changes. 
All in all, the region of Lombardy is starkly influenced by the early neoliberal Forza Italia 
management and the quasi-market healthcare system that it implemented. The Lega's role in the 
region seemed to be more characteristic of the central right Forza Italia with a focus on the 
privatization of healthcare as opposed to the well-being of regions populous. 
 
Veneto 
This section will begin with a political overview of the region, followed by a short description of 
the Liga Veneta transition into the Lega Nord. Before giving an in-depth view of the region’s 
healthcare system, I look at how Veneto differs from Lombardy. The section will conclude with 
an analysis of the Lega’s impact on healthcare in Veneto.  
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The Political System 
 
The region of Veneto is located in the Northeastern quadrant of the country. To the East, it is 
border by Friuli-Venezia Giulia and the Adriatic Sea, and to the West, it borders Trentino-Alto-
Adige and Lombardy. Veneto’s Southern border is shared with Emilia-Romagna. Unlike 
Lombardy, Veneto is a semi-presidential representative democracy where the President of the 
Region is also the regional government's head. Legislative power is held by the Regional Council 
as well as the local parliament. 
 Following the 1999 Reform, the election of the President of the Region takes place via 
universal and direct suffrage. However, contrary to Lombardy, in Veneto, the role of the 
President not only conforms with art. 121, paragraph 4, of the Constitution (described in the 
previous section). Rather the President of the Region also has specific duties according to the 
regional statute. These include, among others, communication and information, implementation 
of differentiated regional autonomy, federalism, consultative referendums provided for by 
regional laws, international relations and development cooperation, cross-border and 
transnational cooperation (Regione del Veneto, n.d.). See Table 21 below for an overview of the 
Presidents of the Region since 2000. 
Table 7.10 Overview of the Presidents of the Region since 2000 
President of the Region Party Year 
Giancarlo Galan FI 1995 – 2010 
Luca Zaia LN 2010 – Present 
 
As in Lombardy, Veneto's executive power is found within the Regional Government 
(Giunta Regionale). The regional government functions through resolutions adopted by a 
majority of its members. These can include bills and administrative acts but have to remain 
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within the competencies of the Regional Council. The President of the Region can approve 
regional regulations, except for those delegated by the national government. See Tables 22-25 
for some of the most important (for my dissertation) ministries and which party held them. 
 
Table 7.11 Regional Government Galan VII 2000 – 2005 
Name Party Position 
Giancarlo Galan  FI President: Institutional and Government Policies 
Fabio Gava FI Vice President: Health Policies 
Luca Bellotti AN Councilor: Budget Policies (later Marialuisa Coppola) 
Antonio De Poli  FI Councilor: Social Policies 
Antonio Padoin  Councilor: Policies for the Territory 
 
Table 7.12 Regional Government Galan VII 2005 – 2010 
Name Party Position 
Giancarlo Galan  FI President 
Marialuisa Coppola NA Councilor: Budget policies 
Antonio De Poli  FI Councilor: Social policies 
Flavio Tossi LN Councilor: Health policies 
 
Table 7.13 Regional Government Zaia IX 2010 – 2015 
Name Party Position 
Luca Zaia LN President 
Marino Zorzato PdL Vice President: Territory, Culture and General Affairs 
Roberto Ciambetti LN Councilor: Budget and local authorities 
Luca Coletto LN Councilor: Health 
Remo Sernagiotto FdI Councilor: Social Services 
 
Table 7.14 Regional Government Zaia X 2015 – 2020 
Name Party Position 
Luca Zaia LN President 
Gianluca Forcolin LN 
Vice President: Budget and Heritage – General Affairs – 
Local Authorities 
Luca Coletto LN Councilor: Health – Social and Health Programming 
Manuela Lanzarin LN Councilor: Social Services 
Source for the above four tables: (Regione del Veneto, 2020b). 
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As in Lombardy, the legislative power is vested in the Regional Council (Consiglio 
Regionale), also established in 1970. In Veneto, the Council is composed of 51 members. 49 
councilors are elected in provincial constituencies via proportional representation, and the 
remaining two councilors are the elected President and the candidate for President who comes 
second. To make sure that the elected President has a majority in the Council, the winning 
coalition wins bonus seats (Rubino, 2015). See Table 26 for an overview of how many seats the 
majority party had starting in 2000. 
Table 7.15 Regional Council Election Results – Majority Party 
Election Year Majority Party and Seats* 
2000 FI 17 
 LN LV 6 
2005 FI 12 
 LN LV 7 
2010 LN 18 
 PdL 13 
2015 ZP 13 
 LN 10 
2020 ZP 18 
 LN 13 
*Until 2015 the seats were out of 60. Starting in 2015 the seats were out of 51. Also, only the top two parties were 
chosen from the majority coalition. FI – Forza Italia, LN – Lega Nord, LV – Liga Veneta, PdL – People of Freedom 
(essentially FI), ZP – Zaia for President. 
 
 
From Liga Veneta to The Lega Nord 
 
The Liga Veneta (LV) was founded in 1978 by Franco Rocchetta, a Venetian philologist, and is 
known as “la madre de tutte le leghe” (The mother of all leagues) (Diamanti, 1995). According 
to scholars, the Liga Veneta (LV), not the Lega Lombarda, was the most important League to 
develop out of Italy's 1970 ethnoregionalist movements (Maraffi, 1994; Perrino, 2013). The LV 
had three specific grievances: frustration with the limited powers of the ‘ordinary statute’ for 
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Veneto (Arban, 2018)40, a desire to safeguard Veneto’s culture and, in particular, its distinct 
language (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2017; Perrino, 2013), and a demand for greater fiscal 
autonomy (Hepburn, 2015). In addition, the Liga was unhappy with the southern-based crime 
organizations, and they felt that southern Italians were over-represented in public services 
(Tossutti, 1996).  
On January 16, 1980, the LV was officially born. It set out seven objectives, including 
self-government for Veneto; a reaffirmation of Veneto’s culture, language, and history; 
Veneto’s independence from the ‘mafia government’ in Rome and the maintenance of its taxes 
and economic resources; the reintegration of emigrants who had been forced to leave Veneto; 
and support for the European federal project (Riondato, 2005). The party “elected their first 
senators in the 80s when in Lombardy, the Northern League didn’t exist really” (Interviewee 
2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). However, because of only marginal 
results in the 1984 European Parliament election41 and the 1985 regional election42, Rocchetta 
decided to join forces with the Lega Lombard head Umberto Bossi in 1989. By 1991 the LV 
joined the LL and other Northern regionalist parties to form the Lega Nord.  
It seemed the formation of the Lega Nord was a beneficial solution to all of the leagues 
in the long run: 
In an interview released in this period, Bossi declared: `We cannot follow one 
strategy in Ligury, a different one in Piedmont or in Lombardy or Veneto. 
Otherwise, we will go back to being marginal autonomous movements. The 
Venetian, the Lombard, the Piedmontese by themselves cannot get anywhere. 
                                               
 
40 It was exceptionally important to the LV to attain the same level of regional autonomy that several special 
regions, such as Sicily, had been granted post World War II. According to an interview conducted by Cohen in 
2007, an early member of the Liga Veneto reported, the party “wanted autonomy similar to what the special regions 
had, (in order) to keep our money....” (Cohen, 2009). 
41 The LV gained 3.3% in Veneto, but did not win seats (Ministro dell’interno, 1984). 
42 The LV obtained 3.7% and two regional councilors (Jori, 2009). 
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A united north is the only one able to fight the common enemy` [defined in 
September 1998 as the Meridional Berlusconi, which only a couple of years 
later became again a political partner when Forza Italia and Lega Nord made 
an electoral alliance for the 2000 regional elections] (II Corriere della Sera, 
24 Sept. 1998) (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2000 p102). 
 
Over time, however, especially with the takeover of Salvini as head of the Lega, it appeared that 
the different leagues had different needs. 
 
What makes the Veneto Case Different? 
The case of Veneto differs strikingly from that of Lombardy in several very important ways. 
These differences are important to understand as they can perhaps explain why the healthcare 
systems developed differently amongst the two Northern regions with long histories of PRR 
governments.  
The first difference has to do with political geography and history. Both Lombardy and 
Veneto were  
considered to be very relevant for the Italian economy. While in Lombardy 
you have basically big enterprises, multinational companies, the financial 
center of Milan and so on. In Veneto you have basically smaller companies, 
family driven companies, the famous industrial driven model, you know, it was 
developed exactly in Northeastern Italy, in Veneto (Interviewee 2.16 Political 
Geographer). 
 
Sometimes referred to as the “Veneto development model” or the “industrial district model,” the 
Venetian industry is made up of local clusters known as distretti (The Business Year, 2020). 
These small, private enterprises (Tossutti, 1996) prided themselves in producing items that the 
surrounding provinces are known for, for example, agro-food in Verona, textiles in Treviso and 
Vicenza and glass in Venice (European Commission, n.d.). This model 
became very famous in the 70s because it was able to resist the petroleum 
crisis shocks. So, when the price of petroleum increases it negatively impacted 
the big companies. You know, if you have a big company, big integrated, with 
thousands of employees, you are not flexible. So, if you have a raw material 
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where the price increase, you have problems for the entire industry. While, on 
the other hand, if you have a model like in Veneto made up of medium and 
small enterprises we are talking about really small enterprises in some cases, 
which work together then you are much more flexible to react. So in the 70s 
this model became very famous and we had thousands of studies of this 
industrial district model (Belussi et al., 2012; Deiottati, 2009; Staber and 
Sharma, 1994). And before the spread of globalization, we really had people 
coming to Veneto to study this model and so on. What happened with 
globalization, is that this model, these territories of Northeastern Italy 
suffered more than Lombardy. Exactly because of the fact that they also 
produced a lot in sectors that were impacted by globalization and Chinese 
competition and whatever (Interviewee 2.16 Political Geographer). 
 
Lombardy did not need the Lega's help to combat globalization because they already had their 
big multi-national industries. With more than 800,000 companies in Lombardy, the region has 
one of the highest rates of entrepreneurship in Europe (European Commission, n.d.). The Liga 
Veneta, however, appealed to the small private enterprises in Veneto who not only feared 
economic decline but also resented the fact that their taxes were being sent to the South 
(Tossutti, 1996). 
This industrial distinction leads nicely into the second difference, namely how the two 
regions were seen. The north-west, most prominently, Piedmont and Lombardy, were part of 
the traditional  Fordist model43, while Veneto was characterized by “diffuse industrialization, 
regional networks, and local economies” (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2000, p 86). Thus, while 
Lombardy could be seen as core regions in economic and political terms (Gourevitch, 1979), 
Veneto was seen more in terms of territorial identity and therefore had a strong inclination to 
develop a very ethnically based party. Regarding their politics and political action, the Lega 
Lombarda was labeled as having a more “populist” nature. At the same time, the Liga Veneta 
was described as having a more “ethnic” nature (Roberto, 1997). The populist appeal of the LL 
                                               
 
43 A manufacturing system designed to produce low cost standard goods that workers could afford (Torricelli, 2014). 
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is likely what made it more successful than any of the other Northern Leagues making a unified 
League politically more appealing.  
Culture and language mark the third difference between the two regions:  
Veneto has an autonomous, neutral and independent tradition. I mean, it's not 
like Catalonia, of course, but also, it's one of the Italian regions in which they 
actively speak their regional dialect. They commonly speak Venetian and 
they've got this autonomous tradition (Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist 
and Social Policy Expert).  
 
According to Sabina Perrino's qualitative interviews, the Lega Nord in Veneto attempted to 
revitalize the Venetian dialect to set itself apart from other regions (Perrino, 2013). So, while 
the Lega Nord was created as a regionalist party united not by language, rather by territory, the 
Liga Veneta added the linguist element to its cause. While Lombardy and Piedmont also 
claimed protection and recognition of their regional languages in the Italian institutional 
framework (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2017), they weren’t as insistent as Veneto. In their 1982 
manifesto, the Liga Veneta stated: “We are neither Celts nor Salvs, neither Italians nor 
Germans, but Venetians, and it is our firm intention to continue to be so” (Gómez-Reino 
Cachafeiro, 2017, p 75). 
These differences (industrial, economic, and cultural) culminated when Salvini took over 
the Lega and turned the regionalist LN into the national Lega: 
Salvini scaled up and this was successful, but then you have the Lega which is 
still a local party particularly in Veneto, but also Friuli Venezia Giulia. You 
have these very strong local Lega parties, which to some extent they are 
connected with the central Lega. This scaling up that Salvini did, as far as I 
know, was not accepted by all of the Lega. There is still a part of the Lega that 
wants to keep it about the Northern Regions (Interviewee 2.16 Political 
Geographer). 
 
Over time it seemed that the values of the regional leagues drifted apart. While the LV still 





As previously mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Veneto follows the Aree Vaste model 
of healthcare. The only difference between this model (depicted below in Figure 17) and the 
classic Italian healthcare model is that there is an extra level of bureaucracy between the regional 
government and the local health units (ASL).  
 
Figure 17 Veneto Healthcare Model 
 
Source: (Biselli, 2016). 
Similar to all the other regions, the regional government is responsible for the health system 
through the departments for health and social services. There are four levels of care within the 
Venetian system: acute care, intermediate care, residential care, and domiciliary care. According 
to (WHO, 2016) there are 17,000 beds organized within a far-reaching network of two regional 
centers (AO’s), five provincial hospitals, a cancer center, 17 general district hospitals, and three 
private hospital centers. Intermediate care refers to the rehab centers, hospices, and community 
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hospitals, while residential describes the care provided in standard old age homes.  Domiciliary 
care covers around 120,000 people who suffer from some sort of chronic problems best treated at 
home.  
Everything that is managed outside a hospital, such as primary care, mental health, or 
palliative care, is done so at the district level. For example, primary care is organized in such a 
way that the patient is provided with an integrated medical team that offers 24-hour support and 
provides a link between primary care and hospital services. This interconnectedness of medical 
services is what makes the Venetian system unique.  
 Unlike the Lombard system, the Venetian health care model is characterized by “a strong 
orientation towards meeting the needs of individuals as well as the community through the 
integration of health and social services” (WHO, 2016, p 16). This becomes apparent when one 
looks at where the power to make healthcare decisions is in each region.  
In Veneto I, I think regional bureaucracy is still very strong. And that will be, 
this was one of the elements which explains the most to the success of Zaia in 
managing the pandemic. But I mean, regional power is strong, but the power 
is probably more distributed, between the regional bureaucracy and local 
managers. in Lombardy they share the opinion that municipalities. In 
Lombardy, on the other hand, local mayors have no influence on healthcare. 
While certainly in Veneto, they have some to a certain extent, to a certain 
extent they have some influence (Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and 
Social Policy Expert). 
 
While the decision-making power in Lombardy is strictly regionally based, with regards to 
healthcare, in Veneto, decisions are more devolved, fitting nicely with the community-based 
model and the integration of services. Also, contrary to the Lombard model, primary care plays a 
central role in the Venetian system. Thus, it is not surprising that the GP is the first contact point 
for patients (Ghiotto et al., 2018) and central to the Venetian healthcare system. 
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 Interestingly, the Lega does not have a provincial majority (See Table 27 below), in fact, 
there are more independent and center-left parties that placed their mayors in the last years. 
Perhaps the cooperation, in terms of health, is better with center-left parties in Veneto, which is 
why the Lega has not tried to consolidate power regionally. 
Table 7.16 Veneto: Provinces, Mayors, and the Parties they are associated with. 
Province Mayor (since) Party 
Treviso Mario Conte (2018) Lega 
Verona Federico Sboarina (2017) Forza Italia (FI) 
Padua Sergio Giordani (2017) Democratic Party (PD) 
Vicenza Francesco Rucco (2018) Independent 
Venice Luigi Brugnaro (2015) Independent (center right) 
Belluno Jacopo Massaro (2012) Independent (center left) 
Rovigo Edoardo Gaffeo (2019) Independent (center left) 
 
In any case, it is interesting to note that when it came time to decide what healthcare 
model to follow, the Presidents of the Regions in both Lombardy and Veneto (Formigoni and 
Galan, respectively) were from the Forza Italia party, and yet, they chose different models.  
 
The Lega and Health 
As was depicted in the previous section: 
Veneto had a traditionally more public-based healthcare provision, at least in 
hospitals. So, for a long time, the right governments, the Forza Italia 
governments first and the League afterwards, were not so keen in expanding 
private markets (Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy 
Expert). 
 
Both Lombardy and Veneto had regional presidents belonging to the Forza Italia (FI) party when 
it was decided that healthcare would devolve to the regions. Thus, as in the case of Lombardy, it 
is important to begin this analysis before the Lega came to presidential power in Veneto.  
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Giancarlo Galan (1995 – 2010) 
Unlike Formigoni in Lombardy, Galan did not come from the Catholic faction of Forza Italia, 
“he did not come from this specific movement called the Comunione e Liberazione” 
(Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). Thus, when it came time to 
decide what kind of healthcare system the region should implement, he opted  
for a more traditional system, placing much more importance on outpatient 
care and public services. So, in some ways Veneto, the organization of the 
health care system is more similar to Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, so the 
red, social democratic, regions (Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and 
Social Policy Expert). 
 
Following this line of thinking: 
In Veneto, healthcare stems out of the embeddedness... So there's a different 
idea. In this sense, the Northern League in Veneto has practically followed the 
Christian Democratic Party when it was formed there, which means 
institutions are fine, but they are rooted in local societies, Catholic local 
societies. So there must be a lot of embeddedness on how institutions including 
hospitals and healthcare work. So it's more a communitarian idea. There is 
no markets, no market ideas involved. (Interviewee 2.17 Economic 
Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). 
 
According to some scholars, Catholicism influenced the Venetian branch of the Northern League 
(Bull and Gilbert, 2001), thereby imbedding the subsidiarity principle into their understanding of 
health and social care, also one of the main principles embraced by social Catholicism (Vampa, 
2016b). Naturally, this implies that more emphasis was placed on the social role of sub-regional 
actors, such as municipalities and local cities. This concept allowed the Venetian welfare model 
to develop into a ‘polycentric’ system (Ciarini, 2012), a form of governance in which various 
governing bodies interact to make and enforce decisions (Carlisle and Gruby, 2019). The 
previously discussed notions, so important to the Venetian core, of regional autonomy and the 
strengthening of a regional identity, likely contributed to this polycentric and local-based, rather 
than region-centric (Vampa, 2016b) social system. 
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 So, while in Lombardy, the Catholic movements, specifically the Comunione e 
Liberazione44, drove Lombard President Formigoni (FI) to support a quasi-market system, there 
was no Catholic influence on Veneto President Gallan (FI). The catholic movements might have 
influenced the LV, but by the time Luca Zaia (Lega) became President of Veneto in 2010, the 
Venetian healthcare system had already been implemented. “Ideologically speaking, in my 
opinion, the Lega, in general, is more pragmatic, and much less market-oriented” (Interviewee 
2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert), which might explain why Zaia did not 
attempt to change the Venetian healthcare system. While Maroni (Lega) in Lombardy did (he 
wanted to make it less market-oriented, more communal, and more social), and failed. 
 
Luca Zaia (2010 – Present) 
As previously mentioned, the Venetian healthcare system was already very community-oriented 
when Zaia took over as President of the region in 2010. Both Zaia and his regional Council, led 
by Health Minister Luca Coletto, supported Galan's system. They “followed this traditional path” 
(Interviewee 2.21 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert), making no efforts to change 
it into something more market-oriented. In fact, 
I don't expect privatization, I expect that they kept on investing in public 
healthcare; in Veneto at least. my impression in Veneto was the League was 
just keen in organizing the system, not in transforming it (Interviewee 2.17 
Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). 
 
                                               
 
44 “This was a movement born in the early 70s. It was a sort of reaction against the mobilization of the left parties 
and left movements in the 70s. It's a group, you can think of as the Catholic right. A group that wanted to essentially 
merge Catholicism and neoliberalism – less state more market was their slogan in the 80s” (Interviewee 2.21 
Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert). 
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In 2012, the Zaia government implemented a regional planning legislation (LR 23/2012) 
that made the system even more patient-oriented by placing the person at the healthcare system's 
center (Ghiotto et al., 2018). Four years later, in 2016, the government passed the Regional Law 
(LR 19/2016) defining a new primary care model in which Integrated Medical Groups were 
promoted. In fact, the law suggested that by the end of 2017, 60% of all the GP’s in the region 
should be part of such a group (The Regional Council, 2016). With this change, the idea that 
“Veneto is a lot closer to Central Italy” regarding healthcare was confirmed. Unlike in 
Lombardy, where GP’s were seen as useless, Veneto praised GP’s as being “an important part of 
the network, of the care network” (Interviewee 2.17 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy 
Expert). These changes solidified the patient and community-oriented nature of the Venetian 
system. As we will see in the next chapter, these changes will set Veneto apart from Lombardy 
with regards to the first wave of the corona pandemic. 
 
Conclusion 
As can be deduced from this section, Veneto has an entirely different approach to healthcare than 
Lombardy. Even with a President from the Forza Italia party, the region chose a more “social” or 
“traditional” healthcare model. This model resembled those of Emilia Romagna and Tuscany 
(both Social Democratic strongholds) much more closely than Lombardy. Despite the similar 
political trajectory, reasons for this difference can be found in the cultural history of the region.  
 Uninfluenced by the catholic movement Comunione e Liberazione, President Galan, 
created a healthcare system that provided a mix of hospital and community care that regarded the 
GP as an essential entity. When President Zaia replaced Galan, he continued to support this well-
balanced system and took it a step further, making it even more patient-focused and placing the 
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GP in an even more central light. Instead of changing the system, like his colleagues in 
Lombardy, Zaia expanded on what his predecessor implemented, making the system even more 
efficient. 
 While the Catholic religion also influenced the Veneto region, its small business and 
community-oriented mentality steered it to create a healthcare network that not only served the 
region well before the pandemic but proved useful during the pandemic. 
 
Conclusion: Lombardy and Veneto 
 
This chapter presented the cases of Lombardy and Veneto, two Italian regions with similar 
political trajectories. Both regions were in the hands of the center-right Forza Italia (FI), 
beginning in 1995 until at least 2010 when Lega Presidents took over. Despite having the same 
parties in power, their healthcare system developed much differently and with very contrary foci.  
In Lombardy, President Formigoni (FI) created a healthcare system unique to Italy. He 
followed a quasi-market model wherein patients could choose whether they wanted to use public 
or private hospital facilities. The system he created revolved around the hospital as the center for 
care, thereby deeming a general practitioner (GP) useless. The result was an unbalanced system 
as only hospital care was given support. Formigoni’s successor, Roberto Maroni (Lega), realized 
this and attempted to balance out the system. After several failed attempts to move care outside 
of the hospital to accommodate the growing elderly and chronically ill population, his term 
ended. An even less successful Attilio Fontana (Lega) took over as President of the region in 
2018. A weak presidential presence coupled with ineffective advisors and an ill-equipt system 
led Lombardy to become the poster child of pandemic failures during the 1st wave of the 
COVID-19 outbreak. 
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The role of the PRR Lega in health was minimal in the region. Lega Health Minister’s 
C’è and Bresciani (under Formigoni) both stepped down due to conflicts with the President 
leaving them powerless in their roles. When Maroni took over the Presidency, change was 
attempted but ultimately failed due to the ingrained network of Forza Italia and Catholic 
Comunione e Liberazione officials making any substantial changes near impossible. During the 
Maroni period, it could be speculated that the Lega leader wanted to change the Lombard system 
to resemble that of his Venetian colleagues; however concrete evidence remains uncovered. 
Under the leadership of Fontana, the COVID-19 pandemic laid bare the systems shortcomings as 
well as the initial leadership issues surrounding the President. 
In Veneto, Giancarlo Galan (FI), uninfluenced by the ultra-conservative catholic 
movement (Comunione e Liberazione), created a more integrated healthcare system. Four levels 
of care created a more balanced system wherein the GP was given the traditional role as 
gatekeeper and seen as an essential part of the system. The historically more communal and 
interconnected region made it necessary to create a connected and more community-oriented 
healthcare system. When Luca Zaia (Lega) replaced Galan in 2010, he expanded this system, 
making it even more patient-centered and more organized. Unlike his colleagues in Lombardy, 
he did not see the need to change the existing system as it presumably worked well. This 
efficiency was supported during the pandemic's 1st wave when despite being a very impacted 
region, case numbers and deaths tolls were marginal compared to those of Lombardy. 
What can be seen from both of these cases is that the impact and influence of the Lega 
was very path-dependent. In Lombardy, the healthcare decisions made by FI and the influence FI 
still has surrounding the healthcare system in the region made it difficult for the Lega to make 
changes despite having the Presidency as well as control over the Health Ministry. Although 
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Lega President Maroni recognized the system was sub-optimal for a rapidly aging population, he 
was virtually powerless to change anything, despite multiple attempts. In Veneto, the health 
decisions made by FI were well-balanced and ultimately proved successful. Thus, they were 
adopted and expanded by Zaia.  
The different trajectories and paths taken by the regions and the power of the respective 
PRR successors were very embedded in both regions' history and culture. Thus, these cases are 






 : COVID-19 in Austria and Italy  
 
 
I began my research on the impact of populist radical right (PRR) parties on health before the 
outbreak of COVID-19. With the onset of the pandemic, I was able to add to my research 
shedding new light or confirming previous findings.  My research was designed to create 
leverage because the literature on the intersection of health and political science, particularly 
how the populist radical right impacts health, is thin at best. I maximized the number of cases 
available since not many countries have populist radical right parties in government by including 
the subnational level. This allowed me to increase the number of cases under investigation. 
 COVID-19 turned out to be a big test for both healthcare and health policies. In Italy, we 
saw regions governed by the PRR and regions not governed by the PRR garnering diverse 
results. In Austria, we saw a deflated PRR party in opposition both nationally and subnationally. 
Their reactions were predictable and had little to do with actual health policy solutions. 
In this chapter, I will begin by giving a quick overview of the corona situation in both 
countries from the beginning of the pandemic until January 2021. Then, I will focus on the 
COVID-19 reactions on a national level for Austria and Italy, even though the PRR in both 
countries is “only” in opposition. Subnationally, I will only look at Italy because there are no 
PRR parties in government in Austria. I will use the cases of Lombardy and Veneto to highlight 
how two regions, both governed by the same party (Lega), had different outcomes, at least 
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initially. The indicators I will use to show this are the number of cases, the number of tests 
administered, and ICU capacity. 
 
 
COVID-19 and the PRR in Opposition 
Austria 
After the September 2019 election in Austria, the new ÖVP formed a new coalition 
government with the Austrian Green Party wherein Rudolf Anschober (Green party) assumed the 
role of Health Minister. This implies that the FPÖ was not in government and thus established 
itself as an effective oppositional force. When the coronavirus broke out in early 2020, the FPÖ 
supported the national government’s course stating mid-March that the “direction of the 
government in the last few days was correct.” However, FPÖ club chairman Herbert Kickl added 
that “many sensible measures were started much too late as valuable time was lost with the 
government concentrating on crisis PR instead of focusing on crisis management” (Freiheitlicher 
Parlamentsklub, 2020b).  
The first confirmed COVID-19 case in Austria was on February 25th. The FPÖ was the 
first party to demand a comprehensive lockdown during a press release on March 13th 
(Freiheitlicher Parliamentsklub, 2020); the government passed this three days later on the 16th 
(see Figure 18). This occurred just one day after the national council agreed to the COVID-19 
laws. The first hard lockdown saw the closure of all shops except those that sold basic supplies 
(grocery stores, pharmacies, and drug stores), as well as all cultural institutions, and even the 
federal gardens and swimming pools had to remain closed. Most air traffic was discontinued, and 
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strict contact and exit restrictions based on the COVID-19 law came into force. Restaurants, 
cafes, bars, and restaurants were closed on the following day.   
By the end of March, Kickl demanded that asylum seekers in Austria not only be 
quarantined but also that their right to asylum should be suspended: “We will need all of our 
resources for our own population in the coming months. Period. Everything else is a slap in the 
face to the Austrians, who are already being asked a lot by the rigid measures against the 
coronavirus” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub - FPÖ, 2020).  
Figure 18 Number of daily confirmed coronavirus (COVID-19) cases in Austria since February 
2020 
 
Source: (WHO, 2021). 
 
On April 15th, Austria took first steps towards reopening and chose a staggered exit 
strategy. The country began by opening small stores and continued with the opening of other 
businesses and schools in 2-week intervals until the eventual opening of hotels and museums by 
the end of May (Desson et al., 2020). By the end of April, the FPÖ began heavily criticizing the 
national government calling for normalization and even going so far as to launch a campaign for 
a petition called “Jetzt reicht’s! - Allianz gegen den Corona-Wahnsinn” [it’s enough! – alliance 
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against the corona madness]. In their campaign, they demanded that the government take back all 
measures that reduce personal freedoms (Falkenbach and Greer, 2020), especially those related 
to the freedom of movement (including travel) and anything pertaining to economic restrictions 
(i.e., store and restaurant closures). They also called for a quick opening of educational 
institutions and a withdrawal of any general restrictions to public events. Despite existing 
evidence of the effectiveness of face-masks, the campaign claimed: “Too many citizens suffer 
from the entirely useless coercion to wear face masks…even though face masks evidently 
provide no protection” (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 2020). 
By the end of October, amid the second wave of the pandemic, Kickl called for a change 
in strategy, arguing that instead of curfews, asymptomatic people should no longer be tested. The 
FPÖ, as well as the other opposition parties (SPÖ and NEOS), were asking why all of the 
necessary preparatory measures such as expanding hospital capacities and implementing better 
measuring and counting instruments were made during the summer months (Kurier, 2020). The 
critic of all opposition parties, but particularly that of the FPÖ, intensified when the government 
announced a second complete lockdown, including school closures to go in effect on November 
17th at midnight. Not only did the FPÖ accuse the government of creating a “lost generation” 
through continued school closures (Austrian Press Agency, 2020c), but also stated that this new 
lockdown “would carry Austria to the grave” (ORF, 2020c).  The country ended the second 
lockdown a few weeks before Christmas only to announce a third lockdown for December 26th.  
Even before a COVID-19 vaccine was approved, the FPÖ already mobilized against 
vaccination. On September 9th, for example, the FPÖTV released a spot on YouTube, 
reinforcing their viewpoint that compulsory corona vaccinations are wrong and that they are 
doomed to fail (FPÖ TV, 2020). In addition, the FPÖ published a press release in which they 
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clearly positioned themselves against mandatory vaccinations (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub, 
2020a). Norbert Hofer, head of the FPÖ, announced that he would not get vaccinated, trusting 
instead his “good immune system” (ORF, 2020). 
 At the time of writing (January 2021), the Austrian government was confronted with the 
decision of whether to extend the hard lockdown from December (which was set to end on 
January 24th) or not.  Proposals such as “Freitesten45” or “testing yourself free” have been struck 
down as unconstitutional by the three opposition parties. The FPÖ sees no reasons for lockdowns 
anymore, and Kickl announced that “lockdowns are pointless from a health politics standpoint 
and because they are unconstitutional” (ORF, 2021). 
 
Italy 
With over 2,220,300 confirmed cases and more than 77,291 deaths (New York Times, 2021) at 
the time of writing, Italy was the first country on the European continent crippled by the 
coronavirus. Although a state of emergency was declared at the end of January 2020, just a few 
days after the first case was discovered, country leaders, as well as medical professionals, 
underestimated the outbreak. Authoritarian public health measures were not promptly 
implemented; instead, regions were initially left to deal with the virus as they saw fit, thereby 
creating a fragmented containment approach (Falkenbach and Caiani, 2021). There was no 
immediate country lockdown; this came about two weeks after the third confirmed death (Hirsch, 
2020). Alternatively, the country took a gradual approach quarantining hard-hit municipalities 
first, then locking down certain northern regions and culminating in a complete country 
                                               
 
45 This would have granted people that participated in the mass corona tests set for January 17th access to restaurants, stores and 
hotels one week before the hard lockdown measures were set to be lifted. 
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lockdown by March 9th, 2020. Precious time was wasted with miscommunication and a general 
miscalculation of the disease's severity, ultimately resulting in a strict and lengthy countrywide 
lockdown that led to drastic socioeconomic effects (Falkenbach and Caiani, 2021).   
Although the citizens’ trust in Prime Minister Conte was high, there was apparent 
disagreement among the parties, resulting in the pandemic's politicization (Capano, 2020). 
Populist radical right (PRR) parties such as the Brothers of Italy led by Giorgia Meloni or Matteo 
Salvini’s Lega regularly criticized the government for its weak leadership and the European 
Union (EU) for its lack of solidarity.  
Both Salvini and Meloni initially negated the evidence of the pandemic. Salvini’s 
Facebook posts encouraged followers to continue with their everyday lives, while Meloni told 
her Facebook followers not to believe anything said on TV (Nardelli and D’Urso, 2020). By 
March, when it seemed the virus was spiraling out of control in Italy, Salvini stayed quite content 
to let the government make the difficult decisions. However, at the end of the month, when he 
noticed increased frustrations due to the lockdown, Salvini found his voice again and started 
firing critique towards the Italian government and the EU. In April, he staged a two-day 
occupation of the Italian parliament to protest the lockdown demanding the restoration of full 
liberties (Roberts, 2020). 
After the 1st lockdown (see Figure 19), shortly before the summer of 2020, both Salvini 
and Meloni adapted their rhetoric to the normalization and consequent awareness of the 
emergency, wherein Salvini argued that the lockdowns were not going far enough and that 
everything needed to be shut down. Both PRR leaders started attacking the EU’s response to the 
crisis, and they released a video stating that the virus was bioengineered in China (Nardelli and 
 224 
D’Urso, 2020). The PRR flank blamed the government for not being able to make substantive 
decisions and implementing them.  
 
 
Figure 19 Cumulative number of coronavirus (COVID-19) cases in Italy since February 2020 
 
Source (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2021). 
 
Not only did the Italian PRR blame the government for anything that went wrong during 
the pandemic, but they also capitalized on the crisis, scapegoating on their traditional targets 
(i.e., immigrants and minorities) (Falkenbach and Caiani, 2021). When a boat carrying several 
hundred migrants from Africa was granted access to the Sicilian harbor in late February, Salvini 
accused Prime Minister Conte of being unable to shield Italians from a disease outbreak in Italy 
(Thrilling, 2020). Salvini claimed that by allowing migrants from Africa to land in Italy, Conte 
was being thoughtless (Smith, 2020). Salvini used this humanitarian act to further his agenda 






































































































































































































































Italian border (Nugent, 2020). Aside from the latent impact previous Lega policies had during 
the pandemic, Salvini greatly influenced the discourse surrounding the coronavirus as a member 
of the opposition. Initially, he used the pandemic to continue his anti-immigrant rhetoric, going 
so far as to blame them for bringing the virus to Italy. Then, he was silent, only to emerge again 
with attacks on the scientific community (regarding masks) advocating for a quick return to 
normality.  
The coronavirus pandemic coupled with the increased support for the PRR shed new light 
on the problems associated with managing refugees and migrants in the country. Refugees, 
asylum seekers, and migrants were among the most severely impacted by the crisis (Caritas, 
2020). Thanks to the “Salvini decree”, discussed in Chapter 6, additional stress with the corona 
pandemic outbreak was caused because both healthcare and support for housing are two pressing 
needs for migrants, particularly during a pandemic (Marchetti et al., 2020). If an undocumented 
migrant was not a resident of Italy, then they were unable to register for the Italian National 
Health Service, thereby impeding their access to services (Carlotti, 2020). No measures were 
adopted under the new Conte government to ease the access for undocumented migrants to attain 
services or provide other useful measures to protect the migrant communities from the virus 
(Falkenbach and Caiani, 2021). 
While Matteo Salvini’s favorability decreased during the pandemic's 1st wave, Luca Zaia, 
the governor of Veneto and more moderate Figure within the Lega party, experienced a political 
boost. Zaia’s handling of Veneto's crisis, one of the regions most affected by the pandemic, 
garnered him much support. Not only did this lead to his third term as governor (Pianigiani, 
2020), but it also made him the second most loved politician in Italy (51 percent of the 
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consensus) behind Prime Minister Conte (Roberts, 2020). This fact nicely leads into the second 
section of this chapter, namely the subnational cases of Veneto and Lombardy.  
 
COVID-19 Subnationally 
As is clear from the previous chapter (Chapter 7), during the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 
and at present (2021), the Veneto region is governed by Luca Zaia (Lega) and the region of 
Lombardy is governed by Attilio Fontana (Lega). There were two initial epicenters of the 
pandemic outbreak; one was in Codogno, in the province of Lodi in Lombardy, and one in Vo’, 
in the province of Padua in Veneto. I will use the rest of this chapter to look at how these two 
regions dealt with the pandemic's onset. As mentioned in Chapter 6, healthcare administration is 
a competency belonging to the regions; therefore, the regions are responsible for acquiring, 
storing, and administering COVID-19 tests. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the regions, 
particularly Lombardy and Veneto, the hardest hit, chose different strategies.  
 
Lockdowns  
The earliest and most significant lockdowns were created in the form of “Zona Rossa’s” or red 
zones in the two areas where the virus first broke out. On Sunday, February 23rd, 2020, the 
Minister of Health, Roberto Speranza (Article One – SD), and the President of the Lombardy 
Region, Attilio Fontana (L), signed an order that would impact the region of Lombardy. In 
particular, the order created, so-called “red zones” for the municipalities of Codogno, Castiglione 
D’Adda, Casalpusterlengo, Fombio, Maleo, Somaglia, Bertonico, Terranova dei Passerini, 
Castelgerundo, and San Fiorano, all located within the province of Lodi (See Figure 20 below 
showcasing the high infection numbers in Lodi compared with the other municipalities in 
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Lombardy in February). In these municipalities, all schools would be closed, all events would be 
suspended, all cultural institutions would close, and people living in these areas would not be 




Figure 20 The trend of infection in the provinces of Lombardy from February 2020 to March 
2020 
 
Source: (Bertazzoni et al., 2020). 
 
A similar order was signed between Speranza and the President of Veneto, Luca Zaia (L), 
creating a red zone for the municipality Vo’ Euganeo close to the city of Padua (see Figure 21 
below for infections per municipality in Veneto). This occurred because the local mayor 
immediately agreed with the president of the region (Zaia) and the national government 
(Speranza and Conte) to close the town and impose a strict curfew (Romagnani et al., 2020). The 
ordinance signed would provide Zaia with measures to contain the virus via the measures listed 
above. The ordinance also listed several precautionary measures people should follow, such as 
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washing hands, avoiding close contact with people, etc. (Zaia and Speranza, 2020). “I have been 
saying and repeating it for weeks: the virus has no political colors. We are at war, in Veneto as 
well as in Rome. And at the moment there is no other remedy than to isolate the outbreaks” (de 
Luca, 2020). Measures such as, for example, closing schools and universities, suspending even 
the Venice Carnival, blocking aggregation centers, sporting events, even religious ceremonies 
would be implemented (Zaia and Speranza, 2020). In addition,  Zaia stated at the beginning of 
March 2020 that he remained convinced that a standardized approach “from north to south” 
should be sought after, “given that the virus knows no boundaries” (Italia Oggi, 2020). 
Figure 21 The Trend of Infections in the Provinces of Veneto from February 2020 to January 
2021 
 
Source: (Gedi Visual, 2021). 
 
While both regional presidents (Fontana and Zaia) created red zones in their regions, 
Fontana failed to convey the disease's severity to the critically hit province of Bergamo. Between 
February 27th and 28th, the Confindustria Bergamo (Bergamo’s Confederation of Business 
Industries) posted a video meant to reassure the international business community that ‘Bergamo 
is running’ as usual (Confindustria Bergamo, 2020). Even the mayor of Bergamo, Giorgio Gori 
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(Democratic Party), initially supported this mentality (Il Giorno, 2020). These attitudes led to a 
delayed lockdown in Bergamo and the neighboring towns of Nembro and Alzano, costing many 
lives. Not until March 3rd did the scientific committee of the  Italian Higher Health Institute 
(ISS) advise to implement red zones for Alanzo and Nembro (Imarisio et al., 2020). On March 
8th, the national government turned the region of Lombardy into an “orange zone”. No “red 
zone” or additional restrictions were applied to Alzano, Nembro, or Bergamo, meaning that most 
business activities and manufacturing companies could continue working – these are finally 
closed on March 23rd (Galizzi and Ghislandi, 2020a).  
After the damage was done (see Table 28 showcasing the number of cases and deaths as 
of April 15th compared with Veneto and the country as a whole), Bergamo became one of the 
hardest-hit provinces worldwide with 5,138 deaths in March alone (Buonanno et al., 2020a). 
Rome claimed that the regional government would have needed to implement the lockdown, 
while the regional government blamed Rome and said that local mayors should have intervened 
more forcefully (Galizzi and Ghislandi, 2020b). The local mayors, in turn, accused the regional 
government of concealing data to avoid the lockdown.  
Table 8.1 COVID-19 surveillance data in the Lombardy and Veneto regions versus the rest of 
Italy as of April 15th, 2020 
 Cases Deaths Case Fatality Rate 
Lombardy 62,153 11,377 18.3% 
Veneto 14,624 940 6.4% 
The Rest of 
Italy 
88,378 9,328 10.6% 
Source: (Odone et al., 2020). 
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There were two main reasons as to why reactions were so different within the two 
regions. The first has to do with coordination. There was “a huge coordination problem between 
the regions and the central government. There was a lot of confusion as to who actually had the 
power to impose red zones and judges will be investigating this” (Interviewee 2.17 Economic 
Sociology and Social Policy Expert). Zaia in Veneto didn’t wait for approval from the central 
government to impose red zones; instead, he coordinated with the local municipalities, which the 
central government approved. Fontana in Lombardy took a different path. He created the red 
zones in the province of Lodi with the approval of the central government but failed to extend 
these red zones to the nearby municipalities of Bergamo and Brescia. One reason for this 
supposed oversight is that there “are no manufacturing sites in Lodi. Whereas Bergamo and 
Brescia are at the heart of Lombardy production” (Interviewee 2.17 Economic Sociology and 
Social Policy Expert).  So, there was a lot of resistance coming from municipal mayors, and 
Fontana simply did not have the political clout to stand up to them. After the death counts surged 
and citizens became upset, local governors, as well as Fontana and the national government, 
blamed each other. According to an economic sociologist and social policy expert, they said: 
“We did not introduce red zones because the national government did not tell us to do it” or “we 
asked the regions to introduce red zones, but they said they were not necessary” (Interviewee 
2.17 Economic Sociologist and Social Policy Expert).   
The second problem surrounded the underestimation of the “true” case numbers in 
Lombardy. Lombardy simply was not testing enough as they followed the national government's 
advice to only test patients with clinical symptoms and those that had been in contact with an 
infected patient. This can also be seen as a primary reason for the slow and uncoordinated 
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reaction regarding lockdowns in the province of Bergamo (Buonanno et al., 2020b). This fact 
leads nicely into the next difference between the two regions – testing. 
 
Testing 
Initially, epidemiological surveillance and swab testing strategies were considered competencies 
belonging to the regional healthcare authorities (Di Bari et al., 2020). On February 21st, 2020, 
the two regions of Lombardy and Veneto start tracing Covid-19 patients, testing both 
symptomatic and asymptomatic people. By February 26th, however, Lombardy decided to only 
test symptomatic cases (Galizzi and Ghislandi, 2020b) as per the national government's 
recommendation. See Figure 22 for the cumulative number of COVID-19 tests performed in four 
regions in northern Italy from February 24th through March 27th, per 10,000 persons in each 
region and then Figure 23 for the cumulative COVID-19 mortality in the same four regions from 
March 2nd through April 3rd as a function of the cumulative number of COVID tests performed 
seven days before, i.e., from February 24th through March 27th. 
Figure 22 Cumulative number of COVID-19 tests performed in four regions in northern Italy 
 
Source: (Di Bari et al., 2020). 
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Figure 23 Cumulative COVID-19 mortality in four regions in northern Italy 
 
Source: (Di Bari et al., 2020). 
Di Bari et al. conducted a study investing these two different testing strategies taken within four 
Northern Italian regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, and Piedmont). While Lombardy, 
Emilia Romagna, and Piedmont followed the stringent policies for swab testing, prioritizing 
symptomatic patients with possible COVID-19 contacts requiring hospitalization – these 
recommendations were issued by the Ministry of Health on February 25th - Veneto chose a 
different route (Di Bari et al., 2020).  
President Zaia took on Andrea Crisanti as scientific consultant when the first case was detected,  
Also known as the ‘father of the swabs’, Crisanti conducted a well-
designed seminal study in the hard-hit municipality of Vo’ that informed 
the global scientific community regarding the best testing-tracing 
approach. He also informed the international press about the potential 
burden of asymptomatic transmission, which at that time was still a 
scientific controversy. His role as science advocate has been pivotal in 
influencing the testing policy of the Veneto region during the first, strict, 
lockdown in the early phase of the pandemic (March-May 2020) 
(Interviewee 2.20 Public Health Expert). 
 
Veneto kept its original “Public Health Plan” that it had implemented after the first cases in Vo’. 
This strategy put forth by the Venetian Councilor for Health, Manuela Lanzarin (L) and 
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supported by Crisanti, followed extensive testing of symptomatic and asymptomatic patients 
followed by the isolation of positive cases (Regione del Veneto, 2020a). Lanzarin also 
announced that there would be close cooperation between the regional government and the 
municipal mayors so that the active surveillance could be intensified (Regione del Veneto, 
2020a).  
Likely, because of both Crisanti and the “Public Health Plan”,  
The Veneto region managed to implement a test-intensive strategy, not 
only in the hospitals, but also and most importantly in the community 
setting. Timely identification and isolation of positive cases of mild 
severity allowed the regional health system to prevent inappropriate visits 
to emergency departments, and mostly to reduce the risk of hospital-
acquired infections. (Interviewee 2.18 Medical Professional and Public 
Health Expert). 
  
In the regions that followed the Health Ministry's orders (Lombardy, Piedmont, and 
Emilia Romagna),46 the number of tests conducted were lower than in Veneto, which followed 
its own, more vigorous testing and isolation strategy. Looking specifically at Lombardy, 
A testing system was never implemented in the community setting until 
May 2020 (regional law 3114, May 7, 2020). This means that close 
contacts of COVID-19 cases, including the relatives of the victims, and 
symptomatic persons, were denied tests in the community setting. From a 
mediatic point of view, citizens felt abandoned and sometimes panicked. 
The only way to get a test was going to the hospital: the number of visits 
to the emergency department, including the ones that could have been 
avoided with a test in the community setting, contributed to the risk of 
hospital-acquired infection. The lack of tests in the community testing 
reduced the quality and the effectiveness of contact tracing, a crucial 
strategy to flatten the curve (Interviewee 2.18 Medical Professional and 
Public Health Expert).  
 
                                               
 
46 Lombardy and Piedmont followed the national government strategy and Emilia Romagna did as well, but with one difference. 
While Lombardy and Piedmont only tested hospitalized or symptomatic patients, Emilia Romagna also tested asymptomatic 
cases, but only in specific municipalities (Cicchetti and Gasbarrini, 2016).   
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As a result, the death rate in Lombardy (as well as in Piedmont, and Emilia Romagna) was 
significantly higher than in Veneto, suggesting that the Venetian strategy superseded that of the 
national government. While Veneto effectively contained the virus, the other three regions were 
helplessly chasing it.  
 Going back to the comparison between Lombardy and Veneto only, Li et al. conducted a 
study displaying the difference between reported and estimated cases, thereby proving that 
testing just symptomatic cases was insufficient (Li et al., 2020). Figures 24 and 25 below display 
the estimated versus the reported cases in Lombardy and Vento (respectively) during the first 
few months of the pandemic.  
Figure 24 Lombardy: Estimated vs Reported Infections 
 
Note: The green and red bars represent the reported versus the estimated number of infections. Ignore the red and green lines. 
Source: (Li et al., 2020). 
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Figure 25 Veneto: Estimated vs Reported Infections 
 
 
Note: The green and red bars represent the reported versus the estimated number of infections. Ignore the red and green lines. 
Source: (Li et al., 2020). 
Currently, Lombardy is leading the Italian regions with the number of tests it is conducting (See 
Figure 26 below); however, it took at least half-a-year to get there. Many people died before they 
changed their testing strategy. 
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Figure 26 Coronavirus (COVID-19) tests conducted in Italy as of January 7th, 2021, by region 
 
Source: (Ministero della Salute, 2021). 
In addition to obtaining good medical advice and having an efficient plan in place, Zaia himself 
played a significant role in the region’s success with tests: 
President Zaia associated his personal image with the fight against the 
pandemic, personally attending TV programs, social events and press 
conferences. For example, he performed self nasopharyngeal swabbing 
during a live press release. This strategy has determined a strong 
association between the results that Veneto Region obtained and the image 
of the President of the Region who, therefore, came out victorious 
(Interviewee 2.19 Medical Professional). 
 
The leadership role that Zaia took on during the first wave of the pandemic garnered him much 
support not only within his region47, but within the Lega party. President Fontana of Lombardy 
had more difficulty: 
After a first clumsy attempt to expose himself publicly on the media (we all 
remember at the beginning of the pandemic when, on live TV, Fontana 
                                               
 
47 Zaia “in the middle of the pandemic” not only saw his “regional government reconfirmed, but he also received a 
large majority of support from the regional population (about 70% of people preferred him and supported him as 




































































































tried to explain how to wear a surgical mask- clearly wrong), he delegated 
other political figures (Health Minister Giulio Gallera, Vice President 
Fabrizio Sala) to manage press conferences, appearances in TV programs, 
etc. (Interviewee 2.19 Medical Professional) 
 
This strategy of not leading the region and assuming responsibility as President did not serve 
Fontana well. In fact, it led to the “reshuffling of top medical advisors (i.e., the General 
Director for Health and Welfare (Luigi Cajazzo) and the Minister for Health and Welfare 
(Giulio Gallera) were replaced)” (Interviewee 2.20 Public Health Expert). 
 
Hospitals 
According to a several medical professionals and public health experts, it was not so much a lack 
of hospitals that presented a substantial problem, rather the lack of a coordinated plan and the 
resulting flexibility of expansion according to need: 
The number of hospitals and the accommodation capacity of the intensive 
care units is adequate to meet the ordinary needs of the local area, but it 
is also true that one of the missing characteristics of Italian Healthcare 
System was the ability to expand availability according to needs. In 
particular, in light of the exponential increase in the demand for beds in 
intensive care units. It would have been necessary to provide for a plan to 
expand the number of beds a priori. The lack of an updated national 
pandemic plan and its regional application led to the need to rely on 
emergency solutions and clumsy attempts to create new intensive care 
beds in inadequate facilities, exposing both operators and patients to 
multiple risks (Interviewees 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20). 
 
The lack of an up-to-date pandemic plan essentially left each region to fend for itself regarding 
hospital capacity. As described in the previous chapter, when you look at the hospital situation in 
the regions, it is important to consider which hospital model each region adopted. According to 
(Mapelli, 2007) there are four: 1) integrated ASL (local health unit and the center of 
administrative operations relating to health), 2) separate ASL, 3) mixed ASL, and 4) regional 
ASL. The integrated ASL is the standard model based on the law 833/78 wherein hospitals and 
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other hospital services (outpatient clinics, psych services, etc.) are managed and financed by the 
ASL. The separate ASL, as is the case in Lombardy and represents the complete opposite of the 
integrated ASL, wherein hospitals have nothing to do with the ASL other than the fact that the 
ASL pays for the hospitals (public or private). Within the mixed ASL system, some hospitals are 
contracted with ASLs, and some are not. The regional model is found in the Aosta Valley, 
Trento, and Molise and just means that there is only one ASL. Figure 27 serves as a reminder of 
the ASL competencies.  
 
Figure 27 Local Health Units (ASL) 
 
Source adapted from (Mapelli, 2007). 
 
 
To visualize the differences between these three models, Table 29 summarizes the different 
aspects, renaming them and adapting them to the pandemic aspects most important in treating the 
virus. 
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Table 8.2 Regional Healthcare Models and their differences in dealing with the pandemic 
 
 
Source: Adapted from (Ciccetti, 2020). 
 
As shown in the Table above, the healthcare system in Lombardy is built on a hospital-centered 
approach meaning that the region relies on hospitals, not home care or general practitioners, to 
care for the sick. In fact, in Lombardy, “GP’s are useless. Formigoni introduced this mentality in 
the mid-90s” (Interviewee 2.176 Economic Sociology and Social Policy Expert). Veneto, on the 
other hand, is at the other extreme. The region is built on a community home approach wherein 
hospital use is very limited (less than 20%), and GP’s are very active. 
The hospital system in Italy, as elsewhere, is the most impacted by the spread of the virus 
as it struggles to both provide adequate hospitalization for COVID-19 patients suffering from 
respiratory crises and to continue to treat other diseases. Looking at Figure 28 below, it is clear 
that most regular hospital beds in the country are located in the North.  
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Figure 28 Regular hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants in 2019, by province 
 
Adapted from (Celata, 2020). 
 
However, it is interesting to note that when looking at Figure 29, most of the intensive care unit 
beds are located in central Italy and not in the North.  
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Figure 29 Number of hospital beds in intensive care units per 10,000 inhabitants in 2019, by 
province 
 
Adapted from (Celata, 2020). 
This distinction is important to consider as the treatment for severe COVID-19 symptoms takes 
place in ICU’s. According to OECD data, the number of beds for the treatment of ‘acute’ cases 
per 1,000 inhabitants was 10 in 1977, 8 in 1985, 6 in 1995, 4 in 2001, and 3 in 2010 for the entire 
country. Today, in 2020/2021, this number amounts to about 2.5 (Celata, 2020). This correlates 
nicely with the trend that hospitals and especially hospital beds are decreasing across countries 
due to exploding healthcare costs (Garcia-Barbero, 1998; McKee, 2004). This is nicely displayed 




Table 8.3 Changes in the NHS from 2010 to 2017/2018 
 
Adapted from (Celata, 2020). 
In Lombardy, the pre-crisis total ICU capacity was approximately 720 beds (2.9% of total 
hospital beds at a total of 74 hospitals); these ICUs usually have 85% to 90% occupancy during 
the winter months (Grasselli et al., 2020). As can be seen in Figure 30, both Lombardy and 
Veneto had to increase their ICU capacity. However, Lombardy had to increase its capacity at a 
bit more than Veneto. 
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Figure 30 Number of intensive care units (ICU) pre-and post-COVID-19 in Italy as of April 
2020, by region 
 
Source (Corriere della Sera, 2020). 
The reason for this additional increase was likely due to the fact that Lombardy, being 
heavily reliant on hospitals for care, did not have a community care network to fall back on. 
While Lombardy had the most intensive care units in the country (861), it had to increase these 
by 50% (438) (Michas, 2020)due to not only the high number of cases in the region but also 
because the region followed a hospital centered approach to healthcare. On the other hand, 
Veneto had a total of 438 beds across 36 hospitals totaling 1 ICU bed for 11,200 inhabitants. 
Over the course of three weeks, the region increased its ICU capacity by 71% (Pasin et al., 2020) 
due to the data arriving from China reporting a 5% ICU admission rate (Xie et al., 2020). What 
ended up happening was that most patients did not need to be hospitalized and were able to be 
cared for at home because of the strong community home healthcare approach in Veneto. In fact, 
only 35.2% (3,487) were hospitalized, and of those, only 10% need to be treated in the ICU (See 
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Figure 31 Number of coronavirus-2019 patients in Veneto from February 25th to March 31st, 
2020 
 
Note: The blue area represents the number of COVID-19 patients managed at home. The red area depicts COVID-19 patients 
requiring hospital admission. While the Green area shows the discharged. 
While hospital treatment is important with regards to the pandemic, it is not the only tool 
available. Ideally, contact tracing and testing would be so widespread that hospital admissions 
are necessary only in the rarest of cases. However, because the pandemic spread quicker than 
officials were able to keep up with testing and contract tracing, the number of hospitals and ICU 
beds became an increasingly important statistic. A further fact that is often neglected is the 
number of medical personnel available. Both medical professionals and public health experts 
commented on a lack of personnel and a lack of appreciation in the form of monetary 
compensation: 
I have worked in the National Service since 2014. Well, the salary for the 
people working with the national health service has been frozen up since the 
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beginning of the millennium. Our, our, power, our salary is the same since 
2000. Medical professionals are continuously requesting increasing in wages 
but, the government has always avoided this (Interviewee 2.6 Medical and 
Public Health Expert). 
 
 
As a result of the limited financial incentives, there is a:  
 
Huge lack of specialists in Italy, and that they are not increasing the grants 
for specialization, so every year, the government says we have xxx € for ten 
anesthesiologists, ten cardiologists, etc. This year (2020), there has been a 
lack of 9000 grants, so there is a lack of doctors everywhere, and that is a 
huge issue. That is why they had to call back medical professionals that were 
already retired (Interviewee 2.12 Medical Professional). 
 
It has long been known that in order to cut health care expenditures, caps were put on medical 
personnel expenditures (Neri, 2019), leaving health professionals underpaid. Even before the 
COVID-19 pandemic, regional health authorities were suffering from shortages of medical 
practitioners and wanted the national government to recruit retired doctors (AFP/The Local, 
2019). Italy is not the only a country with elderly physicians, but it also has an uneven 
distribution of training programs across the country’s regions, making it difficult for young 
people to become doctors; not to mention the bias towards choosing a medical specialty 
(Colombo and Bassani, 2019). So, not only are Italy’s physicians underpaid, but very few people 
want to do the job, thereby leaving hospitals understaffed and personnel over-worked. During a 
pandemic, this combination of a high number of COVID-19 cases (Lombardy and Veneto) with 
insufficient hospital staff for a hospital centered health system approach (Lombardy) has led to 
the particularly high mortality rate that can be seen in the region of Lombardy (26,789 deaths) 




The COVID-19 pandemic displays an interesting and practical application of the theory that PRR 
politicians have a limited and oft skewed understanding of health. While this theory is confirmed 
in both national cases, it does seem to apply in the subnational case of Veneto. To summarize, I 
briefly looked at the reactions of the two PRR parties in opposition on the national level in both 
Austria and Italy. I skipped the subnational cases of Austria as there were no PRR politicians in 
power or in opposition. Then I moved directly to investigating the subnational cases of 
Lombardy and Veneto.  
 On the national level, the Austria and Italian PRR parties (FPÖ and Lega, respectively) 
moved from wanting to close the country’s borders and suspend Schengen at the beginning of 
the pandemic to protesting the wearing of face masks as inefficient and freedom robbing by the 
end of the 1st wave in Summer 2020. In between the onset of the pandemic, after the borders 
were closed, and shortly before the first wave ended, both parties were reasonably quiet. The 
FPÖ supported governmental decisions, and Matteo Salvini seemed to have disappeared 
completely. Come summer 2020, both found their voices again and protested government actions 
in their own ways. The FPÖ continuously criticized the Minister of Health’s inability to 
formulate laws that made sense. At the same time, the Lega continually accused the government 
of favoring immigrants, whom the Lega and FdI blamed for the spread of the virus in the first 
place, over Italian businesses. By the beginning of the second wave in the Fall of 2020, both 
parties captured the public sentiment surrounding “corona tiredness” and began pushing for a 
“return to normalcy”. Especially the FPÖ began criticizing the government for leading the 
country towards bankruptcy and demanded the immediate reopening of businesses, restaurants, 
and hotels. When vaccinations were ready in December, both parties protested forced 
vaccinations and disadvantages for citizens that refused to vaccinate. While these are all very 
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strong opinions, they are opinions coming from the opposition and do not tell us how these 
parties would have acted in government. Therefore, I looked subnationaly. 
 In Austria, Carinthia and Burgenland, as well as the other seven provinces, do not have 
FPÖ members present in their regional government; therefore, these potential cases were 
excluded. In Italy, however, the Lega was and is in government in Lombardy and Veneto, 
thereby making those compelling cases. 
 Both Lombardy and Veneto had and continue, for the most part, to have the most cases in 
all of Italy. Their approaches to the pandemic, especially in the beginning, were, however, very 
different. Right from the start, Veneto made a powerful and unified appearance under regional 
president Zaia communicating that it was essential to follow the rules of the central government. 
After the outbreak in the municipality Vo’ in Padua, Zaia enforced a strict contract tracing and 
testing strategy for symptomatic as well as asymptomatic people. This strategy, along with its 
community-centered health systems approach, quickly decreased the number of cases in the 
region and sharply decreased the first wave's mortality rate. 
 The region of Lombardy under regional president Fontana had a more difficult time 
keeping all of its provinces on the same path. While the province of Lodi entered into a strict 
lockdown after an outbreak was discovered, the bordering province of Milan made no 
concessions. The mayor even announced that the province would not close. These decisions, 
along with choosing a hospital-centered health system approach and only testing symptomatic 
cases, caused the region's numbers to explode.  
 Leadership, communication, but most importantly, the existing organizational 
characteristics of the region's health system played an enormous role during the first wave of the 
crisis, while partisanship played almost no role. Since it is not yet certain when the pandemic's 
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2nd wave will end, I feel it is too speculative to make any concrete remarks. However, it is 
already clear that previous strategies seemed to play less of a role in containing the mutated form 
of the virus, B1.1.7, which was already circulating amongst residents in the winter of 2020.
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Chapter 9 : Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Summary of Findings 
Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties are increasing in political importance across Europe and 
throughout the world. What we know about this party group is how they think about migration, 
security, immigration and, in part, welfare policies. These topics have been well documented 
within research surrounding manifestos (Rooduijn et al., 2014, Careja 2016, Heinisch 2019 & 
2020). We know less about what kind of policies these parties implement when given a position 
in government. Some researchers have focused on this gap ( Afonso 2014, Ennser-Jedenastik, 
2018, Röth et al., 2018), but the specific topic of healthcare as an essential part of the welfare 
state has found little uptake in this body of literature.  
This research is crucial because past performance or the types of policies a party has 
previously passed can often be used to predict future political decisions (Lebas and Euske, 2002). 
Politicians, the electorate, and healthcare professionals stand to benefit from such an analysis 
because it will improve decision-making for policy delivery, election outcomes, and healthcare 
distribution. By expanding on the research relating to the political determinants of health as well 
as the social and welfare politics as they relate to health policy, outcome prediction will improve. 
When thinking of health policies, who is in government and how the health policies might 
change because of the ideologies associated with the party in power is exceptionally relevant. 
Being able to anticipate what these parties will do is fundamental not only to health and political 
science research but also to countries on the verge of elections.  
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So, how do PRR parties approach health policies when given a position in government? 
This dissertation found that elements of welfare chauvinism, increasing benefits for the native 
population while simultaneously decreasing them for the outgroup, were common within the 
health policies passed by the PRR in government. The effectiveness of these policies depended 
on two fundamental variables: 1) the coalition partners willingness to agree to such policies and 
2) the strength of the institutional courts within the country.  
 The willingness of the coalition partner generally depends on tow aspects: their strength 
and their political orientation. This implies that the coalition partner is typically stronger than the 
PRR party, which often makes it difficult for the PRR party to implement its desired policies.  In 
most cases, however, PRR parties form coalitions with a stronger center right party. With such a 
constellation, the PRR party often finds support for their proposed health policies.  
  The second approach that PRR parties in government were found to take is the liberal 
chauvinist one. Policies following this approach typically decrease benefits for all with the 
strongest impact on outgroups. While the PRR’s welfare chauvinist policies were often hindered 
by constitutional rulings as well as by an unwilling coalition partner, liberal chauvinist policies 
were generally supported by the coalition partner (if of conservative orientation) and rarely ever 
questioned by the courts. As previously mentioned, Conservative, or center right parties, most 
often form coalitions with the PRR. In such cases liberal chauvinist policies, also within the 
realm of health, are not uncommon as they serve the interest of both political parties: a decrease 
in spending (conservatives) while also making life more difficult for outgroups (PRR). 
 Countries like Austria, where health policies are primarily made on the national level, 
will find that the PRR can have a greater impact when they hold positions in the national 
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government. On the other hand, countries like Italy, where healthcare has devolved to the 
regions, it makes more sense to look at PRR health impact on a regional level. 
  
Findings from the National Level 
On a national level and the subnational level, as the next section will further explain, the cases of 
Austria and Italy differed substantially in their competencies surrounding health. Given that in 
Austria, most health decisions are concentrated at the national level, it is not surprising that the 
influence of the PRR on health policies was more significant than in Italy, where most health 
decisions were devolved to the regions. 
The FPÖ in Austria influenced health outcomes directly via the health policy decisions 
they proposed and partially were responsible for implementing. One of the FPÖ’s primary goals 
concerning health politics was to strengthen the power of the government while simultaneously 
weakening the influence of institutions outside of the government structures, also involved in 
healthcare decisions. Therefore, it makes sense to divide the FPÖ influence on health into two 
categories: 1) structural reforms of the health system such as the social insurance merger and the 
introduction of a private hospital financing fund and 2) policy choices targeting behavioral 
outcomes, such as the introduction of new e-cards and the reversal of the smoking ban.  
The structural health reforms took on welfare chauvinist, and liberal chauvinist 
characteristics, wherein the liberal chauvinist approach was more prominent, very likely due to the 
close involvement of the ÖVP. These structural reforms were critical because they gave the FPÖ 
increased influence within healthcare structures (Haider’s initial goal in the ’90s). The ultimate 
result of the healthcare merger was the breakdown of the SPÖ stronghold in all things concerning 
health. Thus, the FPÖ and the new ÖVP could now position key players within the newly created 
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health insurance company ÖGK (resulting from the fusion of the nine regional health insurance 
companies).  
Looking at the other structural reform initiated by the FPÖ, PRIKRAF, or the private 
hospital reform, we see just how prominent clientelism continues to be within the political realm. 
Accusations of clientelism were also geared towards the new ÖVP implying that clientelism is not 
only a PRR problem, rather one that is deeply embedded within the structures of the political 
system in Austria, as well as in other countries, no doubt48. This reform was not only problematic 
because of its highly clientelistic nature but also because much of the money that was used to 
support the private hospitals is paid for by patients’ contributions. In addition, those insured 
through the ÖGK (Austrian Health Insurance) contribute a significant amount of money to the 
PRIKRAF fund, but they only use 50% of the beds; the rest are used by the self-employed and 
civil servants (covered by a different insurance company). While this reform can be considered 
clientelistic, it also has a hidden welfare chauvinistic flair to it. The FPÖ, more often than not, sells 
itself as a worker’s party catering to those that see the brunt of globalization. The FPÖ, however, 
is also a party that caters to the Burschenschaften (traditional student fraternities), primarily made 
up of wealthy, incredibly right-leaning educated FPÖ voters. By modifying the PRIKRAF to 
include more private hospitals, the FPÖ was pampering its much smaller electorate. by increasing 
the welfare benefits of those that can afford private insurance on top of the mandate for public 
insurance while potentially decreasing benefits for all non-privately insured Austrians covered by 
the ÖGK. 
                                               
 
48 The new ÖVP’s clientelist appetite can be seen in the court cases surrounding the trading of political offices for 
favors and false statements in court Finance Minister Blümel (new ÖVP) and Chancellor Kurz (new ÖVP) are 
currently (2021) involved in. 
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The reforms instigated by the FPÖ that target individual behavior can be classified as 
welfare chauvinist regarding the e-card changes and anti-science with respect to the overturned 
smoking ban increased corona measures and a general lack of support for vaccinations. While 
several of the health policy reforms passed were done so with the help of the new ÖVP, the FPÖ 
distinguishes itself from its conservative coalition partner by also putting forth policy decisions 
that sharply contrast scientific evidence. The most important example is the FPÖ’s role in 
overturning the smoking ban, which the former SPÖ-ÖVP coalition had introduced. Against 
overwhelming scientific evidence, the FPÖ portrayed itself as the protector of small business 
owners and ordinary people propagating individual choice over top-down regulations.  
In summary, the FPÖ’s policy choices incorporate both clear markers of well-known PRR 
characteristics as well as elements influenced by its conservative coalition partner. Favoritism 
towards the native, ordinary people and the systematic exclusion of foreigners from health and 
social services eligibility is a common FPÖ policy mantra, even with regards to health. Examples 
can be found in the introduction of a photo-based e-card, the new minimum income law, or the 
Family Bonus Plus regulation. Also, in line with conceptualizations of PRR parties is the liberal 
chauvinist approach coupled with anti-elitist sentiments, which became apparent in the structural 
reform of the health care system. The legitimization of this reform, which the ÖVP actively 
supported, created a system “closer to the ordinary people.” However, it decreased the 
representation and thus the self-administrative power of the worker group, represented by 
established labor organizations. The short-term “aims” appeared to reduce bureaucratic costs and 
relieve the SPÖ of their monopoly in all things health. The long-term aim will presumably result 
in more bureaucracy (we see this already), which will lead to higher costs to run the health 
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insurances (already happening – need governmental support) and will very likely result in a 
decrease in services for the insured.  
The anti-elitist/anti-science nature of the FPÖ’s policy preferences also manifested in its 
harsh opposition to stricter anti-smoking laws and increased corona measures. This type of 
“science populism” is common in PRR parties. In this case, the FPÖ propagated the interest of 
particularistic groups (smoking customers and small bar owners) while ignoring the advice of 
public health authorities. Although in opposition during the corona pandemic, the FPÖ went from 
approving the government's strict measures in the Spring of 2020, at times even saying that the 
actions were not severe enough, to finding the measures exaggerated and unnecessary by summer 
2020. Upon the onset of the 2nd wave in the fall of 2020, the FPÖ settled on criticizing the 
government's lack of cohesion and their inability to present clear and legally sound measures. 
 
As expected, Lega politicians' health policies passed or supported in Italy were fewer, 
given that health policies are typically made at the subnational level. The policies made on the 
national level can be summarized as being typically Conservative due to the strict debt 
containment measures during the Berlusconi coalitions (II-IV) and welfare chauvinistic coupled 
with anti-scientific rhetoric during the Conte government (I). While the LN was not able to 
directly pass health policies during the Berlusconi coalitions, they supported the retrenchment 
measures proposed during the second Berlusconi government. During the third Berlusconi 
government, the LN also supported further healthcare retrenchment efforts and attempted to 
reduce access to healthcare for undocumented migrants indirectly through the security laws.  
During Conte, I, the anti-scientific vaccination rhetoric and the welfare chauvinistic 
policies passed in the Salvini Decree dominated the short-lived government. The already difficult 
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situation surrounding the corona pandemic in Italy was made even more difficult due to the 
Lega’s consistent criticism of the government, their attempt to uphold anti-immigrant sentiments 
by blaming migrants for importing the disease, and their inconsistencies regarding the wearing of 
masks. 
PRR politics in Italy and elsewhere, can generally be summarized as having a lot of bark 
but no bite. This was formulated more eloquently by Anna Cento Bull when she described the 
politics of the Lega as “a form of political communication that articulates demands which are not 
supposed to be taken seriously and implemented, but which are nevertheless constantly 
rearticulated” (Bull, 2010, 431). This is to say that manifestos and rhetoric are filled with action 
points; however, these can be counted on one hand when it comes to implementation policies. In 
fact, in Italy, health policies, as with other policies, are only tampered with when necessary (i.e., 
the COVID-19 pandemic). Otherwise, they are left alone as there are too many consequences 
associated with negative outcomes.  
 
Findings from the Subnational Level 
The subnational sections have demonstrated how two prominent and popular PRR parties (the 
Lega in Italy and the FPÖ in Austria) have influenced health politics at the subnational level. The 
findings establish that the magnitude of PRR influence on health depends on who parties form 
coalitions with, how much authority they are actually given within the local health ministry, and 
what institutional structures are in place.  
Based on the literature surrounding the consequences of PRR parties and their approach 
to social policy, the expectation was that these parties would also pursue welfare chauvinistic 
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policies regarding healthcare. While this is most certainly in line with their intentions, this 
section found that the PRR parties in subnational governments were generally unable to pass 
desired policies or even attain a position where they could pass such policies due to coalitional 
and institutional constraints.  
While the FPÖ in Austria followed a mostly welfare chauvinistic approach to health 
during its time in national government (2017-2019) (Falkenbach and Heiss, 2021), the same 
could not be said for the subnational consequences. To begin with, in Austria, health policies are 
mostly made at the national level, so it was expected that the influence on a subnational level 
would be less. Secondly, in both Austrian cases (Burgenland and Carinthia), the FPÖ did not 
control the health resort. In Burgenland, this occurred because the FPÖ was simply the weaker 
coalition partner. In Carinthia, the situation was slightly different. Although the FPÖ did not 
control the health sector, they attempted to reform the hospital structures due to their prominent 
role on the hospital advisory boards. The FPÖ goal was to cut hospital expenditure through 
closures, mergers, or simply by slimming down bureaucratic structures to redirect funds to 
support their “Carinthian’s first” mentality. Thus, while it appears that the Carinthian FPÖ was 
taking a typically conservative retrenchment approach, they were attempting to cut in one area 
(hospital care) so that they could redistribute to other (social policies, labor market activation, 
tourism) sectors. In essence, the argument can thus be made that the Carinthian FPÖ took an 
indirect welfare chauvinistic approach to health. They attempted to redirect funds to sectors that 
they controlled, thereby increasing benefits for some while decreasing them for others. What 
ultimately hindered the Carinthian FPÖ from being successful was the strength and resilience of 
their coalition partner, the SPÖ.  
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In the cases of Italy, the two Italian regions of Lombardy and Veneto followed similar 
political trajectories in relation to health. Both regions were in the hands of the center-right Forza 
Italia (FI), beginning in 1995 until at least 2010 when Lega Presidents took over. Despite having 
the same parties in power, their healthcare systems developed much differently and with very 
contrary foci.  
In Lombardy, President Formigoni (FI) created a healthcare system unique to Italy. He 
followed a quasi-market model wherein patients could choose whether they wanted to use public 
or private hospital facilities. The system he created revolved around the hospital as the center for 
care, thereby deeming a general practitioner (GP) useless. The result was an unbalanced system 
as only hospital care was given support. Formigoni’s successor, Roberto Maroni (Lega), realized 
this and attempted to balance out the system. After several failed attempts to move care outside 
of the hospital to accommodate the growing elderly and chronically ill population, his term 
ended. An even less successful Attilio Fontana (Lega) took over as President of the region in 
2018. A weak presidential presence coupled with ineffective advisors and an ill-equip system led 
Lombardy to become the poster child of pandemic failures during the 1st wave of the COVID-19 
outbreak. The failure of the Lega to change the Lombard health system can be primarily 
attributed to institutional barriers.  
In Veneto, Giancarlo Galan (FI), uninfluenced by the ultra-conservative catholic 
movement (Comunione e Liberazione), created a more integrated healthcare system. Four levels 
of care created a more balanced system wherein the GP was given the traditional role of 
gatekeeper and seen as an essential part of the system. The historically more communal and 
interconnected region made it necessary to create a connected and more community-oriented 
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healthcare system. When Luca Zaia (Lega) replaced Galan in 2010, he expanded this system, 
making it even more patient-centered and organized. Unlike his colleagues in Lombardy, he did 
not see the need to change the existing system as it worked well. This efficiency was supported 
during the pandemic’s 1st wave when despite being a very impacted region, case numbers and 
deaths tolls were marginal compared to those of Lombardy. It could be argued that the Lega in 
Veneto were also presented with institutional barriers in the sense that they had to continue with 
the health system they were given because it was effective, efficient, and well-liked by the 
populace. So, while they might have wanted to make changes, they did not because the system 
was successful.  
Findings Across Cases, Contributions, and Lessons 
This research contributes to the literature surrounding the impact of PRR parties in 
government. It not only looks at the understudied area of health impact, but it does so on both a 
national and subnational level. Both the consequences of PRR governments on health and health 
policy as well as the focus on subnational PRR governments expand the perspective of PRR 
study. The findings affirm that party’s matter when thinking about policy impact and suggest that 
PRR parties are generally constricted by either their coalition partner (as was the case in Austria) 
or institutions (as was the case in Italy).  
Successful implementation of PRR policies, specifically regarding health, can be seen in 
the national case of Austria, where the coalitional constraint was removed as the ÖVP in 1999, 
and the new ÖVP in 2019 readily supported the FPÖ’s proposed changes. Only institutional 
barriers stood in the way. Typically, these institutional barriers surrounded the social policy 
changes that the FPÖ proposed, deeming them unconstitutional, against human rights, or not in 
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line with EU laws and regulations. Frequently these barriers also surrounded accusations of 
clientelism and corruption.  
Looking beyond the six cases presented here, there are lessons to be learned for countries 
dealing with strong PRR parties. The first lesson is that it is often better to give the PRR party a 
position in government than to keep them in the opposition. Both on the national level (1999) 
and subnational level (Burgenland) in Austria, the FPÖ was given a position in the ÖVP and 
SPÖ (respectively) governments as a minority coalition partner. By taking the FPÖ out of the 
opposition, there was less critic against the government, the ÖVP and SPÖ could mostly follow 
their own political programs without substantial influence from the FPÖ since they were in the 
minority and, most importantly, internal conflicts, especially at the national level, destroyed the 
FPÖ. This strategy likely only works when the PRR party in question has never been in 
government before, as the second ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2019 went much better for the FPÖ 
until corruption scandals forced the FPÖ ministers to step down. 
The second lesson surrounds institutions. If a country has strong, established institutions, 
independent courts, and an engaged civil society, PRR policies that can be classified as being 
directly welfare chauvinistic are generally deemed unconstitutional in some way, shape, or form. 
Similarly, accusations of clientelism and corruption are taken seriously and typically result in the 
dissolution of the government and the political end of the accused. We have witnessed this 
several times in Austria. However, the current situation with Minister Blümel and Chancellor 
Kurz is alarming, seeing as both are refusing to step down from their positions despite being 
accused of corruption and false testament. In Italy, the situation is slightly different as the legal 
system and the approach to corruption are questionable, making the standards that politicians are 
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held to equally questionable (best example Silvio Berlusconi, not to mention the power and 
influence of the Mafia). 
A third lesson revolves around the strength and the number of coalition partners in any 
given government (national or subnational). The higher the number of parties in any one 
government, the less strength any one party has, in general. Looking at the Italian governmental 
coalition from 2001 to 2006 with Silvio Berlusconi (FI) as Prime Minister, the government was 
made up of the Conservative Forza Italia (FI), the PRR Lega Nord (LN), the PRR National 
Alliance (AN), the Conservative Union of the Center, the Conservative Christian Democratic 
Center and the Liberal Democratic Foundation. Each of these party’s had at least one ministerial 
position, with FI holding nine ministries including the PM, the LN holding six ministries along 
with the deputy PM, the AN holding six ministries along with the deputy PM, the Union of the 
Center, and the Christian Democratic Center each holding two and the Liberal party holding one 
ministry. With such a dispersal of power, it is difficult for any one party to have complete 
control. However, the party with the most ministries (generally also the party holding the 
Chancellorship or the PM), in this case, the FI, will likely have more say than the other parties. A 
completely different scenario arose in Italy in 2018 when the Lega and the Five Star Movement 
(M5S) won the election. The two parties split the ministerial position, each attaining nine 
ministers and the heads of both parties becoming deputy PM. The PM, President Conte, in this 
coalition was independent, as were six other ministerial positions. Here, the PRR Lega was given 
more freedom to govern as the coalition partner (M5S) was their equal in power. 
Specifically, in terms of health, the color of the coalition partner matters greatly. Here, it 
makes sense to look to Austria as, on a national level, the FPÖ was only ever in government with 
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the Conservative ÖVP, a party that is not known for making health policies. Thus, in such a case, 
the likelihood that a PRR party has control of the health sector is high, allowing them to impact 
health significantly. If, on the other hand, we look to the subnational level, we see that both in 
Carinthia as well as in Burgenland, the FPÖ was in a coalition with the SPÖ. The Social 
Democratic SPÖ, as was previously mentioned, is known for being actively involved and making 
health policies. Thus, it is of little surprise that the FPÖ had little influence on health in both 
provinces as this sector was always in the control of the SPÖ. 
A further lesson for consideration is surrounding the cultural makeup of a country, 
province, or region in establishing the potential success that a PRR party has in that area. 
Whether a PRR party or politician comes to power, at least from a subnational standpoint, 
depends a lot on the historical make-up and development of that region or province. In Austria, I 
showed two different cases Burgenland and Carinthia, both had the FPÖ in government, but then 
in the latter province, the FPÖ was much more successful. This was mostly due to the historical 
development of the province and the animosity between Slovene minorities and Carinthia’s 
fueled by WWII.  The cultural clashes in a province like Carinthia coupled with the general 
sentiment that previous governments (SPÖ led) were not hearing the plights of the population led 
to a perfect breeding ground for populist sentiment and the rise of the FPÖ. 
In Italy, the regions of Lombardy and Veneto also had their historical and cultural 
differences leading to very different PRR leaders. The Lombardy region was more influence by 
the market-driven and oriented Forza Italia with close ties to the ultra-Catholic Comunione e 
Liberazione, making it very difficult for the Lega to follow through on their agenda. On the other 
hand, the community-oriented, small and middle business populated Veneto with its desire to 
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upkeep the Venetian language and culture gave the Lega more political and institutional room to 
become successful. 
The findings in Lombardy and Veneto were rather unexpected as one would assume that 
political parties have similar interests thereby attempting to create unified systems. It is 
surprising that the FI party, created two completely different systems leading one to believe that 
it is not only parties that influence the creation of systems, rather, perhaps more so, the history 
and traditions of the region. 
A final lesson that leads nicely into the next section entitled Future Research involves the 
capacity of PRR parties in government to make their ideas more mainstream. Even if PRR 
parties fail, their ideas are often adopted by mainstream, usually Conservative, parties. I showed 
that the Lega’s capacity to influence policy-making during its years (especially initial years 
2001-2006) in the national government was rather limited. However, the impact that the Lega 
has had on the Italian political culture has been extremely significant. For example, the desire 
and need to transform Italy into a federal country, a traditional LN issue, is now accepted by 
mainstream political parties. In addition, the issue of security has now become a relevant 
political issue for all the political forces. 
In Austria, we have seen the same development. Conservative parties such as the ÖVP, 
and even more so the new ÖVP, have adopted the FPÖs positions with regards to immigration, 





On both a national and subnational level, future research would do well to investigate the 
new ÖVP, considering the FPÖ’s political standstill due to the Ibiza affair and the dismissal of 
Heinz Christian Strache as a member of the FPÖ. The new ÖVP has, in part, taken over the FPÖ’s 
position on the political spectrum while keeping up their Conservative appearance.  
Given the current political situation (2021), where the new ÖVP have formed a coalition 
with the substantially weaker Green Party who also happen to control the Ministry of Health, future 
research should look at how much influence the new ÖVP has within the Green Health Ministry. 
Considering the COVID-19 pandemic and its further unfolding, my guess shows a new ÖVP that 
wants credit and control of everything when things are going well and finds officials to blame and 
get rid of49 when outcomes turn sour.  
Future research on the PRR in Italy should continue to follow the Lega but also keep an 
eye open for Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. This increasingly popular PRR party could be 
placed to the right of the Lega on the political spectrum. In addition, health policies in the 
country might be better studied on a regional level seeing as the devolution of the health system 
has left the national competencies rather sparse.  
While this dissertation has covered the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the Lega's 
political impact in Veneto and Lombardy, this should be expanded to other regions in Italy and 
compared with countries that have a similar political constellation and devoluted healthcare 
system as the Italian one.
                                               
 
49 Clemens Auer previous advisor to former Health Minister Anschober (Green) was relieved of his post due to 
supposed poor decisions-making with regards to vaccination acquisitions for Austria. Former Minister Anschober 
resigned due to health issues caused by the stress of feeling unsupported by his coalition partner (new ÖVP). 
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Appendix A: Interview Coding Protocol Austria and Italy 
 
 
Table A.1 Interview Coding Protocol Austria 
 
Theme / Codes Notes 
1. FPÖ  
1.1 Health in all Policies  
1.2 Federal  
1.2.1 Social Policies  
1.2.2 Health Policies  
1.2.3 Migration  
1.3 Party  
1.4 Burgenland  
1.4.1 Health  
1.5 Carinthia  
1.5.1 Politics  
1.5.2 Migration  
1.6 EU  
1.7 Vorarlberg  
2. Federal  
2.1 Politics  
2.1.1 ÖVP   
2.1.2 SPÖ  
2.2 Social Policy  
2.3 Health Politics  
3. Politicians   
4. PRR Parties in General Not Austria specific 
5. The dark side of parties Austria Specific 
5.1.1 reduced generosity  
5.1.2 increased generosity  
6. Healthcare System   
6.1 Financing AT National level 
6.2 Reforms AT Health reforms on a national level 
6.3 Carinthia  
6.4 Burgenland  
7. History  
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7.1 World History of the world as it impacts Austria 
7.2 Austria  
7.3 Carinthia  
7.4 Burgenland  
7.4.1 Population  
8. Carinthia  
8.1 SPÖ Politics  
8.2 ÖVP Politics  
9. Burgenland  
9.1 SPÖ Politics  
9.2 Migration  
9.3 SPÖ vs FPÖ Differences between the SPÖ and FPÖ in the 
region and why it matters 
10. Carinthia vs. Burgenland Specific contrasting features mentioned 
11. Vaccination Federal level 
12. Electorate  
12.1 ÖVP vs. FPÖ Speaks to voter pouching 
 
 
Interview Coding Protocol Italy: 
 
Theme / Codes Notes 
1. History  
1.1 Geography  
1.2 Military  
1.3 Population  
2. Federal Government  
2.1 Healthcare  
2.1.1 Devolution  
2.1.2 Health Literacy  
2.1.3 Health Rights  
2.1.4 Health Costs  
2.1.5 Health Reforms  
3. Healthcare System  
3.1 Regional  
3.1.1 Variation Speaks to the general variation in healthcare 
systems between regions  
3.1.2 Lombardy  
3.1.3 Veneto  
3.1.4 Emilia Romagna  
3.2 Hospitals  
3.3 Financing  
3.4 Personnel  
3.5 Waiting Times  
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3.6 Freedom of Movement Speaks to the ability to move freely between 
the healthcare services of different regions 
4. Regions Speaks to the Italian Regions in general 
5. Cities Speaks to the Italian cities/municipalities 
6. Culture  
7. Vaccinations  
8. SIMM Italian Society of Leadership and 
Management in Medicine – immensely strong 
organization that influences policy 
9. Immigration  
9.1 Problems  
9.2 Healthcare  
9.3 Legal vs Undocumented Speaks to the different types of immigrants 
and the rights they have 
9.4 Regions  
9.5 Federal  
10. Welfare Type Refers to welfare chauvinism, liberal 
chauvinism, etc. 
11. Out group Any group deemed as being “excluded” 
12. Party  
12.1 Italian Party System  
12.2 Lega Nord  
12.3 Social Democrats  
12.4 M5S  
12.5 Fratelli d’Italia  
13. Lega Nord  
13.1 Policy  
13.2 Health  
13.3 Support  
13.4 Regionalism  
13.5 Salvini Leader of the Lega since 2013 
15. Corona  
15.1 Leadership  
15.2 Testing  
15.3 Healthcare  
15.4 Hospitals  
15.5 Confusion  
15.6 Communication  
15.7 Personnel  
15.8 Federal Government  





Appendix B: Austrian Parliament 1999 to present 
 
21st National Council 1999-2002 
The 21st National Council election of 1999 was interesting in that the Social Democratic (SPÖ) 
party had significantly more votes than any of the other parties represented within the council. 
This was also the first time that the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) came in 3rd place, beat by the 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) who increased its vote share by 5,02%.  
Initially, coalition talks were held between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, but when the SPÖ 
refused to give the ÖVP the position of finance minister, the coalition talks ceased and the ÖVP 
formed a governmental coalition with the FPÖ in 2000. This marked the first time in Austrian 
history that a populist radical right party (FPÖ) entered into government. Both governmental 
parties had 52 seats in the National Council giving them the majority in Parliament if they 
worked together (104). Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) would become the Chancellor. The fact that 
the SPÖ had more seats (65) than each governmental party individually made the opposition 
somewhat stronger than usual. 
The policies that were relevant during this election period can be summarized as: the FPÖ 
led by, Jörg Haider, increased its anti-foreigner rhetoric, advocated for a freeze on immigration, 
took a stronger stance against crime, wanted a 23% flat income tax rate, opposed the 
enlargement of the EU and more aid for Austrian families with children. The ÖVP was pro EU 
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and NATO and advocated for a free market economic reform while the SPÖ pushed for Austrian 
neutrality and stronger state control over the economy (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). 
 
22nd National Council 2002-2006 
 These elections came a year early due to the breakup of the FPÖ and the vice Chancellor 
of the party Susanne Reiss-Passer stepped down. Shortly after, Parliament voted to dissolve the 
government and new elections were set (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). Because of divisions 
and coup attempts within the FPÖ, the party lost 34 of their seats. This loss benefited the ÖVP 
majority greatly, adding 27 to their 52 seats. The ÖVP decided to continue their governmental 
coalition with the FPÖ surpassing the necessary seat allocation for a coalition by only one seat. 
Whereas the majority in the previous National Council was 104 for the government coalition, it 
slipped to 97 during this period signifying an increase in seats for the opposition. Wolfgang 
Schüssel (ÖVP) continued as Chancellor during this period. 
 The policy analysis for this election period was very interesting as the ÖVP positioned 
themselves very far to the right taking on much of the FPÖs platform. The ÖVPs campaign for 
this election was led against asylum seekers coming into the country for economic reasons (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2013). The SPÖ also repositioned themselves to encompass the neo-liberal 
positions of the former ÖVP, thereby also shifting right in their ideological stance. 
 
23rd National Council 2006-2008 
In 2006, the National Council Election resulted in an unsurprising SPÖ majority (68 
seats) with the ÖVP not too far behind (66 seats). The FPÖ increased their seats by three but 
could no longer be considered as a coalition partner as the total seats (ÖVP and FPÖ) would be 
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under 96. It is interesting to note that there were two far-right parties participating in this election 
period the FPÖ as well as the BZÖ (formed by former FPÖ leader Jörg Haider after having split 
from the FPÖ due to irreconcilable differences in 2005). After three months of negotiations, a 
grand coalition SPÖ/ÖVP was formed in 2007 with Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) as Chancellor of 
Austria. This coalition was shaky from the very beginning disagreeing on everything from health 
policy to taxes and education (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013), thus it was not a big surprise 
that the cooperation was short-lived. 
Chancellor Gusenbauer announced that he would step down as SPÖ leader and soon after 
the ÖVP leader, Wilhelm Molterer, announced that his party would withdraw from the coalition 
government (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). The problem between the two parties began with 
a disagreement over tax reform and escalated when the SPÖ submitted a proposal to offset 
inflation. After much bickering back and forth, the National Council voted unanimously to 
dissolve itself and hold new elections.  
The campaign platforms during this election can be summarized as: The ÖVP continued 
its support for business-friendly tax cuts implemented by Schüssel's government. The SPÖ 
promised to deal with youth unemployment. The FPÖ called for the expulsion of foreigners from 
Austria and the BZÖ also supported an anti-immigration platform (Inter-Parliamentary Union 
2013).  
 
24th National Council 2008-2013 
 The collapse of the coalition government SPÖ/ÖVP in 2008 led to new elections 25 
months before they were actually due. Despite garnering the worst results since WWII, a new 
SPÖ/ÖVP coalition was born with 57/51 seats won respectively (Inter-Parliamentary Union 
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2013) and Werner Faymann (SPÖ) was elected Chancellor of Austria. The FPÖ and the BZÖ 
were able to increase their seats to 34 and 21 and the Green party trailed behind with 20 seats. 
 The policy issues surrounding this election were the following: The SPÖ reintroduced its 
policy project of making the last year of kindergarten compulsory and free of charge. The ÖVP, 
previously opposing that policy in the previous governing period, announced that it would 
support the SPÖ's plan as well as fight abuses of asylum rules. Both far-right parties campaigned 
to end immigration and called for the expulsion of foreigners and asylum-seekers who 
committed crimes. Heinz Christian Strache, head of the FPÖ, criticized the outgoing coalition 
government, calling its members "traitors of the people". While Jörg Haider (BZÖ) promised to 
fight off the "catastrophe of inflation" and provide rent subsidies and free kindergarten (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2013).  
 
25th National Council 2013-2017 
 The 2013 National Council elections resulted in a very similar outcome to the previous 
years. The SPÖ and ÖVP seat shares continued to decrease 52/47, the seats acquired by the FPÖ 
increased to 40, the Greens remained consistent around the mid 20 mark and two new parties 
joined the political spectrum: Frank Stronach and the NEOS. Despite the increased losses, the 
SPÖ and ÖVP decided to form once again with Werner Faymann (SPÖ) elected as Chancellor of 
Austria once more. 
  The promises made during this election period can be summed up as follows: the SPÖ 
promised to create more jobs, adopt tax cuts for low earners and tax increases for "millionaires". 
The ÖVP opposed new taxes and promised to introduce measures to free businesses from red 
tape. The FPÖ campaigned to leave the European Stability Mechanism bailout fund for ailing 
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euro zone members, a voice echoed by the FRANK, which also called for a flat rate tax. The 
NEOS said it would not join a coalition that included the FPÖ, stating that it does not share the 
party's views on Europe and immigration (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2013). 
 
26th National Council 2017-2019 
 The 2017 National Council elections brought about a few changes. The SPÖ was able to 
hold onto its 52 seats while the FPÖ under Strache gained 11 seats resulting in a total of 51 seats 
for the populist party. After having given the ÖVP a new image (the traditional black color of the 
party was changed to turquoise) under Sebastian Kurz, the party increased its share of seats for 
47 to 61. The Green party did not meet the requirements to make it into parliament due to 
internal conflict and the splitting of their party, while the NEOS increased their seat share by 1 
vote. The new party JETZT under Peter Pilz (formally a member of the Green party) took 7 
seats.  
 The SPÖ and the ÖVP did not want to form a coalition together due to strong political 
differences and the past governing difficulties as partners. Thus, the ÖVP decided to work with 
the FPÖ once again and Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) was named Chancellor of Austria with Strache 
(FPÖ) as his Vice Chancellor. 
 While my analysis ends in 2019 as that is when the FPÖ left government, Chancellor 
Kurz formed a new government in 2020 with the Green Party after the country was led by a 
technocratic government for almost one year.   
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Appendix C: Italian Parliament 1996 to Present 
Parliament 2018-Present 
No political party received the necessary majority of 40% to form a majority parliament, 
therefore the two biggest winners, 5SM and the center right block (including the PRR party, 
Lega), had to negotiate a coalition and develop a joint political program (Statsita 2018). Despite 
the fact that no one party held the parliamentary majority, more than 50% of Parliament is now 
made up of populists of both Left and Right orientation. Lengthy and unfruitful negotiations 
between Lega head Matteo Salvini and 5SM Luigi di Maio resulted in a third person nomination 
for Prime Minister of the country. Giuseppe Conte, a lawyer with no political experience and an 
independent political orientation was chosen for the job and given the okay by President 
Mattarella to form a government. Because neither the 5SM or the Lega had the governmental 
majority, one could say their power was relatively evenly distributed considering that typically 
one coalition member has the majority and is thus able to nominate the Prime Minister. 
 
Parliament 2013-2018 
The clear electoral majority was won by the center-left alliance of the Italy Common Good (IBC) 
and the Democratic Party (PD). In second place came the center-right alliance under Berlusconi 
and the anti-establishment 5 Star Movement headed by Beppe Grillo came in third. No political 
majority was found in the Senate resulting in a Grand Coalition between Italy Common Good, 
the center right coalition and the PD. Soon thereafter, Berlusconi withdrew his support from the 
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Grand Coalition and formed his Forza Italia party, leaving the PD to lead the coalition. For the 
year 2013-2014 there was no majority in Parliament as it was shared between the center-right 
and center-left thus resulting, once again, in a neutral, Independent Prime Minister. Between 
2014 and 2018, the center-right parties left the Grand Coalition, thereby leaving the majority to 
the Center Left.  
 
Parliament 2008-2013 
From 2008 until 2011 Berlusconi’s center right coalition had the majority in Parliament and 
subsequently elected Berlusconi as prime Minister (for the 4th time). In 2011, lasting until the 
end of the governmental period in 2013, Berlusconi was removed from power and his entire 




Throughout this period the Social Democratic center left union had the majority and was 
therefore able to elect the Prime Minister, Romano ProdiThe Prodi government was dissolved by 
President Napolitano in 2008 after the Senate gave Prodi a vote of no confidence, which is why 
the general election was called out in 2008. 
 
Parliament 2001-2006 
The center right coalitions led by Silvio Berlusconi won the absolute majority in this election. 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia had become the biggest party in Italian politics during this time 




A snap general election was called in 1996 where the leaders of the center left coalition narrowly 
defeated Berlusconi’s Center Right alliance, thus giving the center left the majority in 
Parliament. An interesting side note is that Umberto Bossi’s Northern League distanced 
themselves from Berlusconi’s center-right coalition and ran alone after having left the Berlusconi 
cabinet in 1994. 
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Appendix D: Hypo Alpe Adria Scandal 
 
Timeline of the scandal taken and adapted from (ORF, 2016): 
1992 è (net worth €1.87 billion) The province of Carinthia brought Grazer Wechselseits 
Versicherung (GraWe) on board as a co-owner of the State Mortgage Bank. Shortly thereafter, 
Wolfgang Kulterer (ÖVP) was made board member of the Bank by governor Zernatto (ÖVP) 
and converted it into a stock corporation. Jörg Haider (FPÖ) criticized Kulterer’s placement 
because Kulterer came from the Raiffeisenbank (ÖVP controlled). Kulterer expanded the banks 
presences into the Balkan countries wherein shareholdings are bought, and bank subsidiaries are 
created. 
2005 è (banks net worth €24.2 billion) 
2006 è Kulterer is put under pressure and German investor Tilo Berlin (ÖVP) joins with 4,5% 
through the investment of €125 million from “wealthy private individuals”. In March, expensive 
swap losses are uncovered and the balance sheet for 2004 has to recalculated. It comes up 
negative. The Financial Market Authority reports the entire management board for falsifying 
accounts. Kulterer steps down and is replaced by Siegfried Grigg (party unknown), but Kulterer 
continues to pull strings in the background.  
2007 è GraWe announces that it will sell its shares to Tilo Berlin. In May, the bank is sold for 
€1.62 billion to BayernLB, a deal that was apparently supported by Jörg Haider (FPÖ/BZÖ). 
Tilo Berlin and those associated with him earn €150 million on the deal and he becomes CEO of 
the Hypo. This sale was investigated by the Carinthian state parliament but did not reveal any 
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significant findings. BayernLB holds 50% of the bank’s shares, GraWe 26.45%, the province of 
Carinthia 20%, the Hypo-Alpe-Adria-Employee Foundation 3.33% and Berlin and associates 
.22%. By November, BayernLB had to invest €440 million (and GraWe €160 million) of fresh 
capital into its Carinthian subsidiary for the first time 
2008 è (net worth €42.3 billion). Further invest by BayernLB were made. Kulterer pleads guilty 
of falsifying accounts. Due to the financial crisis BayernLB had to invest another €700 million 
into the Hypo Bank. The bank also received €900 million in participation capital from the 
province of Carinthia as a bank aid package. The Carinthian shares continue to decrease and are 
at 12.42%, meaning that BayernLB owned more than 67%. 
2009 è Tilo Berlin leaves the group and is replaced by banker Franz Pinkl (ÖVP), who 
previously resigned from Österreichische Volksbanken AG (ÖVAG). In April, the bank 
announces a loss of €520 million in 2008. By the fall, house searches take place in Bavaria and 
Carinthia. The Munich public prosecutor's office suspects that BayernLB paid €400 million too 
much for the Hypo. In November, the Hypo Group announced that it would post a loss of “well 
over one billion” in 2009. Thus, the bank needed a new capital injection of around €1.5 billion. 
BayernLB no longer want to be the only company pumping money into the bank and so the 
province of Carinthia demands that the Austrian federal government help. The problem is that 
the capital requirement is estimated at €1.5 to 2 billion euros implying that the balance sheet 
losses are so large that the Hypo fell below the minimum core capital ratio. The state of Carinthia 
demands a second aid package from the federal government. The then Finance Minister Josef 
Pröll (ÖVP) sees the owners as being responsible. Bavaria's governor wants support from the 
federal government in Austria and Germany. By December, Bavaria's Finance Minister Georg 
Fahrenschon publicly calls the purchase of Hypo a "mistake". A day later, the rating agency 
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Moody’s lowers the Hypo rating to "junk status". Negotiations for state aid are continue. 
Bavaria's opposition brings criminal charges against those responsible for Hypo purchases. Tilo 
Berlin is one of them. Initially, Austria's political leaders emphasized that constructive proposals 
from the owners to rescue the Hypo must come before federal aid would be given. Likely 
because a report was released that the Hypo was threatened with risk provisions of €3.1 billion 
over the next five years, Pröll (ÖVP Finance Minister) announces the nationalization of the 
Hypo. The previous owners would provide € 1.05 billion in capital and the Austrian federal 
government would provide up to €450 million. The prosperous internationally active Hypo Alpe 
Adria Bank was symbolically bought by the Republic of Austria for €3. 
2011 è (net losses of €1.6 billion) arrests begin. 
 
Interviewee 1.3 Politician describes the scandal and the FPÖs involvement as follows: 
Take the Hypo, that is the biggest lie that ever circulated in Carinthia. 
Carinthia never took on a guarantee (Bürgschaft) for the HYPO, this is a 
fallacy. Carinthia was the deficiency guarantor. Very important. No 
liability, no direct liability assumed, rather deficiency guarantor. That 
means that via the Carinthian Landesholding Gesetz that when HYPO 
goes into bankruptcy the court orders a liquidator (massenverwalter). The 
liquidator leads the company and looks to see what liabilities he has. The 
first liability that the HYPO Kärnten has is the mutual cross-guarantee 
system of the Landeshypothekenbanken just like the Raiffeisen provincial 
banks has the Raiffeisen central bank as cross-guarantee. There they have 
the bond institute (Pfandbriefanstalt) all the provincial HYPOs are a part 
of this and these provincial HYPOs would have had to send the liquidator 
700-800 million € right away. And no one has to know that this was the 
reason why the federal government got involved. The HYPO upper 
Austria, the HYPO Salzburg and the HYPO Steiermark make up 60% of 
all HYPO revenue and these three banks are predominately under the 
ownership of the Raiffeisen (ÖVP). That means of the 700-800 million €, 
Raifeissen would have had direct damages up to 500 – 600 million €. That 
is the reason why Mr. Pröll (ÖVP Finance Minister at the time) initiated 
an emergency nationalisaton (Notverstaatlichung). I handed in a 
notification because of this to the public persecutors office that I find this 
to be a biggest injustice. The liquidator, if he would have claimed these 
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guarantees, would have then phased-out the HYPO and when he sold the 
last pencil then he could have determine the damages, if there are any.  
In the end it looks like we might even get something out of this whole thing 
because right now no one is talking about 32 billion anymore, now its only  
9 billion. 
And when the liquidator sold the last pencil he would have said now we 
have damages priced at, I don’t know, €5 billion, €8 billion, then he would 
have had the deficiency guarantor (ausfallsbürge) Land Kärnten, then he 
would have called the governor and then if I would have been governor, I 
would have told the liquidator: Yes, I am your deficiency guarantor, but 
you see in the Landesholding, it says: in the case that the deficiency 
guarantor should ever be used, the owner of the bank is liable for the 
damages. This would have first led to the Freistaat Bayern and then the 
Republic of Austria. So, if this day came and I was governor I would say, 
yes you are right I am going to call the chancellor of Austria. I would have 
told him I have 5 billion to pay, you have to pay the damages anyways, 
don’t you want to send the money right away? 
 
Upon asking the interviewee why the case was not presented as described, the interviewee 
answered: 
Because Mr. Pröll and the ÖVP had two interests: 1) to spare the 
Raiffeisen from paying the 5-6 million and 2) to make Haider and his FPÖ 
responsible for something for eternity. In fact the SPÖ used the following 
argument for years: “What do you want the FPÖ in government for? Do 
you want to make a Carinthia out of it?” This was the most beautiful 
argument for them against the FPÖ.  
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Appendix E: Interviews 
 
Austria: 









1.1 Health Expert / Official 22.08 18 Carinthia Austria  
1.2 Political Scientist 18.07.19 Carinthia Austria  
1.3 Politician 23.08.19 Carinthia Austria  
1.4 Politician 31.08.19 Carinthia Austria  
1.5 Politician 16.09.19 Carinthia Austria  
1.6 Health and Welfare Expert 11.10.19 Austria   
1.7 Health Expert / Official 20.10.19 Austria   
1.8 Politician 21.02.20 Burgenland Austria  
1.9 Politician 09.06.20 Burgenland   
1.10 Public Health Expert 16.07.20 Austria   
1.11 Public Health Expert 16.07.20 Austria   
1.12 Public Health Expert 16.07.20 Austria   
1.13 Health Expert 04.09.20 Vienna Austria  
1.14 Health Economics Expert & Advisor 5.10.20 Austria   
1.15 Politician 21.10.20 Burgenland Austria Corona 
1.16 Health Expert / Official 28.11.18 Austria Tyrol  














Official for Health, Welfare, Health 
Integration and Sport 19.06.18 Italy Lombardy 
 
2.2 Public Health Expert 19.06.18 Italy Regions  
2.3 Health Expert / Official 21.06.18 Immigrants Regions  
2.4 Migrant Expert 22.06.18 Italy   
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2.5 Public Health Expert 22.06.18 Italy   
2.6 
Medical, Hygiene & Public Health 
Expert 28.11.18 Italy  
 










2.9 Public Health Expert 29.11.18 Italy Regions  
2.10 Health and Public Health Expert 29.11.18 Italy Migrants  
2.11 Political Scientist 18.03.20 Italy   
2.12 Medical Professional 22.03.20 Corona   
2.13 
Political Scientist and Migration 
Expert 27.03.20 Regions  
 
2.14 Political Sociologist 01.04.20 Italy Migrants  
2.15 Health Economist 18.12.20 Italy Regions  
2.16 Political Geographer 13.01.21 Lombardy Veneto Corona 
2.17 
Economic Sociologist and Social 
Policy Expert 20.01.21 Veneto Lombardy Corona 
2.18 
Medical Professional and Public 
Health Expert 08.02.21 Corona Lombardy   
2.19 Medical Professional 08.02.21 Corona Lombardy   
2.20 Public Health Expert 08.02.21 Corona Lombardy   
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Appendix F: Interview Protocol Form 
Interviewee Name: ___________________________  
Interviewee Title: ___________________________  
Interviewee Institution: ___________________________ 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. My name is Michelle Falkenbach 
and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan School of Public Health. This 
interview is part of research being conducted for my dissertation. As my earlier email/phone call 
mentioned, I am interested in learning more how Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties (FPÖ and 
Lega) impact health and health policy in Austria and Italy. You have been selected because you 
have been identified as someone who has much knowledge regarding national and subnational 
policy making. Your expertise will help me better understand if and how the PRR parties 
impacted health and health policy. All of your responses will be kept anonymous, unless you 
give me permission to use your name. Before we start, do you have any questions for me?  
Interviewee Background 
o Can you tell me what your specific role is/was? (politicians) 
o Can you tell me what your area of expertise is exactly and how long you have been 
working in this field? (Political scientists, health experts, researchers, etc.) 
Political Perspective (Federal) 
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o You have been in the federal government for xx years. What can you tell me about 
the health politics of the FPÖ/Lega? 
• Probe: The FPÖ were able to appoint health ministers during their coalition 
with the ÖVP in 2000 and again in 2017? Why? 
• Probe: What was their attitude towards privatization and health? 
• Probe: What was their attitude towards the Austrian welfare state? 
• Probe: What was their attitude towards migrants – legal and illegal? 
 
o Usually, we see the SPÖ controlling the health ministry. What would you say is the 
difference between SPÖ and FPÖ health politics? 
• Probe: How would you say do the health and social policies of the FPÖ 
change when they are in government? 
 
o What ministries are the most important for the FPÖ/Lega? 
• Probe: What influence does the FPÖ/Lega have on health politics? 
 
o How would you classify the FPÖ/Lega’s welfare politics? 
• Probe: Who should benefit? 
• Probe: Would you consider them to be a PRR party? 
 
o What would you say were the differences in governing style between the 
FPÖ/ÖVP/SPÖ/Greens or Lega/PD/FI/Independents? 
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o What was the FPÖ/Lega attitude towards migrants? 
• Probe: How did this influence their politics? 
• Probe: Did the Conservative or Social Democratic Party ever try to take on 
this attitude to steal voters away from the FPÖ/Lega? 
 
Political Perspective (Regional) 
 
o You have been in the regional government for xx years. What can you tell me about 
the health politics of the FPÖ/Lega? 
 
o How does this differ from other provinces/regions? 
• Probe: Social politics? 
• Probe: Health politics? 
• Probe: Why did the FPÖ/Lega make it into regional government in this region 
and not in others? 
 
o What political goals do the FPÖ/Lega follow? 
• Probe: What influence does the FPÖ/Lega have on health politics? 
 
o What is the FPÖ/Lega attitude towards migrants? 
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